ed, all on board must necessarily and in- the best articles of every description; glass, | against a heavy head sea in a westerly crockery,plate, linen, and so forth, were pro- gale. In the state in which they had sailvided for the officers' mess at the public cost, and a steward appointed to assist in preparing their table. He now came briefly to notice the points to which the noble Duke had adverted. And, first, that the ship was overcrowded. When it was proposed to take this ship for the purpose, the number to be embarked was not quite accurately known. The number stated by the Horse Guards was 677 officers and men, with the usual proportion of women and children. The Admiral at Sheerness was directed to state what number she could conveniently accommodate; and the answer was 702. At the same time a requisition was made to the Admiralty for the conveyance of further detachments of troops, and the Birkenhead was appointed to carry them. The Admiralty suggested that 100 of the Rifles might be transferred to the Birkenhead, which was declined, the commanding officer of the Rifles preferring that they should all remain together in the Megara, which afforded due accommodation to the entire number. With respect to the Ordnance stores which were supposed to have encumbered the vessel so much, it was quite true that a requisition had been made to the Admiralty for the embarkation of certain tents and rifle ammunition, which no doubt were embarked; nor could it be supposed the troops were to be sent on service unprovided with what was necessary to enable them to take the field. With regard to the discomfort and inconvenience justly complained of on the passage to Plymouth, this was solely attributable to the misconduct of the master who had charge of the vessel, and who for certain reasons of his own was determined to touch at that port; which, though unknown to the Admiralty, was so well known in some quarters, that letters were waiting for the ship at Plymouth, where the Admiralty had no notion she would go. The troops were embarked on the 2nd January, the vessel having arrived at Dover on the 1st. On the 2nd, after the embarkation, she immediately sailed for the Downs. It was quite true, as the noble Duke had stated, that some inconvenience arose from the circumstance of the arm-racks being fitted for muskets, and not for rifles; which, however, might have been rectified by the artificer on board. The steamer sailed in very bad weather; she left the Downs on the morning of the 3rd, and arrived at Plymouth, after a severe passage, in which she was forced VOL. CXIX. [THIRD SERIES.] LORD COLCHESTER said, he had taken some pains to inquire into this subject, and certainly had learned in well-informed quarters that the Megara was well adapted for the purpose of a troop ship. It was true, as the noble Lord had stated, that no ship could sail in bad weather, especially with soldiers unaccustomed to the sea, without some discomfort being caused; but, then, this might have been foreseen, and he had never heard it explained why Dover should have been chosen for the place of embarkation; he supposed it was for the purpose of saving the Government a trifling expense in moving the regiment by rail to a harbour where it could have been embarked in smooth water. The noble Earl had not answered two points. First, as to the amount of baggage and ordnance stores which had been conveyed. This was material; for, although the Admiralty might have been right in their estimate as to the number of men the vessel would carry when nothing else was on board, it made all the difference if a large quantity of Ordnance stores were on board, taking up the space required for the accommodation of the troops. Again, as to the want of due accommodation. Some years ago he (Lord Colchester) was a lieutenant on board a frigate, in which a battalion of these very troops, the Rifles, had embarked for Scotland; and he well remembered that the only thing the troops seemed to care about when they got on board was their rifles. So soon as they had placed their weapons in a proper manner they appeared quite satisfied, and comparatively careless about their own personal accommodation; and he had no doubt that in the present instance the discontent of the troops on account of their T own personal discomfort had been very the germs of which had been laid during much increased by the inconvenience they the period of their passage-fully manihad found in respect to their rifles. It fested itself. If it appeared that the was true that the racks had been altered; troops maintained their health after their but as the Admiralty had forgotten to send arrival at the Cape, then the Admiralty a pattern of the rifle, though altered they and other authorities might be absolved were not amended. The answer of the from blame; but if it should be found that noble Earl had not been so satisfactory the regiment landed in a state of ineffias he could have desired. He (Lord ciency, or that within a very short time Colchester) would call their attention to after landing it became inefficient, then, another point-as to the class of officers without any regard to the subject of bagto whom the command of vessels employ-gage, or rifles, or anything else, he would ed as troop ships was now committed. not hesitate to say that the authorities Formerly those vessels were given to were in error as to the state in which they officers who held the rank of Commander sent the regiment afloat. It was of inin the Navy-equal in rank with the field finitely more importance that 400 men officers of a regiment. This secured him should be landed in a state of efficiency that proper degree of authority and respect than that 600 should be landed with the which it was necessary he should have in germs of disease in them, and in a state of such cases, and which he could not have inefficiency. The importance of this subwhen he was only a master, inferior in ject had been brought under his notice in rank to the commanding officers of the connexion with the expedition to China. regiment embarked. It was not likely The 98th Regiment was placed on board that under such circumstances he should ship for transport to China, together with have that authority and weight which it a number of recruits for other regiments; was desirable he should have on board the and, although the health of the troops was vessel. And he believed that on this ac- maintained during the passage, the regicount, in many cases, considerable difficulty ment fell to pieces as soon as it was had followed. He thought that the old landed, and was for many months unable practice should be resorted to of having to take the field. His conviction was, troop ships commanded by officers of the that, with a view to the transport of troops rank of Commander. efficiently, ample room should be afforded them. He thought also, that out of consideration for the comfort of the troops, they ought not to be sent to sea so soon after embarkation, but that a lapse of, say 48 hours, should be allowed between embarkation and sailing. The EARL of MINTO said, as to the Ordnance stores they were only the tents and ammunition attached to the regiment. He agreed with the noble Lord that it was better these transport vessels should be commanded by officers of higher rank than that of master. It had been usual to give these vessels to Commanders, and the change had arisen only from the desire to find more accommodation for the troops embarked; as a Commander carried with him lieutenants and other officers, who all took up room. He believed, however, that the Admiralty were now satisfied that the experiment had failed, and that in future Commanders would be employed. The EARL of MINTO said, the troops on board the Megara were not unduly crowded; for if they were so, the officers were given the option of removing 100 of their number to another ship, and had declined to do so. The EARL of ELLENBOROUGH thought the ship must have been overcrowded. The Megara was stated to be a vessel of 1,300 tons. [The Earl of MINTO: 1,400 tons.] They must, then, deduct from that the tonnage appropriated to machinery. There were on board upwards of 700 troops, and a crew of 200— altogether about 900 persons; so that the ship must have been greatly overcrowded. He certainly would not venture to send troops to the Cape without allowing at least one ton and a half, if not more nearly two tons, to every man on board. The EARL of ELLENBOROUGH would recommend the noble Duke (the Duke of Montrose) to move for the production of the doctor's report, which would afford the true test of the conduct of the Admiralty, and of all the officers concerned; for it would then be seen whether the troops maintained their health and efficiency, not merely up to the time of their arrival, but for three or four weeks afterwards. It was often not until after the arrival of The EARL of MINTO said, that, in antroops at their destination that sickness-swer to inquiries as to how many men the Lord Colchester Megara would accommodate conveniently, | mons threw out the Bill. He thought it the report of the naval authorities at but just to that late noble and learned Sheerness was about 702. The Admi- Lord to make this observation. ralty, as he had said, offered to transfer 100 men from the Megara to the Birkenhead. The EARL of ELLENBOROUGH would beg, then, at once to move for a return of the number of men, women, and children embarked on board Her Majesty's steamer Megæra, and also for a return of the tonnage of that ship, deducting the tonnage of the machinery. EARL GREY said, there could be no objection to the return. He agreed with the noble Earl that the real test on this subject would be the state in which the regiment arrived; and he was glad to inform the noble Earl that hitherto every regiment sent out had arrived at the Cape in such a state of efficiency that the troops had been enabled to march straight from the transports to take part in the operations in progress. The LORD CHANCELLOR confirmed the statement of the noble and learned Lord, observing that Lord Cottenham had desired the suppression of the office. It was also but justice to the Gentleman who had for many years held the office of Secretary of Bankrupts to state that he had long since intimated his readiness to resign the appointment. Bill read 3a: Amendment made; Bill passed. House adjourned till To-morrow. HOUSE OF COMMONS, Monday, February 16, 1852. NEW MEMBER SWORN.-Hon. Wm. LOCAL MILITIA. Order for Committee read; paragraphs in Queen's Speech at the opening of the Session read, as follow: "Gentlemen of the House of Commons, "I have ordered Estimates of the Expenses of the current year to be laid before you. The DUKE of NORTHUMBERLAND said, that the commanders of transports, in addition to their pay as masters in the Navy, had a per centage upon the provisions consumed. Therefore, although it was the duty of an officer to make his voyage in the shortest possible time, it was to the advantage of the master of a transport to make his passage long. The master, he believed, also derived a pecuniary advantage from going to the cheapest market for provisions. Now, if anything happened to a ship in the Downs, "Where any increase has been made in the the master would, most naturally, put into Estimates of the present over the past year, such Portsmouth; but if there was an advan- explanations will be given as will, I trust, satisfy tage in seeking a cheaper market at Ply-you that such increase is consistent with a steady mouth, an officer might be tempted to go adherence to a pacific policy and with the dictates there. He thought it was not right to of a wise economy." place officers in such a situation as this, when their duties and their interests were at variance. "I rely with confidence on your loyalty and zeal to make adequate provision for the Public Service. MR. HUME objected to going into Committee without some reasons being stated. The Motion agreed to: Returns ordered. There had been no ballot for the militia SECRETARY OF BANKRUPTS' OFFICE ABOLITION BILL. for many years, and he should object altogether to the industrious classes being disturbed now for such a purpose, and peace The LORD CHANCELLOR moved the able and quiet habits interfered with by a Third Reading of this Bill. LORD BROUGHAM was understood to say a measure of a somewhat similar nature had been previously introduced, which had been characterised elsewhere as a job for the purpose of increasing patronage, though its object was to lop off a payment of 3,000l. a year, which would have been saved to the public. That measure was called a job of Lord Cottenham's, and the House of Com measure most unequal in its pressure, and for which no reason was given. LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I think it will be more convenient to discuss the subject in Committee, where Members may ask questions and receive explanations, and make remarks upon the matter, without being fettered by some of the rules of debate in a sitting of the House. MR. REYNOLDS wished to know whe ther the intended measure was confined to | bound to defend Portugal against any England? LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I will explain the measure at length in Committee. House in Committee. enemy that might attack that country; an obligation which was avowed by the whole House in 1826, and Mr. Canning called upon the House to fulfil that obligation. But, in the fourth place, we are LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, in 1848 I made a statement to the House with re-connected, and have been for more than spect to the defences of this country, and in the course of my statement, I said I thought it would be desirable to form a foundation for a permanent militia force, which might be of great service in case of invasion. Unfortunately, that proposition of mine, and other propositions with respect to the naval and military service, were coupled with a proposal for increased taxation, which became very unpalatable to the House and to the country, and the Government did not persevere in the proposal. I recall it to recollection now, chiefly for the purpose of showing that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, without any pressure of extraordinary circumstances, it was wise to make provision for the defence of the country. At the time at which I then addressed the House Louis Philippe was upon the throne of France; there was no apparent revolution at hand; the disposition of that King was known to be pacific; his counsels were moderate and wise. At that time I thought it would be advisable to make permanent provision for the defences of the country; and I now renew the proposition, with the hope that the House and the country will take the same view which Her Majesty's Government take, that it would be wise to have a permanent force of militia. When I say that, it is not that I mean to depart in any respect from the assurances which were given in Her Majesty's Speech, that the relations of this country with foreign Powers were of a friendly nature, and that there was nothing apparently at hand to disturb those relations; but at the same time I think it never can be assumed that a country in the position in which this country is can be secure from the danger of war. In the first place, we may have some aggression upon some of our possessions, or even upon our own country. In the next place, it is possible that we may have some dispute with respect to the rights of our subjects, or injury supposed to be inflicted upon them by subjects of other countries. In the third place, we are bound by treaty with respect to several of the countries of Europe to defend them, if attacked. [An Hon. MEMBER: No.] Yes; I will only mention one instance; we are a century, with the general system of Europe; and any territorial increase of one Power, any aggrandisement which disturbs the general balance of power in Europe, although it might not immediately lead to war, could not be matter of indifference to this country, and would, no doubt, be the subject of conference, and might ultimately, if that balance were seriously threatened, lead to hostilities. These are reasons, Sir, why we cannot believe ourselves altogether safe from the danger of war. But there is another question which has arisen of late years, and which has been so much the topic of discussion in books and pamphlets, in conversation and in letters, in newspapers, both on this and the other side of the Channel, that it will be quite unnecessary for me to dilate upon it, or do more than mention the subject. It is, that since the invention of steam navigation this country can no longer be considered so safe as it formerly was considered, when it was necessary for an enemy to obtain the command of the Channel, and even to be favoured by the winds and waves, in order to effect any invasion, or even to inflict the most petty insult upon this country. The changes introduced by steam navigation are very great. What would be their extent in ease of war, I believe no man can safely predict; but this, at least, is obvious, that any foreign force attempting to land on any part of this coast would no longer have the same difficulties to contend with which other proposed invaders of England in former days had to contemplate. Now, with that change of circumstances we must couple this fact-which is likewise one universally acknowledged that this country is generally averse to large military establishments; that we never have been able under any Government, Whig or Tory, to endure the notion of very large military establishments, and the maintaining a large standing army, and have rather kept our establishments very far indeed below those of other countries. But it must likewise be considered that in former times, and, indeed, from the time of the Seven Years' War, I believe, to the last peace, it was generally reckoned wise as well as a force constitutional to maintain a considerable subject of training the men to the use of force of militia, which could be, as it those muskets, and inquiries have been were, a reserve for the general army, and made, and boards of officers have sat, as upon which the country might rely from well with respect to the choice of the time to time for a certain number of men musket that shall prove the best arm of who had been trained to the use of arms. service, as the weight of balls to be used, As things at present stand-as they have and the practice of soldiers in the use of stood now for many years-we have no the weapon. These matters have been support of that kind, no such force of subject of much consideration, and the militia. It is to that subject I particu- noble Duke at the head of the Army unlarly wish to call the attention of the ceasingly turns his attention to this matter, House. I shall say a few words, and only with a view that whatever military force a few, with regard to our military force. we have be in the highest degree of effi With respect to our naval force I shall not ciency. I now come, then, to the subject make any observations at present, think- of a militia; and we have to consider, in ing it much better that my right hon. the first place, whether it would be adFriend the First Lord of the Admiralty visable to establish a militia on the plan of should state his views upon that subject the old militia, or whether it would be at length when the naval estimates shall better to establish one on the plan of come under consideration. With respect the local militia. Now, with regard to to our military force, I should say that the the regular militia, as it was constituted addition we propose to make to our regular in the last war, I should say that it Army in the present year is very small, differed little from the regular Army; amounting to 4,000 men of the line, and but, at the same time, it was 1,000 for the artillery, in all rather a less number of men than have been despatched to the Cape since the commencement of hostilities in that colony. But I think it is of importance to state, first, the general policy which we hold with respect to our military force in the colonies, and, next, to advert to the views of the Commander-in-Chief with respect to our present armaments. With regard to the former subject, I should say that there has been for some time past a policy rather to diminish the military force in our colonies, and rely upon the people of the colonies themselves to furnish such force as may be necessary to preserve internal tranquillity, and keeping only a very small force of our regular Army there. We have acted in pursuance of that policy in more than one instance; and I should say generally I think it is better, with respect to the force we maintain in our colonies, to have it in positions in which a considerable number can be collected, rather than dispersed, as has been in former years, over all our colonies, thus leaving many of them open to attack, and without any adequate force to protect them. With regard to the second topic I have mentioned, I should say that the Commander-in-Chief and the Master-General of the Ordnance have for some time turned their attention to the improved arms which have been introduced, the muskets, which it is well known have a much longer range than those formerly in use; they have likewise considered the which the Government was restricted from using out of the United Kingdom. I own I think, if we were to propose such a force at present, there would, in the first place, be a very great objection to any compulsory service in such a force, considering it as a permanent military force; and if it were to be restricted (as it would) to service in the United Kingdom, it would be better, in case of hostilities, to have a large increase of the military force. But what I have now to propose is a force of a very different description. It is a force intended to be embodied for very limited service, employed generally in their own counties, and only called out for a small portion of the year. It appears to me, that if, at the breaking out of war, you had no force of this kind, it would take a very considerable time before you could collect and organise a sufficient number of recruits for your Army, and during that time you would have but a very limited and insufficient force; and, considering that some of your posts abroad, such as Malta, and Gibraltar, and others, would ask for an increased force, it would be impossible to have a sufficient number of men to supply them. But, if you can have a considerable number of men who have been partly trained, they would be immediately available, and for a certain time they would be upon the coast and ready to meet invasion, while at the same time the process of recruiting was going on and the increase of your regular Army; |