Hamilton Unbound: Finance and the Creation of the American Republic

Portada
Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002 - 230 páginas

Modern financial theories enable us to look at old problems in early American Republic historiography from new perspectives. Concepts such as information asymmetry, portfolio choice, and principal-agent dilemmas open up new scholarly vistas. Transcending the ongoing debates over the prevalence of either community or capitalism in early America, Wright offers fresh and compelling arguments that illuminate motivations for individual and collective actions, and brings agency back into the historical equation.

Wright argues that the Colonial rebellion was in part sparked by destabilizing British monetary policy that threatened many with financial insolvency; that in areas without modern financial institutions and practices, dueling was a rational means of protecting one's creditworthiness; that the principle-agent problem led to the institutionalization of the U.S. Constitution's system of checks and balances; and that a lack of information and education induced women to shift from active business owners to passive investors. Economists, historians, and political scientists alike will be interested in this strikingly novel and compelling recasting of our nation's formative decades.

 

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In a work that is really a collection of somewhat loosely related essays, Wright explores the transformation of American financial markets between 1780 and 1840, emphasizing the impacts of Revolution ... Leer comentario completo

Contenido

ARTISANAL DEMAND FOR BANK DISCOUNTS
131
THE MANHATTAN COMPANY AND BANK
134
BURR THE BANK AND THE CRUCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION
138
FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE COMMERCIAL REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION
142
NOTES
145
Credit Analysis and the Prevalence of Dueling
153
HOW INSTITUTIONAL LENDERS REDUCED INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
154
A BLOODIER MORE PERSONAL SOLUTION
159

Early US Constitutions as Solutions to the PrincipalAgent Problem
59
THE THEORY OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
60
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN THE COLONIAL ERA
62
THE SIMULTANEOUS EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
66
CONSTITUTIONAL METHODS FOR LIMITING AGENCY PROBLEMS IN GOVERNMENT
70
PENNSYLVANIAS FIRST CONSTITUTION AND THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
79
NEW YORKS FIRST CONSTITUTION AND THE US CONSTITUTION
80
CONCLUSIONS
85
Financial Development Economic Growth and Political Stability
89
PRECURSORS AND PRECEDENTS
91
THE US FINANCIAL REVOLUTION 17871800
97
EVIDENCE OF FINANCIALSECTOR EFFICIENCY AND SOPHISTICATION 17901850
103
EVIDENCE OF RELATIVE SIZE AND IMPORTANCE
107
CONCLUSIONS
123
NOTES
124
Banks and the Revolutionof 1800
127
A SHORT HISTORY OF BANKING IN EIGHTEENTHCENTURY AMERICA
130
NINETEENTHCENTURY RESIDUES OF CHARACTERBASED LENDING
164
THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF BUSINESS INFORMATION
167
CONCLUSIONS
168
NOTES
169
Financial Markets and the Subjugation of Women
173
THE EARLY US FINANCIAL SYSTEM
175
AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF INFORMATION
177
FEMALE BUSINESS VENTURES
179
CHANGES IN FEMALE INVESTMENT PATTERNS
182
DECREASED ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND BANK CREDIT
185
CONCLUSIONS
190
Requiem
195
NOTE
198
References
199
Index
219
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Acerca del autor (2002)

ROBERT E. WRIGHT is Lecturer in Economics at the University of Virginia. He is the author of The Origins of Commercial Banking in America, 1750-1800 (2001), and The Wealth of Nations Rediscovered: Integration and Expansion in American Financial Markets, 1780-1850 (2002).

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