serve you, because you think it too costly to induce them." And this, you fancy, would be the more economical measure of the two! and you disguise its monstrous injustice and oppression-some of you, under the wretched screen of the ballot, which is leaving the incidence of the iniquity to chance, or throwing it on Providence; others under the scarcely less transparent curtain of universal service,—which, if purchasable exemptions were forbidden, would be impossible and extravagant, and if they were allowed, would be simply a more wasteful and irregular system of recruiting. Would you dare-would you even propose-to fix an unremunerating rate of salary for your civil servants, and then collect them by conscription? And, if not, why should you recommend such a system for the military service of the State?

II. THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

It will be admitted on all hands-and it would be a waste of time to argue the point-that the most important and imperative duty of the State, after providing for the safety and independence of the country, is to secure the prompt, efficient, and pure administration of justice to all its subjects. That justice should not be over-costly, is of signal consequence also; but is not half so essential as that it should be accessible, equally reliable for rich and poor, and, in fact, never impeded or denied, directly or indirectly; that every man who is wronged should have a remedy, easy and at hand; that every crime should be promptly and

adequately punished; and that a legitimate litigant should be able to obtain a conclusive decision to his lawsuit; that no man should have to endure a wrong, because it is so tedious and costly to get righted; or, dread an appeal to the law, as a worse calamity than submission to a fraud or an oppression. A Government which does not secure this full and ready justice. to its people clearly fails in one of its most solemn and urgent obligations; if it fails because the discharge of this obligation would cost money, the excuse would seem only to add to the guilt of the failure; and if, having sufficient funds in hand, it prefers to use that money in purchasing popularity by remission of taxation, rather than in doing justice by strengthening the staff appointed to administer the law, it is difficult to characterise, in moderate language, the degree or the nature of its laches. Now, that the State in England is, and has long been, habitually guilty of this grave iniquity, is only too notorious; and the expense, cruelty, and injustice thus inflicted on the community is known to be enormous and incalculable, but unluckily does not admit of being laid before the public in precise or provable figures.

The state of affairs referred to has been denounced as a scandal for more than a generation, yet it exists as a scandal still, and, probably, a scandal almost unmitigated in its essential points. Many attempts have been made to remedy it, but none have been effectual, and few have been actually carried into operation. No one denies the allegations, yet the facts adduced are of

I

the most astounding order. I enter into no discussion as to the remedy: it would be pure impertinence in me even to pretend to an opinion on the subject. only know that the present judges cannot, by any diligence, get through their ever-increasing business, far less overtake arrears. I know that, under the existing system, this inadequate judicial staff, instead of sitting continuously-and what institutions should be constantly open and in action, if not courts of justice?-suspend operations for several months in the year in the metropolis, and hold assizes only twice or three times a year in the provinces. The appellate system, too, is a source of indescribable oppression. The impossibility of getting through the work has led to the use of the less occupied Queen's counsel to supplement the judges in trying causes at assizes; and to a far worse evil the practice of almost forcing parties (by the most urgent advice from the bench) to submit their disputes to arbitration—i.e., to a most costly and unsatisfactory method of decision.1 The hardest source of cruelty of all upon the suitors is the remanets-i.e., the cases which are postponed from session to session, simply because the judges have not time to hear them. They have therefore to be left over till another assize or another time; and what this means, in the way of added fees, renewed expenses for the journeys and maintenance of witnesses, and other items of outlay, may be imagined by many of us, but

1 See "Statistics of the Courts of Justice," &c., by F. H. Janson, Esq., read before the Statistical Society, Feb., 1874.

can be known only in its full bitterness by the unhappy victims. Yet, what was told us a few weeks ago by a late law officer of the Crown? Sir H. James's speech on the Judicature Bill of last Session says:

"It seemed to him most unadvisable to bring the legal business of the country to a dead-lock by reducing the number of those judges. The 15 judges could not perform the duties which now devolved upon them. The trials of heavy commercial causes took place only at short sittings held three times a year, and the present state of things was in consequence a scandal to the country. The number of remanets, some of which had been standing for two years, was, in the Court of Queen's Bench, 186; in the Court of Exchequer, 92; and in the Court of Common Pleas, 37; and to these there had just been added 108, 111, and 112 new causes in those three courts respectively. The circuits required 14 judges, and there must be one judge sitting in chambers; consequently there was no provision made for the Central Criminal Court, or for cases of indisposition, and it would be impossible, under the Bill, to have continuous sittings in London during the circuits."

Two other quotations from the Law Reports, given in the Times, will suffice for illustrations :

"EXCHEQUER CHAMBER,

"Dec. 5, 1871.

"BUSINESS OF THE COUrt.

"Mr Justice Mellor said there were other judgments to be delivered, but on account of the engagements of the judges, several of them having to go the Winter Circuit, and his own Court being short-handed, the Court had been unable to prepare their judgments in the other cases, and they must therefore stand over until February.

"Mr Justice Willes announced that, from a similar cause, this Court must suspend its sittings, and could not hear any of the cases of error from the Court of Exchequer, which, therefore, must stand over until February. Thus the Court was leaving

the greater part of its business undisposed of, and most of the cases have been pending two or three years.

"From the same cause, only two out of the eight cases in error from the Common Pleas were heard at this sittings, and the other six stand over."

Again

"COURT OF ERROR IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER,

"Nov. 30, 1872.

"(Sittings in Error from the Court of Exchequer, before the Lord Chief Justice, Mr Justice Blackburn, Mr Justice Keating, Mr Justice Denman, and Mr Justice Archibald.) "The Court, as thus constituted, sat to take cases in error from the Court of Exchequer, of which there were 18-enough to occupy the Court for two or three weeks, especially as many of them are cases of great weight. Three days only, however, could be appointed, consistently with the other probable demands upon the time of the judges as judges of ordinary or first instance jurisdiction; and the Lord Chief Justice, upon the judges taking their seats, had to announce that it was found it would be impossible to sit on Monday, owing to the Winter Circuits, so that the sittings will be curtailed to a single day, scarcely sufficient to dispose of one case. The consequence was that all the cases but the first one or two had to stand over until after next Term. Before taking any of the new cases, judgment was delivered in one which had stood over for consideration from the last sittings."

All

Now, I have not a word to say as to the variety of remedies which have been suggested during the discussions of the last two sessions. Legal doctors differ too much to make it decent for an unprofessional layman to offer an opinion. Nor is it necessary. that is essential to my argument stands out above all controversy―viz., that all these ruinous remanets and enforced arbitrations, which are the disgrace and opprobrium of our system, and so grievous a cruelty