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embodying some arrangement of this sort, but Walewski refused to sign it, upon the ground, says Sir T. Martin, "that the Emperor's Government desired to keep the satisfaction to be obtained from the Porte and the arrangement subsequently to be made respecting the Principalities distinct from each other, and also because, were he to sign the Memorandum, it would appear that. France had made a concession on the latter point for the purpose of inducing the Sultan to agree on the former." He also appears to have stated that it was not necessary to sign the document, because "amongst men of honour writing was unnecessary." In May, 1858, at the second Congress of Paris, it was discovered that writing in this case was extremely necessary. When the British Plenipotentiaries contended that the French Emperor had yielded on the point of the union of the Principalities, His Majesty denied that he had done anything of the sort. The only concession he ever made, according to his account, was that he would not insist on their being ruled over by a foreign prince-a detail of secondary consequence. It seems also to have been admitted on our side that we had agreed to recognise the administrative union of the provinces, so that the misunderstanding may have arisen out of a quibble over the terms "administrative" and "political" union.

During this visit, Lord Malmesbury tells us that extraordinary precautions were taken by the Queen for the Emperor's protection. Eighty detectives were sent down from London, besides French police. The strictest guard was kept round the Palace and over the island. Besides this, a number of men-of-war's boats guarded the shore, and did not allow a single boat to approach." From a memorandum of their conversations which Prince Albert drew up, it is obvious that the settlement of the question of the Principalities was not the sole object of Napoleon's journey to Osborne. He broached a great many insidious proposals for a redistribution of European territory, also for a revision of the Treaties of 1815, but they were all coldly and sceptically received. He even suggested a wild scheme for converting the Mediterranean into an European lake. "Spain might have Morocco, Sardinia a part of Tripoli, England Egypt, Austria a part of Syria-et que sais je," writes Prince Albert, in describing this suggestion; † the first step being a friendly understanding with England on the subject. As his Majesty had told the Prince he was soon to have an interview with the Russian Czar, it need hardly be said that no encouragement was given by the Queen to these extraordinary projects. In truth, neither the Queen nor her Ministers were at this moment in a mood for entering on an adventurous foreign policy. The Indian Empire had been shaken to its centre by the revolt of the Bengal Army, a revolt known in history as the great Indian Mutiny, and the causes of which must now be traced.

* Memoirs of an Ex-Minister, Vol. II., p. 78.

+ Martin's Life of the Prince Consort, Chap. LXXIX.

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CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE INDIAN MUTINY.

The Centenary of Plassey-Rumours of Rebellion-Causes of the Mutiny-The Annexation of Oudh-Lord Dalhousie's Indian Policy-Its Disturbing Effect on the Minds of the Natives-The Royal Family of Delhi-The Hindoo "Sumbut "-The Discontent of the Bengal Army-The Grievances of the Sepoy-The Greased Cartridges-The Mystery of the " Chupatties "-Mutiny of the Garrison at Meerut-The March to Delhi-Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow-The Tragedy of Cawnpore-Death of the Commander-inChief-Who took Delhi?-Sir John Lawrence in the Punjab-The Saviour of India-Lord Canning at Calcutta-First Relief of Lucknow-Despatch of Sir Colin Campbell-Second Relief of Lucknow-Savage Fighting at the Secunder-baugh-The Queen's Letter to Sir Colin Campbell-His Retreat to CawnporeHis Management of the Campaign- Windham's Defeat at the Pandoo River-Sir Colin Campbell's Victory over the Gwalior Army.

WITH the exception of the Sicilian Vespers, no revolt ever smote a great Empire so unexpectedly as the Indian Mutiny. Gaily was the centenary of Plassey celebrated at a banquet in, London on the 23rd of June, though the sultry air of India was even then laden with rumours of a wide-spreading rebellion. A few casual allusions to these reports were made in both Houses of Parliament, but July brought with it the rush of rising waters in the dull ears of the nation, when news of the atrocities of Meerut and the rebel march on Delhi startled the country from its apathy.

To the end of time historians will probably differ as to what it was that caused the Indian Mutiny. Some have laid stress on considerations of general policy. Others have attributed the catastrophe to special acts of administration. The acts of administration were, however, but the sparks that exploded the forces of revolution, which had been slowly accumulating in the country. To understand the origin of the Indian Mutiny one must understand the administration of Lord Dalhousie, and fairly estimate the last acts of his viceregal career. Of these none had a more serious effect on the minds of the Native Courts than the annexation of Oudh. Inasmuch as Dalhousie was personally a strong opponent of annexation, the presumption is that the step, objectionable as it seems, was inevitable. Oudh was misgoverned by a vicious but feebleminded Prince, and the people were tortured not only by his besotted tyranny, but by the exactions of a corrupt aristocracy. At the same time, the Kings of Oudh had long been trusty allies of the East India Company, who had borrowed money from them, protected them against their mutinous subjects, and used their territory as a recruiting ground for the Sepoy army. Onehalf of Oudh had been given to the Company, by the Treaty of 1801, on condition that a British army should be maintained in the country for the support of the reigning dynasty. Attempts had been made-notably by Lord

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Auckland-to evade this obligation, but they were made in vain. After the first Sikh war, Lord Hardinge had warned the King of Oudh that the Company could no longer tolerate misrule in his territory, and Dalhousie, in 1848, had sent Colonel Sleeman to reconstruct, if possible, its internal administration. The task was a hopeless one, and in 1851 Sleeman reported

that there was no choice but to assume the whole government of the kingdom. Dalhousie shrank from taking this step, and in 1854, when Sleeman resigned, Sir James Outram was appointed as his successor, and asked to report on the whole case. Outram, though a firm anti-annexationist, confirmed Sleeman's statements. He admitted that the duty imposed on the Indian Government

by the Treaty of 1801 rendered it necessary to have recourse to extreme measures. As a warm advocate for maintaining Native States so long as they had any vitality, it was, said Outram, painful and distressing to him to confess that in continuing to uphold the sovereign power of an effete and incapable dynasty we were inflicting infinite misery on 5,000,000 of people.+ Unfortunately, the Treaty of 1801 had stipulated that all improvements in the administration of Oudh must be carried out by Native officers under British advice. It was impossible, therefore, to transfer the administration of Oudh

* Sleeman's Tour in Oudh, Vol. II., p. 353.

† Oudh Blue Book, p. 46.

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to the servants of the Company, and equally impossible to expect reforms from the servants of the King. Lord Dalhousie's notion was that the Treaty of 1801 should be "denounced "- that the King should be told he must either sign a fresh one, handing over the administration of his country to the Indian Government, or forego the protection of the British force, which stood between him and a revolution. Dalhousie ignored the fact that the withdrawal of our troops from Oudh logically involved the retrocession of that half of the kingdom which was given to us as payment for their services, and yet there can be little doubt that had his demand been pressed, the King of Oudh would have yielded. Dalhousie's advisers differed in their views, and in the end the Court of Directors settled the matter by ordering the GovernorGeneral to annex the country, depriving the King of revenues, rank, power, and authority, and allotting a suitable pension to him and his successors.* Dalhousie's plan, on the other hand, was to assume the administration, but not to extinguish the dynasty of Oudh, and it was with reluctance that he carried out the policy of his masters. The country was annexed by Sir James Outram on the 7th of February, 1856, the King's private property being confiscated and sold. These are the essential facts of the case, and it is easy to pass judgment on them. No Treaty conferred on the Company the shadow of a right to do more than secure for the people of Oudh good government. As it was quite possible to do that without destroying and degrading the dynasty, the seizure of Oudh was simply an act of rapine. † As the Kings of Oudh had been noted all over India for their staunch loyalty to the English in India, every Native prince regarded the annexation of Oudh as a menace to his throne. At every Native Court it was whispered that to be loyal to England was simply to invite ruin. Thus the last act of Dalhousie's viceregal reign sowed the seeds of suspicion, distrust, and even hatred in the hearts of the Native dynasties.

But the whole policy of this great and vigorous ruler, by a curious irony of fate, had steadily prepared the minds of the Indian races for a revolution. Dalhousie had covered India with railways, canals, roads, and telegraphs. He had introduced a cheap postal system by which a letter from Peshawur to Cape Comorin, or from Assam to Kurrachee, was carried for three farthings— one-sixteenth of the old charge. He had reformed the Civil Service, he had improved education and prison discipline, he had passed laws that went to the root of family life, such as those permitting Hindoo widows to marry again, and relieving persons who changed their religion from forfeiture. As for his wars and his annexations, he had the "tyrant plea, necessity." When

* Oudh Blue Book, p. 235.

If we go behind the facts and pretexts of the official case we can easily discern better though unstated reasons for the annexation of Oudh. After the annexation of Scinde and the conquest of the Punjab, Oudh was left protruding into British territory, so as to cut it into two parts. Oudh was in our way, and it was therefore taken.

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leaving Calcutta he said mournfully, and with a trace of misgiving, as he looked back on his brilliant achievements, "I have played out my part, and while I feel that in my case the principal act in the drama of my life is ended, I shall be content if the curtain should now drop on my public career." But the great work done by Dalhousie had not been done without friction between the paramount power and its subjects and vassals. It was, indeed, thought in England that Dalhousie handed India over to Lord Canning in a state of profound tranquillity. Yet, looking deeper than the surface, says an able writer on Indian history, "there were latent causes of uneasiness which largely pervaded the minds of the Native classes of all ranks and creeds.” * Dalhousie's system of progressive education was detested by Hindoo and Moslem alike, because it undermined the whole fabric of their faith. The Moslem youth, it is true, did not frequent the English schools. But young Hindoos flocked to them with an eager thirst for knowledge, and they went to the missionary seminaries, where Christianity was taught, quite as freely as to State schools, where its teaching was prohibited. In their homes, they spoke of what they were taught to their parents, who regarded the whole system of English education as a diabolical device for corrupting the faith and morals of their children. This suspicion was strengthened and confirmed by the aggressive proselytism of the missionaries, to whose zeal one of the soundest and best informed of Native civilians has directly traced the origin of the Mutiny. The entire scheme of Dalhousie's policy was based on the assumption that the Natives would greet with loyalty and gratitude the new era of progress that he ushered in. On the contrary, as Colonel Meadows Taylor says, "the material progress of India was unintelligible to the Natives in general. A few intelligent and educated persons might understand the use and scope of railways, telegraphs, steam-vessels, and recognise in them the direction of a great Government for the benefit of the people; but the ancient listless conservativism of the population at large was disturbed by them. The English,' it was said, 'never did such things before, why do they do so now? These are but new devices for the domination of their will, and are aimed at the destruction of our national faith, caste, and customs. What was it all to come to? Was India to be like England? The earlier Company's servants were simple but wise men, and we respected them; we understood them and they us; but the present men are not like them; we do not know them, nor they us.' No one cared, perhaps, very much for such sentiments, and fewvery few-English heard them; but they will not have been forgotten by those who did." The Directors of the East India Company had, prior to Dalhousie's * The History of India, by Meadows Taylor, p. 710.

† Curiously Mr. Cobden was among the few Englishmen who both knew and cared. In a letter to Mr. Bright, dated the 24th of August, 1857, he says, "From the moment that I had satisfied myself that a feeling of alienation was constantly increasing with both Natives and the English--we had some striking evidence to this effect before our Committee in 1853-I made up my mind that it must end in trouble sooner or later."-Morley's Life of Cobden, Chap. XXV.