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actually admit affection allowed already analysis appear assert believe called certainly cognition colour common sense conceive condition consciousness consequently constitutes contradiction demonstrated direct Disc discriminate distinction doctrine doubt elements equally error evidence example exist experience extension external reality extracts fact faculties feeling figure former give Hamilton hand Hegel hold ideas immediate intuitive Kant knowledge known less light material matter means Meta mind modes nature necessary nervous never non-ego noumenalism object once organism original outer perceive perception perhaps phenomenal phenomenon philosophy position possibility present presentationism primary qualities principles priori probably proper proved question reason reference regards Reid Reid's relation relative remains remark representative resistance sciousness secondary seems seen sensation side sight simple single space stand subjective suppose surely testimony theory things thought tion touch true truth ultimate universal unknown whole wholly
Página 111 - Speaking of the perception of the external world — " We have here a remarkable conflict between two contradictory opinions, wherein all mankind are engaged. On the one side stand all the vulgar, who are unpractised in philosophical researches, and guided by the uncorrupted primary instincts of nature. On the other side, stand all the philosophers, ancient and modern ; every man, without exception, who reflects. In this division, to my great humiliation, I find myself classed with the vulgar.
Página 70 - S57b,sq.) 21. Nay, the Perception proper, accompanying a sensation proper, is not an apprehension, far less a representation, of the external or internal stimulus, or concause, which determines the affection whereof the sensation is the consciousness. —Not the former ; for the stimulus or concause of a sensation is always, in itself, to consciousness unknown. Not the latter; for this would turn Perception into Imagination — reduce it from an immediate, and assertory, and objective, into a mediate,...
Página 113 - In this country in particular, some of those who opposed it to the skeptical conclusions of Hume did not sufficiently counteract the notion which the name might naturally suggest ; they did not emphatically proclaim that it was no appeal to the undeveloped beliefs of the unreflective many ; and they did not inculcate that it presupposed a critical analysis of these beliefs by the philosophers themselves.
Página 119 - Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.
Página 72 - That the notion of space is a necessary condition of thought, and that, as such, it is impossible to derive it from experience, has been cogently demonstrated by Kant...
Página 8 - ... accidentally revealed to us through certain qualities related to our faculties of knowledge, and which qualities, again, we cannot think as unconditioned, irrelative, existent in and of themselves. All that we know is therefore phenomenal — phenomenal of the unknown.
Página 6 - The sum of our knowledge of the connection of mind and body is, therefore, this, — that the mental modifications are dependent on certain corporeal conditions ; but of the nature of these conditions we know nothing.
Página 84 - Thus a perception of the Primary qualities does not, originally and in itself, reveal to us the existence, and qualitative existence, of aught beyond the organism, apprehended by us as extended, figured, divided, &c.
Página 3 - An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is itself presented to observation, may be called a presentative; and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as it were, viewed by the mind face to face, may be called an intuitive cognition. A mediative cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is held up or mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation, may be called a representative cognition.