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garded as a contract within the meaning of the constitution, and that such grant could not be revoked by a state legislature, yet that there could be no doubt, but that land granted by the government might be taken by the legislature, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, on payment of an equivalent, and that such an appropriation was not a violation of a contract by which property, or rights in the nature of property, and which might be compensated for in damages, were granted by the government to individuals. (a) The decision in the case last cited might be placed upon another ground, to wit, that as the right of eminent domain is an inherent sovereign power, admitted and recognized under all governments; that right gives to the legislature the control of private property for public use. This fundamental principle of all governments may be considered as a condition annexed to all grants of land, and as such, entering into and forming a part of the contract, in all grants of this character, and subject to which all such grants are held. Thus entering into and forming a part of the contract itself, the exercise of this right cannot in any just sense be said to impair the obligation of such contract.

§ 271. It will not impair the obligation of a contract created by the grant of a charter, if the property of the corporation be taken for the public use. Even if the powers of the corporation be thereby suspended, or the corporation itself dissolved. (b) An act of the legislature made without any consideration, and intended as a mere gratuity, executory in its character, and unexecuted in fact, does not in fact create such a vested right or con

(a) Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston and Worcester Rail Road Co., 23 Pick. 360.

(b) Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19. See also The Proprietors to the Piscataqua Bridge v. The New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35. Barber v. Andover, 8 N. H 398.

tract as that it may not be changed or defeated by subsequent acts of legislation.(a) This decision in the case last cited was placed upon the ground that the act was executory; that the constitution had adopted a distinction between contracts executory and executed, and did not mean togive any efficacy to nude pacts, nor to create new obligations, but to preserve all the obligatory force of contracts, and that all such executory contracts as it protected were such, and only such, as were founded on a sufficient consideration; that the act was a mere promise to collect and pay over a fund, and that as a mere gratuity. This promise to collect, and the promise to deliver might be retracted at any time before it was executed, without impairing the obligation of any contract.

§ 272. Although marriage is a civil contract, it is evident from the nature of the obligation it imposes, from the appropriate remedies, when they are violated, and from reasons which must have actuated the framers of the constitution of the United States, that general laws, providing for the dissolution of existing marriages, but operating upon transactions subsequent to their passage, are not within this clause of the constitution.(b) A private act of the legislature authorizing the sale of the estates of infants, for their maintenance and education, is within the scope of the legitimate authority of a state legislature, and is not within this prohibitory clause of the constitution.(c)

§ 273. It is also by the same section of the federal constitution declared, that "No state shall, without the consent of the congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any state on imports or exports shall be

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(a) The Trustees of the Bishop's Fund v. Reder, 7 Conn. R. 99, N. S. (b) Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 380.

(c) Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wen. 365.

for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the congress. No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty or tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay." We have already, when considering the powers of congress, considered the cases which have arisen under that branch of this clause which relates to states laying imposts, or duties on imports or exports. It will therefore be unnecessary to advert to them in this connection.

CHAPTER IX.

OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION UPON LEGISLATIVE POWER.

§ 274. HAVING considered in a previous chapter the restrictions upon legislative power under the federal constitution, we shall in the next place consider those which are contained in the constitutions of the respective states. These may be considered as divided into two classes. Those which restrict legislative action, unless certain conditions precedent are complied with, which are necessary to give validity to a legislative act; and those which are absolute and imperative in all cases, and operating per se as an absolute and unqualified restriction upon legislative power. An instance of the former kind is to be found in the constitution of New York of 1821, art. 7, sec. 9, which provides, "The assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature shall be requisite to every bill appropriating the public moneys or property for local or private purposes, or creating, continuing, altering, or renewing every body politic or corporate. In the same class may be ranked the provision, that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, nor unless the public exigencies require it. In the latter class are such provisions as declare that no sanguinary laws shall be passed, nor bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, nor laws which impair the obligation of a contract, and all provisions of a similar character.

§ 275. Under the constitution of New York of 1821,

the question has frequently arisen as to what bills are two-third bills within the meaning of sec. 9 of art. 7. This question has been considered under two heads: 1st, what is a bill appropriating the public moneys or property for local or private purposes? 2d, what, within this clause, are bills creating, continuing, altering, or renewing a body politic or corporate? The question arising under the first head, to wit: what is a bill apprcpriating the public moneys or property for local or private purposes? has seldom, if ever, been the subject of judicial determination, although the question as to what is a public use of property, has been frequently judicially determined. It has, however, frequently come under consideration in legislative committees, and by presiding legislative officers. It has also several times been discussed and passed upon by the attorney general of this state. It has elicited much conflict and contrariety of opinion. The limits of this work will not admit of our giving a detailed statement of the respective opinions which have been expressed on this point.

§ 276. On a former occasion, and in another capacity, we submitted to the public our views as to the construction which should be given to this clause in our state constitution; and we have seen no reason since that time for a change of opinion. In expounding a constitutional provision, the same rules of construction and of interpretation should obtain as are adopted and applied in the construction of a statute. One rule is, that such a construction should be put upon a statute as will prevent any clause, sentence, or word from being su perfluous, void, or insignificant; and where the words used will allow of a double meaning, such a construction should be adopted as will allow some meaning to all the words used. With these rules in view, what is the true construction of this clause in our constitution? Such a construction should be put upon this clause in

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