gress, become the seat of government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased, by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and other needful buildings." Under this clause, after an act of cession to the United States, the jurisdiction of the states over such territory ceases; and the inhabitants of those places thus ceded, cease to be inhabitants of the state, and can no longer exercise any civil or political rights under the laws of the state. In accordance with this principle, in the case of The Commonwealth v. Clary,(a) it was held, that the courts of the commonwealth could not take cognizance of offences committed upon lands in the town of Springfield, which had been purchased by the United States for the purpose of erecting arsenals, &c., to which the consent of the commonwealth was granted by the statute of 1798. The court in that case held, that although the consent of the commonwealth to the purchase of this territory by the United States had a condition annexed to it, that civil and criminal process might be served therein by officers of the commonwealth, that this condition was made with a view to prevent the territory from becoming a sanctuary for debtors and criminals; and that from the subsequent assent of the United States to this condition, evidenced by their making the purchase, it resulted that the officers of the commonwealth, in executing such powers, act under the authority of the United States: that no offences, committed within that territory, were committed against the laws of that commonwealth, nor could such offences be punished by the courts of the commonwealth, unless congress should give them jurisdiction: that the laws of (a) 8 Mass. R. 72. [CHAP. VIII. the commonwealth had no force within such territory, and that the inhabitants thereof could not exercise any civil or political privileges under the laws of Massachusetts. That such a consequence necessarily followed, but that no hardship was thereby imposed on those inhabitants, because they were not interested in any elections made within the state; nor were they held to pay any taxes imposed by its authority, nor bound by any of its laws. (a) § 224. In the case of The United States v. Cornell,(b) Mr. Justice Story, in discussing the question of state jurisdiction being ousted, says: "The constitution of the United States declares, that congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, &c. When, therefore, a purchase of lands for any of these purposes is made by the national government, and the state legislature has given its consent to the purchase, the lands so purchased by the very terms of the constitution, ipso facto, fall within the exclusive legislation of congress, and the state jurisdiction is completely ousted." He held that this was the necessary result, for exclusive jurisdiction was attendant upon exclusive legislation; and the consent of the state legislature was, by the very terms of the constitution, by which all the states were bound, and to which all were parties, a virtual surrender and cession of its sovereignty over the place. That it was under the like terms in the same clause of the constitution, that exclusive jurisdiction was now exercised by congress in the District of Columbia that if exclusive jurisdiction and exclusive legislation did not imply the same thing, the state could (a) See also, 1 Hall's Journal of Jurisprudence, 53. (b) 2 Mason's R. 63. not cede, nor the United States accept for the purposes enumerated in the clause, any exclusive jurisdiction. But if there has been no cession by the state of the place, although it has been constantly occupied and used under purchase or otherwise by the United States for a fort, or arsenal, or other constitutional purpose, the state jurisdiction remains complete and perfect. This rule was held in the case of The People v. Godfrey,(a) and in the case cited from Pennsylvania.(b) In the case of Godfrey, the court held that it had jurisdiction of a murder committed by one soldier upon another within Niagara fort. §225. A question has been made as to what was the effect of the proviso or reservation usually annexed to the consent of the state, that all civil and criminal process, issued under the authority of the state, might be executed on the lands so ceded in like manner as if the cession had not been made. This question, it will be perceived, was collaterally considered in the case above cited from 'Massachusetts.(c) It also came under consideration in the case of The United States v. Cornell. (d) In that case it was contended, that the state retained a concurrent jurisdiction over the place. The court under this point proceeded to consider the true intent and effect of such a proviso. It held, that in its terms it did not contain any reservation of concurrent jurisdiction or legislation. That it provided only that civil and criminal process, issued under the authority of the state, which must of course be for acts done within and cognizable by the state, might be executed within the ceded lands, notwithstanding the cession: that not a word was said from which it could be inferred that it was intended that (a) 17 J. R. 225. (c) 8 Mass. R. 72. the states should have a right to punish for acts done within the ceded lands: that the whole apparent object was answered by considering the clause as meant to prevent these lands from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice, for acts done within the acknowledged jurisdiction of the state: that there was nothing incompatible in this with the exclusive sovereignty or jurisdiction of one state, that it should permit another state in such cases to execute its processes within its limits: that a cession, or exclusive jurisdiction, might well be made with a reservation of a right of this nature, which operated only as a condition annexed to the cession, and as an agreement of a new sovereign to permit its free exercise as quoad hoc, his own process: that this was the light in which it had been viewed in the case of Clary,(a) and that in the judgment of the court, that view of the clause comported entirely with the apparent intention of the parties, and gave effect to acts which might otherwise be construed as entirely nugatory: that it might be well doubted whether congress was by the terms of the constitution at liberty to purchase lands for forts, &c., with the consent of the state legislature where such consent was so qualified, that it would not justify the exclusive legislation of congress there: that it had not the least doubt that the true interpretation of the proviso left the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the lands thus ceded in the United States. § 226. Chancellor Kent says, congress, in exercising powers of exclusive legislation over a ceded place or district, unite the powers of general with those of local legislation. The power of local legislation comes with it, as an incident to the right, to make that power effectual. Congress exercises that particular local power, like all (a) 8 Mass. R. 72. its other powers, in its high character as the legislature of the Union, and its general power may come in aid of these local powers. It is therefore competent for congress to try and punish an offender for an offence committed within one of these local districts, in a place not within such jurisdiction, and to provide for the pursuit and arrest of a criminal escaping from one of those districts after committing a felony there, or to punish a person for concealing out of the district a felony committed within it.(a) § 227. The next power granted to congress is, "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." In the case of Mc Culloch v. The State of Maryland,(b) it was decided, that under this clause of the constitution congress had power to incorporate a bank. That the power of establishing a corporation was not a distinct sovereign power or end of the government, but only the means of carrying into effect other powers which are sovereign. Whenever it becomes an appropriate means of exercising any of the powers given by the constitution to the government of the Union, it may be exercised by that government. That, if a certain means to carry into effect any of the powers expressly given by the constitution to the government of the Union, be an appropriate measure, not prohibited by the constitution, the degree of its necessity is a question of legislative discretion, not of judicial cognizance. In the case of The United States v. Fiske, (c) it was held, that the power of congress to give the priority to debts (a) 1 Kent's Com. 430. (6) 4 Wheat. 316. (c) 2 Cranch, 358. |