France followed our example, called her cers; we had at that time 101 line-ofsteamers from the Mediterranean, and col- battle ships in commission, and these offilected her force in the northern ports. He cers were found amply sufficient to carry (Sir F. Baring) did not think we should on all the operations in the Navy. If they have added one jot to our security by hav-looked at the present list-though he knew ing a large force in the Channel. He had thought it right to say this; but, as for the attacks out of doors upon the Board of Admiralty, it was not worth while to enter upon the defence now: the time was gone by when it would have been of the slightest value. He had no doubt those who had succeeded to that department had the utmost zeal for the service. He (Sir F. Baring) had been able to reduce the Estimates by 1,500,000l.; there were those who thought still more reduction could be made, and he hoped it could, but he was not so sanguine as to believe that the new Board would be able to make the same statement. that alterations had been made in the right The CAPTAIN SCOBELL said, it appeared to him that some of the observations which had been made as to the late Board of Admiralty were not very true, though he believed there had been some abuses in the management of the dockyards, and considerable want of judgment in building ships. It was not his intention, however, to enter into those matters then. His object was to make a few practical observations to the Committee. The Estimates before the Committee were made up by the late Board of Admiralty, and accepted by the present Board of Admiralty. There could be no dispute about that. The ques- of the list, and he found there were in tion, then, to be considered was, how they the Navy between 800 and 900 mates, were to spend their money in future. They midshipmen, and cadets. A great fault had been congratulated upon having a at the Admiralty was, that there were naval officer at the head of the Admiralty. While giving every credit for good intentions to the present head of the Admiralty, he must say that he would agree much more in those congratulations if the head of the Admiralty were not a Parliamentary or political man, and if the appointments and promotions in the Navy were not dispensed-not by the fault of the head of the Admiralty, but by the fault of the system-among those who have interest in preference, in many cases at least, to those who possess merit. The next subject he wished to call the attention of the Committee to was, how the list of officers stands as to efficiency; and for that purpose he would first call the attention of the Committee as to how the Navy List stood in 1795. We had then 91 admirals, 420 captains, 197 commanders, and 1,395 lieutenants, making 2,103 offi so many all seeking for promotion, and that three-fourths of the officers in Her Majesty's Navy lived and died in the rank of lieutenants, and more than half the number of commanders never attained a higher rank. Now, if the First Lord of the Admiralty wanted to choose seventy postcaptains, he had 350 to choose from, and he can keep back the promotion of any man he pleases from the rank of an active admiral. These things, he believed, would never be perfectly cured till the Navy was emancipated from political shackles, and placed, as the Army is, under a chief who will not be compelled to resign office at every change of Ministry. Looking to what may be practically done to sustain the efficiency of the Navy, he was of opinion that our ships are paid off too frequently. He believed the custom was to pay ships of the Navy off every three years, or the perhaps they might serve four years, if required for some special service. It was only last January that they paid off the Ganges of 80 guns, the Portland of 44 guns, the Champion of 26 guns, and the Gorgon, a 10 gun steamer-in all 160 guns, and a complement of 1,200 men-in the course of one month, and the men were sent adrift. He also wished to know what was to prevent their enlisting seamen for a longer period than at present-for five, or seven, or fourteen years, as they enlist soldiers? They would then have men who would not be constantly leaving the Navy. Look at the Rodney. She was at that moment in Portsmouth harbour, and though she was commissioned last August, she had not been to sea yet. What was to prevent their taking men for a longer period of service? He would let the period extend to fourteen years, and he would take no man for less than five years, and he would pay them some bounty for seven or ten or fourteen years' service, as the marines are paid. The first year was taken up in teaching the men. The second year they begin to shake themselves into their places, and the third year they were fit to fight any ship that ever floated; and then it was that the sailor was brought home-the admiral reviewed the crew, said the ship was in beautiful order, and the crew in fine condition, and then the ship was dismantled, and the men paid off. He thought the proposed reserve ought to consist of at least 10,000 men, that was to say 8,000 seamen and 2,000 petty officers, and out of that number they could easily get 6,000 or 7,000 men when they were actually wanted. A great deal had been said about the vulnerability of this kingdom to invasion. He had lately stated to the House his general opinion upon that subject. His opinion was, that though it would be wise to make some provision at home, yet they need not be frightened as long as they could keep a good Navy afloat. They should not only have the ships ready, but they should have the men on board, and the ships out cruising, not lying in port, but practising so as to be ready to meet the enemy, if an enemy should come. From a calculation he had made, he found that 8,000 officers, seamen, and marines would be sufficient to man three line-of-battle ships fitted with screws; five screw frigates, from 50 to 24 guns each; six large class steam frigates, ten steam sloops, together twenty-four steamers of various sizes, ptain Scobell If in all mounting 528 guns, and manned by 8,000 officers, seamen, and marines. they had that large force, not in their ports, not much at anchor, not smoking the coast with their coal, but exercising the vessels under canvass, they would be sufficiently prepared for any emergency. He might be asked where he would get the 8,000 seamen that would be required to man these ships. In answer to that he would suggest that there was scarcely a foreign station that might not spare one or more ships of the squadron-he did not mean the Mediterranean only, but North and South America and the coast of Africa, and all other stations The other day he saw in the newspapers that there were five English men-of-war at Rio Janeiro at anchor at one time; and they might depend upon it that an admiral will always keep as many ships out on a foreign station as he can. A distinguished Member of that House had recently observed - he meant the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston)-that this country had the smallest Army of any principal nation in Europe. There was a very good reason for that. It was because England is an island; they all knew if she was joined to the Continent she would have to keep up a large Army to protect herself from the encroachments of her neighbours; but, situated as we are, he thought it morally impossible an enemy could land on our coast. In the first place, it would take a long time for a force to embark. It was true that the army of Sir John Moore, where he was present, embarked in a single night. But how was that accomplished? Why, as the boats from the ships approached the shore the men leaped into them anyhow, so that there were not in any boat three men belonging to the same regiment, and they had neither horses nor stores to embark— for the horses were shot, and the stores abandoned. But no invading force could be embarked in that manner. He remembered when he was employed in blockading Boulogne, where the invading army of Napoleon was to have been embarked, and his opinion was that the country was more vulnerable then than it was now the agency of steam had done so much to strengthen it; for calms and fogs would have assisted the enemy then much more than they could do now. If they were now to be brought over in large steamers or line-of-battle ships, they must be landed in boats at a distance from the shore; and then it was to be remembered that every man of them | timates of Sir Robert Peel's Government would be as sick as a dog. They might were so large was, that between 1841, depend upon it that an invading force, when they entered office, and 1846, when either in coming across or in landing, would they retired, no fewer than seventy-two be cut to pieces in detail, if there were but steamers of 28,000 horse-power and an efficient force at hand. Another re- 74,000 tons burden, had been built, equal commendation he would make would be to thirty sail of the line. He knew the that at least half the men employed in Government had been accused of building the Navy should be ablebodied seamen. steamers in a panic, and therefore of buildThe difference in expense would be only ing them badly. Now, if time had per3d. per day, and the provisions and al- mitted, perhaps they might have made exlowances the same, while in case of a periments, and thus saved some faults; but war these able seamen could be drafted then they would have been neglecting a into the new ships, and their places still higher duty, the safety of our own taken by ordinary seamen and lands- shores. But though they had now a larger men. With regard to assembling more naval force than France possessed, both men-of-war at home, he conceived that in steamers and sailing vessels, yet there with the advantage of steam and the elec- were circumstances which made the smaller tric telegraph, England should be more the naval force of France more available for head quarters of the Navy, because, if invasion than our large naval force was for necessary, additional aid could be imme-defence the main circumstance being, diately despatched to any foreign station. that we had a vast colonial empire to deIf he added a remark, not very complimentary to the other branch of the service, it should be jocularly; but the alarm about invasion was chiefly expressed by soldiers, from the illustrious Duke downwards. Sir Francis Head was a soldier, and so was the Swiss Colonel," and many of them had by their writings, helped to raise and keep up the alarm. And the reason was plain-they could not comprehend the capabilities of resistance that might be made on the ocean, and especially the resources that had been put into their hands by the power of steam. For example, he had never known a marine officer, however long he might have been at sea, who had learned to steer or manage a boat. If this was the case in small matters, it might be supposed how ill-informed they were as to matters that were more im-ence in the service, and were perfectly portant. His opinion upon the whole was, that our ships should be collected more at home, for the Colonies were well defended with forts and batteries, but that was not the case with Great Britain. MR. CORRY said, he agreed with the right hon. Baronet (Sir F. Baring) that our Navy was never in a better condition than at the present moment, whether it regarded our ships or stores; but he must remind the Committee that it was through the effort of Sir Robert Peel's Government to build a steam fleet that they now possessed a reserve of steamers in a state of efficiency for sea at a moment's warning. The right hon. Baronet had taken credit for having reduced the Estimates by 1,500,000l. But the reason why the Es fend, and an enormous commercial interest to guard in every sea, so that the greater portion of our navy was necessarily out of our reach; while France, which had no such interests to protect, had its navy chiefly at home. It was therefore important that we should always have the means of manning our reserve ships, and sending them to sea at the shortest notice, in the event of a war. The French had a great advantage in manning their fleet, for all French seamen were liable to be called upon to serve four years in their navy, and as they hardly ever volunteered to serve again, he was informed that there were at the present moment in the maritime districts of France 23,000 seamen liable to be called up to serve on board of the navy, who had already had four years' experi conversant with naval discipline. Now there were on the last registry of the English seamen 210,000 names; but few of these men had any knowledge of naval gunnery, or were acquainted with the restraints of discipline on board a man-ofwar. As one means of remedying that defect, he would suggest that the reserve marines who were now trained to naval gunnery should be increased. The number of marines serving ashore was 5,300, which was the number at the time he was in office; but he had ascertained then, and he had no reason to suppose it was different now, that no more than 3,000 of these were available for embarkation. As it would require 6,000 marines to man the reserve Navy if it were required, he would suggest that the marine force should be increased | tioned, representing that captains had reby 3,000 men. The expense of this in- fused accommodation where it could be crease would not be more than 100,000l. a given. He would suggest to his hon. year. He was not sanguine about the suc- Friend (Mr. Stafford) the expediency of cess of the particular plan proposed for the submitting the case to the noble Duke at reserve of seamen, though he thought the the head of the Admiralty. Our Navy late Board deserved every credit for having was lately engaged in a bloody scene at proposed it. He doubted if the men would Lagos. The loss was greater than that be found willing to enter upon the plan which was usually incurred in a naval proposed, and therefore he would recom- action; and in his report to the Admimend the Members of the present Board to ralty the commanding officer, speaking consider a very able scheme for the forma- of the surgeons and assistant surgeons, tion of a coast militia, which was addressed saidby Sir Thomas Hastings to the Board of Admiralty in 1846. The plan was to assemble 15,000 men once a year, and train them in gunnery and other naval exercises. If that plan were adopted, he thought they would have a most efficient naval re serve. Penelope, off Lagos, Jan. 2. 'Nothing could exceed the devotion of the officers of the medical staff to the exigencies of the day-one surgeon, five assistant surgeons. Whenever a man was struck in the boats a medical man was immediately at his side, setting their own lives at nought when compared with the wants of their brave companions in arms." The assistant surgeons ought to have those comforts to which their position and education entitled them. Allusion had been made mates effected by the right hon. Gentletleman lately at the head of the Board of Admiralty. He did not give the right hon. Gentleman credit for it; he thought it an injury. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say that he hoped the noble Duke at the head of the Admiralty would effect still further reductions; but if that course were pursued, what dependence in the event of an attempted invasion could be placed on the Navy? The more efficient it was made, the more secure would the country be against attack. It was pleasing to hear that there was a reserve of steam vessels ready to be equipped within twenty-four hours in the event of a declaration of war, and satisfactory to recollect that the mercantile steam marine was much greater than in France; where France could fit out one steamer from its mercantile marine, we could fit out ten. If in the event of a war letters of marque were given to some of our steamers, and the steamers were well armed, there would not be a trading vessel of a nation at war with this country to be seen three months after the declaration of war. CAPTAIN BOLDERO wished to call the attention of his hon. Friend the Secretary for the Admiralty to a Resolution which had been passed by that House, declaring its opinion that better accommodation to a reduction of 1,500,000l. in the Estishould be provided for assistant surgeons throughout the Navy. He might assert without fear of contradiction that the Resolution had not been carried out in that spirit of justice in which it was the intention of the House that it should be carried out. He readily admitted that the position of assistant surgeons had been very much improved since the passing of that Resolution. But an order had been promulgated which had acted most injuriously on assistant surgeons, and which was an insult to the whole medical profession. It was declared in that order that no young man entering the Navy as an assistant surgeon should receive cabin accommodation till he had passed through a professional service of three years. At the age which those gentlemen who were of superior and scientific education had attained when they entered the service, they were compelled to associate in the cockpit with boys for for three years before they were thought fit to be placed in the society of lieutenants of the Navy and lieutenants of marines. It was possible a lieutenant of marines seventeen years of age, might be embarked in a line-of-battle ship; and if he were fit to receive a cabin, an assistant surgeon should Another defect in that order was, that it was not sufficiently peremptory in requiring captains to give the accommodation required. He did not say they wilfully evaded it. He had received letters from all parts where our ships were sta be so. Mr. Corry CAPTAIN HARRIS had on former Sessions called attention to the manning of the Navy. He had had interviews with Lord Auckland and other Lords of the Admiralty on the subject, and had put the case to them whether it would be possible to resort to impressment in the event of war. To many old officers with whom he had been they would find their seamen running to America in the event of a war. He was persuaded the country would approve of this abrogation of the right to press, and assuming the principle that every one was What would be the re-bound to serve the State in the event of a war, enable Parliament to pass a legal compulsory statute, so that the service would not be injured by it. Notwithstanding some complaints that had been urged, the system of registration had workuncommonly well; and he was satisfied it would ultimately prove of great value to the marine of the empire. in communication, and who differed with sult of attempting it? The Executive would SIR FRANCIS BARING said, he wished to say a few words on the important subject of the manning of the Royal Navy, which was one of the most difficult questions they could have to consider in endeavouring to provide for the efficiency of our naval force. They might have ships in abundance; and yet if they wanted men the country would not be safe. The late Board of Admiralty had, after much deliberation, devised a plan which they thought would, to a certain extent, meet the difficulty, and which would at any rate serve as an experiment. He could not himself feel very sanguine as to the efficiency of that plan until it should have been fairly tried. He had heard it stated that it was difficult to understand the scheme; but he should say that the present Board of Admiralty ought either to take it up fairly or to abandon it altogether. There was no conceivable scheme with respect to which differences of opinion would not prevail among naval officers; and any scheme which was not known to have the support of influential parties at the Admiralty could not succeed. It was most important that the first step in any plan should be taken efficiently if it were to be taken at all; and he repeated that he hoped the new Board of Admiralty would either abandon the scheme of the naval reserve, or would seriously endeavour to carry it into successful operation. There was another point upon which he wished to offer a few words of explanation. Formerly, if at the outbreak of a war a bounty had been given for the entry of any one seaman, a similar bounty had been given to every man in the service; and that had been found to be a very onerous and inconvenient arrangement. It was at present proposed, therefore, that, without affecting the rights of existing seamen, those who might enter the service for the future should not have the power of claiming the bounty in question. With re |