to further General Pennefather's views, shortly afterwards sent him up some companies of the 20th regiment and about 200 of the Guards. These, for the most part, were men who had some little time before come to the rear to replenish their pouches, their ammunition being exhausted, and the rest had been brought off pickets, which, in the emergency of the moment, were thought unnecessary. Another brigade of French infantry (mustering 3000 men) and two more batteries of 12-pounders had before this arrived, but, by General Canrobert's wish, they were kept in reserve and did not go into action at all. Sir De Lacy Evans about this time rode up to Lord Raglan; he had come from Balaklava, where, as you may remember, he had gone from illness, and, on receiving intimation of the battle, had insisted on returning to the front, although not in a fit state of health to do so. He appeared to take a very gloomy view of matters, and even at this time seemed to think that the issue of the day was doubtful. His division being under such able command as that of General Pennefather, who had held it during the heat and burden of the day, Sir De Lacy Evans had the good taste and kind consideration not to deprive him of it; so that the honour of commanding the PLAN OF THE BATTIE OF INKERMAN, FOUCHT ON THE 5TH NOVEMBER 1854 POSITION OF THE TROOPS AT MIDDAY A. Near here Sir G. Cathcart & Col! Seymour were killed & Br Gen Torrens wounded. B. Sandbag Battery taken by enormous loss division during the entire action might remain with him who had already so brilliantly distinguished himself.* Our 18-pounders had not been in action half an hour before their superiority was shown by the enfeebled reply of the enemy's artillery. Indeed, at one time, a great number of their guns ceased firing, and we were in hopes that they were finally silenced. However, our expectations on this point were disappointed, as shortly after they all opened again; probably they had merely ceased from a temporary want of ammunition. Their fire, nevertheless, continued to decrease and was far less accurate. It was evident that they had lost many of their best artillerymen. On the other hand, although our loss in gunners had been very great, especially among those serving the iron 18-pounders (17 of whom were killed or wounded), we received fresh men from the right siege train, and if anything our fire became more and * Lord Raglan, in his despatch of the battle of Inkermann, states that "he" (Sir De Lacy Evans) " did not fail to give him" (General Pennefather) "his best advice and assistance." This appears to have been an error on the part of his lordship, as I have it from the very best authority that General Pennefather never spoke to Sir De Lacy Evans until the battle was over. more accurate. I never saw such beautiful practice; the greatest praise is due to Colonel Dickson for the admirable manner in which he directed his men. Shortly before 1 P.M. it became perfectly evident that the Russians only continued their cannonade in order to cover their infantry, who began to retire in heavy columns. The day cleared with our prospects, and as we gazed on the battle-field, and compared our small force with the still huge masses of our retreating foes, we felt indeed greatly relieved that we had no longer their legions opposed to us. The mighty duel of artillery continued for some time, the enemy drawing off their guns by fours every ten minutes or so, until but two batteries remained on Cossack Hill. These were severely knocked about by our 18-pounders, but Lord Raglan sent an aide-de-camp to Colonel Dickson to desire him to cease firing, as he wished to advance some infantry, and thought that the enemy would be glad of an excuse to withdraw their guns. Colonel Dickson begged to be allowed to have a few shots more, as he said he had the range so perfectly; and, to verify his assertion, the guns, which were then loaded, were fired, and the shot went crashing through two Russian carriages. A minute or two |