the common possession of a fine power, though in matter of fact that union may be often disturbed, a complex sea of forces and passions troubles men in life and action, which in the calmer region of art are hardly to be felt at all; and therefore the cultivation of a fine taste tends to promote the function of a fine judgment, which is a main help in the complex world of civilized existence. Just so too the manner in which the more delicate parts of religion daily work in producing that "moderation" which, upon the whole and as a rule, is essential to long success (defining success even in its most narrow and mundane way), might be worked out in a hundred cases, though it would not suit these pages. Many of the finer intellectual tastes have a similar restraining effect; they prevent or tend to prevent a greedy voracity after the good things of life, which makes both men and nations in excessive haste to be rich and famous, often makes them do too much and do it ill, and so often leaves them at last without money and without respect.

But there is no need to expand this further. The principle is plain that though these better and higher graces of humanity are impediments and incumbrances in the early fighting period, yet that in the later era they are among the greatest helps and benefits; and that as soon as governments by discussion have become strong enough to secure a stable existence, and as soon as they have broken the fixed rule of old custom and have awakened the dormant inventiveness of men, then for the first time almost every part of human nature begins to spring forward, and begins to contribute its quota even to the narrowest, even to "verifiable" progress. And this is the true reason of all those panegyrics on liberty which are often so measured* in expression but are in essence so true to life and nature, — liberty is the strengthening

*Sic, but evidently a typographical error, perhaps for "unsound."- ED.

and developing power-the light and heat — of political nature; and when some "Cæsarism" exhibits as it sometimes will an originality of mind, it is only because it has managed to make its own the products of past free times or neighboring free countries; and even that originality is only brief and frail, and after a little while, when tested by a generation or two, in time of need it falls away.

In a complete investigation of all the conditions of "verifiable progress," much else would have to be set out. For example, science has secrets of her own: nature does not wear her most useful lessons on her sleeve; she only yields her most productive secrets, those which yield the most wealth and the most "fruit," to those who have gone through a long process of preliminary abstraction. To make a person really understand the "laws of motion" is not easy, and to solve even simple problems in abstract dynamics is to most people exceedingly hard; and yet it is on these out-of-the-way investigations, so to speak, that the art of navigation, all physical astronomy, and all the theory of physical movements at last depend. But no nation would beforehand have thought that in so curious a manner such great secrets were to be discovered; and many nations, therefore, which get on the wrong track, may be distanced — supposing there to be no communication-by some nation not better than any of them which happens to stumble on the right track. If there were no "Bradshaw " and no one knew the time at which trains started, a man who caught the express would not be a wiser or a more business-like man than he who missed it, and yet he would arrive whole hours sooner at the capital both are going to; and unless I misread the matter, such was often the case with early knowledge. At any rate, before a complete theory of "verifiable progress" could be made, it would have to be settled whether this is so or not, and the conditions of the development of physical science would have to be

fully stated; obviously, you cannot explain the development of human comfort unless you know the way in which men learn and discover comfortable things. Then again, for a complete discussion whether of progress or degradation, a whole course of analysis is necessary as to the effect of natural agencies on man, and of change in those agencies; but upon these I cannot touch, - the only way to solve these great problems is to take them separately. I only profess to explain what seem to me the political prerequisites of progress, and especially of early progress. I do this the rather because the subject is insufficiently examined; so that even if my views are found to be faulty, the discussion upon them may bring out others which are truer and better.