division during the entire action might remain with him who had already so brilliantly distinguished himself.*

Our 18-pounders had not been in action half an hour before their superiority was shown by the enfeebled reply of the enemy's artillery. Indeed, at one time, a great number of their guns ceased firing, and we were in hopes that they were finally silenced. However, our expectations on this point were disappointed, as shortly after they all opened again; probably they had merely ceased from a temporary want of ammunition. Their fire, nevertheless, continued to decrease and was far less accurate. It was evident that they had lost many of their best artillerymen. On the other hand, although our loss in gunners had been very great, especially among those serving the iron 18-pounders (17 of whom were killed or wounded), we received fresh men from the right siege train, and if anything our fire became more and

* Lord Raglan, in his despatch of the battle of Inkermann, states that "he" (Sir De Lacy Evans) "did not fail to give him" (General Pennefather) "his best advice and assistance." This appears to have been an error on the part of his lordship, as I have it from the very best authority that General Pennefather never spoke to Sir De Lacy Evans until the battle was over.

more accurate. I never saw such beautiful practice; the greatest praise is due to Colonel Dickson for the admirable manner in which he directed his men. Shortly before 1 P.M. it became perfectly evident that the Russians only continued their cannonade in order to cover their infantry, who began to retire in heavy columns. The day cleared with our prospects, and as we gazed on the battle-field, and compared our small force with the still huge masses of our retreating foes, we felt indeed greatly relieved that we had no longer their legions opposed to us. The mighty duel of artillery continued for some time, the enemy drawing off their guns by fours every ten minutes or so, until but two batteries remained on Cossack Hill. These were severely knocked about by our 18-pounders, but Lord Raglan sent an aide-de-camp to Colonel Dickson to desire him to cease firing, as he wished to advance some infantry, and thought that the enemy would be glad of an excuse to withdraw their guns. Colonel Dickson begged to be allowed to have a few shots more, as he said he had the range so perfectly; and, to verify his assertion, the guns, which were then loaded, were fired, and the shot went crashing through two Russian carriages. A minute or two

later he ceased firing, an example which the Russians immediately followed, and then we had the satisfaction of seeing the last of their artillery limber up and gallop off the field.

Thus terminated the battle of Inkermann, for, although they fired at us from the Russian steamers occasionally, and we also sent a few shots after the now distant columns of infantry, yet no more actual fighting took place. Lord Raglan was very anxious that, as soon as their artillery was withdrawn, the Russians should be pursued down the Inkermann road; thinking that their panic would be thus increased, and many prisoners made, besides causing them heavy loss. In all retreats troops are invariably more or less in a state of disorganization; and there could be no doubt that, had this been done according to Lord Raglan's wish, a greater blow might have been struck upon the enemy. Moreover, as almost the entire Russian force retreated over the Tchernaya river by a single bridge, there was good reason to suppose that they must have been in great confusion, from the masses of men who had to pass over in so narrow a space. Unfortunately there was no British infantry that could be sent on this service; all our available troops had been engaged-all had suffered a heavy