judge be declared to be an act of violence against herself, and in that peculiar but effectual way the offender could be condemned and executed. Against all gross excesses of the prerogative this is a sufficient protection. But it would be no protection against minor mistakes; any error of judgment committed bona fide, and only entailing consequences which one person might say were good and another say were bad, could not be so punished. It would be possible to impeach any minister who disbanded the Queen's army, and it would be done for certain. But suppose a minister were to reduce the army or the navy much below the contemplated strength; suppose he were only to spend upon them one-third of the amount which Parliament had permitted him to spend; suppose a minister of Lord Palmerston's principles were suddenly and while in office converted to the principles of Mr. Bright and Mr. Cobden, and were to act on those principles, - he could not be impeached. The law of treason neither could nor ought to be enforced against an act which was an error of judgment, not of intention; which was in good faith intended not to impair the well-being of the state, but to promote and augment it. Against such misuses of the prerogative our remedy is a change of ministry; and in general this works very well, every minister looks long before he incurs that penalty, and no one incurs it wantonly. But nevertheless, there are two defects in it. The first is that it may not be a remedy at all: it may be only a punishment. A minister may risk his dismissal; he may do some act difficult to undo: and then all which may be left will be to remove and censure him. And the second is that it is only one House of Parliament which has much to say to this remedy, such as it is: the House of Commons only can remove a minister by a vote of censure. Most of the ministries for thirty years have never possessed the confidence of the Lords, and in such cases a vote of

censure by the Lords could therefore have but little weight; it would be simply the particular expression of a general political disapproval. It would be like a vote of censure on a Liberal Government by the Carlton, or on a Tory Government by the Reform Club. And in no case has an adverse vote by the Lords the same decisive effect as a vote of the Commons: the lower House is the ruling and the choosing House, and if a Government really possesses that, it thoroughly possesses nine-tenths of what it requires. The support of the Lords is an aid and a luxury; that of the Commons is a strict and indispensable necessary.

These difficulties are particularly raised by questions of foreign policy. On most domestic subjects, either custom or legislation has limited the use of the prerogative. The mode of governing the country according to the existing laws is mostly worn into a rut, and most administrations move in it because it is easier to move there than anywhere else. Most political crises- the decisive votes, which determine. the fate of Government - are generally either on questions of foreign policy or of new laws; and the questions of foreign policy come out generally in this way, that the Government has already done something, and that it is for the one part of the legislature alone-for the House of Commons, and not for the House of Lords-to say whether they have or have not forfeited their place by the treaty they have made.

I think every one must admit that this is not an arrangement which seems right on the face of it. Treaties are quite as important as most laws; and to require the elaborate assent of representative assemblies to every word of the law, and not to consult them even as to the essence of the treaty, is prima facie ludicrous. In the older forms of the English Constitution this may have been quite right: the power was then really lodged in the Crown, and

because Parliament met very seldom, and for other reasons, it was then necessary that on a multitude of points the Crown should have much more power than is amply sufficient for it at present. But now the real power is not in the sovereign, it is in the Prime Minister and in the Cabinet; that is, in the hands of a committee appointed by Parliament, and of the chairman of that committee. Now, beforehand no one would have ventured to suggest that a committee of Parliament on foreign relations should be able to commit the country to the greatest international obligations without consulting either Parliament or the country. No other select committee has any comparable power; and considering how carefully we have fettered and limited the powers of all other subordinate authorities, our allowing so much discretionary power on matters peculiarly dangerous and peculiarly delicate to rest in the sole charge of one secret committee is exceedingly strange. No doubt it may be beneficial, many seeming anomalies are so; but at first sight it does not look right.

I confess that I should see no advantage in it if our two chambers were sufficiently homogeneous and sufficiently harmonious. On the contrary, if those two chambers were as they ought to be, I should believe it to be a great defect. If the administration had in both Houses a majority, -not a mechanical majority ready to accept anything, but a fair and reasonable one, predisposed to think the Government right, but not ready to find it to be so in the face of facts and in opposition to whatever might occur, -if a good Government were thus placed, I should think it decidedly better that the agreements of the administration with foreign powers should be submitted to Parliament. They would then receive that which is best for all arrangements of business,—an understanding and sympathizing criticism, but still a criticism. The majority of the legislature, being well disposed to the Government, would not "find" against

it except it had really committed some big and plain mistake. But if the Government had made such a mistake, certainly the majority of the legislature would find against it. In a country fit for parliamentary institutions, the partisanship of members of the legislature never comes in manifest opposition to the plain interest of the nation; if it did, the nation, being (as are all nations capable of parliamentary institutions) constantly attentive to public affairs, would inflict on them the maximum parliamentary penalty at the next election, and at many future elections. It would break their career. No English majority dare vote for an exceedingly bad treaty; it would rather desert its own leader than insure its own ruin. And an English minority, inheriting a long experience of parliamentary affairs, would not be exceedingly ready to reject a treaty made with a foreign government. The leaders of an English Opposition are very conversant with the schoolboy maxim, "Two can play at that fun." They know that the next time they are in office the same sort of sharp practice may be used against them, and therefore they will not use it. So strong is this predisposition, that not long since, a subordinate member of the Opposition declared that the "front benches" of the two sides of the House that is, the leaders of the Government and the leaders of the Opposition-were in constant tacit league to suppress the objections of independent members. And what he said is often quite true. There are often seeming objections which are not real objections, - at least which are in the particular cases outweighed by counter-considerations, and [which] these "independent members," having no real responsibility, not being likely to be hurt themselves if they make a mistake, are sure to blurt out and to want to act upon but the responsible heads of the party, who may have to decide similar things or even the same things themselves, will not permit it; they refuse, out of interest as well as out of patriotism, to engage

the country in a permanent foreign scrape, to secure for themselves and their party a momentary home advantage. Accordingly, a Government which negotiated a treaty would feel that its treaty would be subject certainly to a scrutiny, but still to a candid and a lenient scrutiny; that it would go before judges. of whom the majority were favorable, and among whom the most influential part of the minority were in this case much opposed to excessive antagonism. And this seems to be the best position in which negotiators can be placed; namely, that they should be sure to have to account to considerate and fair persons, but not to have to account to inconsiderate and unfair ones.

At present the Government which negotiates a treaty can hardly be said to be accountable to any one. It is sure to be subjected to vague censure. Benjamin Franklin said, "I have never known a peace made, even the most advantageous, that was not censured as inadequate, and the makers condemned as injudicious or corrupt. Blessed are the peace-makers' is, I suppose, to be understood in the other world, for in this they are frequently cursed." And this is very often the view taken now in England of treaties. There being nothing practical in the Opposition, nothing likely to hamper them hereafter, the leaders of Opposition are nearly sure to suggest every objection. The thing is done and cannot be undone; and the most natural wish of the Opposition leaders is to prove that if they had been in office, and it therefore had been theirs to do it, they could have done it much better. On the other hand, it is quite possible that there may be no real criticism on a treaty at all; or the treaty has been made by the Government, and as it cannot be unmade by any one, the Opposition may not think it worth while to say much about it. The Government, therefore, is never certain of any criticism; on the contrary, it has a good chance of escaping criticism: but if there be