Lord Raglan's Successor- "Take Care of Dowb"- Lord Panmure's Nepotism - The Crisis of the WarGortschakoff's Last Struggle-The Battle of the Tchernaya River -France and the War-A Despondent Court-Divided Counsels among the Allies-The Bridge of Rafts-The Grand Bombardment-French Attack on the Malakoff- British Attack on the Redan-Why the Attack Failed-The "Hero of the Redan"Pélissier's Message to Simpson-Appeal to Sir Colin Campbell-Evacuation of the Redan-Fall of Sebastopol -Retreat of the Russians to the North Town - Paralysis of the Victors - The Queen's Anger - Her Remonstrances with Lord Panmure-A New Commander-in-Chief-Taking Care of "Dowb"-Codrington Chosen-The Wintry Crimean Watch-Diplomatic Humiliation of Palmerston-France Negotiates Secretly Terms of Peace with Austria-Palmerston's Indignant Remonstrances-The Queen Objects to Prosecute the War Alone-The Surrender of Palmerston-He Abandons the Turks-An Unpopular Peace-The Tories Offer to Support the Peace-The Queen and the Parliament of 1856.

WHEN Lord Raglan died, General Simpson, who had been his chief of the staff, was appointed to succeed him. It is enough to say that Simpson was infinitely less capable than his predecessor; but, on the other hand, he was a good-natured, pliable man, not likely to be troublesome to the authorities at home. Mr. Alfred Varley, the eminent electrician, told Colonel Hope, V.C., that when Lord Panmure's despatch appointing General Simpson to the chief command was received, the message ended with the mysterious order-"Take care of

Dowb." Mr. Varley, who was on duty, thinking "Dowb" was some unknown Russian general who had been suddenly discovered by Lord Panmure, requested that the message should be repeated. It turned out, however, that "Dowb" was merely an abbreviation of Dowbigging, and that Dowbigging was one of Lord Panmure's relatives, whom he, as a Minister, pledged to suppress the nepotism that had ruined the army, thus authoritatively recommended to the good offices of the new Commander-in-Chief.* "Take care of Dowb," from that day till now, has indeed been the shibboleth of jobbery and corruption in all branches of the Queen's service. Thus, though the crisis of the war had now come, it was only too obvious that little could be expected from an army led by a feeble and subservient general, and directed from home by an "administrative reformer" of Lord Panmure's type.

On the 21st of July General Simpson reported that his trenches were within two hundred yards of the Redan, which had been greatly strengthened since the last assault, and that they could not be pushed farther. The loss of life in the trenches was so enormous that the assault could not be long delayedand yet, till Pélissier took the Malakoff, it was madness to attack the Redan. On the other hand, overwhelming reinforcements were being poured in from Russia, and, on the 16th of August, Prince Gortschakoff made a bold attempt to raise the siege. He crossed the Tchernaya river, and attacked the French and Sardinians, but was hurled back with great loss. This came as glad tidings to the Queen, who had heard with apprehension that the French were beginning to cry out against the war, and that they were complaining that France was simply a tool in the hands of England. The victory of the Tchernaya and the Queen's visit to Paris silenced these murmurs for a time. Prince Albert, however, was still despondent, for no progress was made after this battle; and his letters from the Crimea warned him that another winter campaign would yet have to be undertaken.

The months of July and August produced in England a fresh crop of censures in the newspapers. It was even suggested that, by way of counteracting divided counsels among the allies, the siege should be entirely left to the French, while the English, Sardinians, and Turks should sally forth and attack the Russian army of observation in the field. In September, the beginnings of a bridge of rafts between the north and south sides of Sebastopol were seen, and, on the 5th of September, the grand bombardment, preliminary to the assault on the Malakoff and Redan, commenced-the French opening four miles of cannonade at a given signal. A terrific hail of shot and shell was almost continuously poured upon the hapless city till the 8th, when the moment for the assault arrived. Pélissier was to hoist the tricolour on the Malakoff when it was taken, and that was to be the signal for the British attack on the Redan. For many hours a savage contest raged round

* See a curious letter on this subject from Colonel Hope, V. C., in the Daily Chronicle of 14th September, 1886, and a rote appended to it from the pen of the Editor of that newspaper.

1855.]

ASSAULT ON THE REDAN.

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and on the Malakoff, but in the end the French captured the stronghold. The British storming force of 1,000 men, with small covering and ladder parties, then rushed forward to the outworks of the Redan. In crossing the space of two hundred yards that intervened between their trenches and the fortress, they were swept by a terrific fire, under which they fell like swathes of corn before the reaper. The troops--for the most part weedy young recruits-soon became demoralised, and many of them had actually to be kicked into action by their sergeants. Somehow they forced their way over the ramparts a confused undisciplined mob in a pitiful state of disorganisation. One figure alone stands out in this scene of murky strife in heroic grandeur-that of Colonel Windham. He strove with furious energy to rally the scattered remnants of regiments which were mixed up with each other, and to hurl them against the inner breastwork. But as at the Alma, there were no supports at hand, and Windham sent messenger after messenger imploring Codrington to hurry them on. His entreaties were unheeded, partly because some of the messengers were shot, partly because Codrington, like most of the English generals in the Crimea, did not seem to consider that slender storming parties needed strong and instant support. At last Windham, enraged at the useless and sickening slaughter of his men, determined to go himself and force his chief to send the stormers succour. "Let it be known," he said to Captain Crealock, "in case I am killed, why I went away.' He passed through the zone of fire in safety, reached Codrington, and, whilst vainly arguing with him, he saw that the day was lost. The subalterns and sergeants he had left behind-for most of the superior officers were killed or wounded-could no longer hold the men to their deadly work. First one, then another, and then a small group, were seen to creep through the gaps in the Redan. Then a mad rush of terror-stricken soldiers, yelling and shrieking in panic, proclaimed that Windham's mission was useless, and that the fight was over. As for the Commander-in-Chief, where was he all the time? Cowering in a safe corner of the trenches, where he could see little of the fight! There Pélissier's messenger found him when he came to ask if he would not immediately assail the Redan again. "The trenches were," according to Simpson's despatch, "subsequently to this attack, so crowded with troops, that I was unable to organise a second assault."

وو

General Simpson might as well have doomed his men to sudden death as send such a slender column as had been repulsed, to storm the Redan. This, then, is the sum of the matter. The first assault failed because the stormers were too few; the second was not attempted, lest they might have been too many! Ultimately, Simpson did what he ought to have done in the first instance; that is to say, he fell back on Sir Colin Campbell and the Scottish Brigade.* But

Simpson was bitterly blamed for not asking Campbell's Division of Guards and Highlanders, who were picked and seasoned soldiers, to assault in the first instance. Campbell, however, though he often exacted cruel sacrifices from his men, was parsimonious of blood, and it was said in the camp that he

when his Highland scouts went to reconnoitre during the night, they found the place deserted. The losses on our side were frightful, especially in officers and sergeants. Of the 2,447 stormers who were killed and wounded, 1,435 belonged to the Light Division; in fact, owing to Simpson's imbecility in sending a mere handful of men to the attack, and Codrington's inexcusable neglect to hurry on supports, we sacrificed more men in failing to carry the Redan, than Wellington lost when he captured Badajoz.* During the night the Russians

set fire to the town. Crossing the bridge of rafts, the enemy fled to the northern side of the harbour, leaving us in possession, not of Sebastopol, but, as Gortschakoff said, of a heap of blood-stained ruins.

On Sunday, the 9th of September, the news that Sebastopol had fallen refused to attack till he had time to make the necessary preparations. Then he observed, grimly, he would not "attack, but 'tak' the Redan." Codrington seems to have imagined that there was no need for all this caution. He attacked, but did not take, the fortress; in fact, to take it on his plan was an utter impossibility.

That was partly due to the fact that our trenches were 200 yards from the Redan. This space was enfiladed by a murderous fire when crossed by the stormers. The French, 20,000 strong, were only 20 yards from the Malakoff. Simpson's excuse for hastening the attack instead of pushing the trenches closer was that every day the French were losing 200 and we 60 men in the trenches.

1855.]

FALL OF SEBASTOPOL.

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was proclaimed through England. And so the siege that had gone on for the best part of a year, which had involved the construction of seventy miles of trenches, and the expenditure of 1,500,000 shells, came to an end-gloriously for the French with victory at the Malakoff, ingloriously for England with ignominious defeat at the Redan. On the 29th of September, the Russians were

repulsed at Kars; but on the 28th of November, the neglected and faminestricken garrison, whose heroic defence under General Fenwick Williams was one of the most brilliant episodes of the war, had to surrender. The occupation of Kinburn and the bombardment of Sweaborg were the only successes won by us at sea.

When Sebastopol fell, it was not the Russians but Generals Simpson and Pélissier who were paralysed by the catastrophe. The Allies, in fact, seemed to sit helplessly looking on, and gave the enemy time to render his position on the north side of the city almost impregnable. Thus once more the