mander in Chief, respecting the English wounded left at Talavera. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will apply to General Cuesta, that he may be permitted to pass the Spanish outposts and return again.

'Colonel Waters will show you the letters with which he is charged.

I have the honor to be, &c.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To General O'Donoju.

'MY DEAR SIR, 'Deleytosa, 9th August, 1809. 'I have heard that the Spanish head quarters were yesterday at Peraleda de Garbin; that the enemy's cavalry passed the river by the ford of Azutan, but that General Bassecourt still held possession of the bridge of Arzobispo : and that the Spanish head quarters were to be moved last night to Mesa de Ibor.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will make me acquainted with General Cuesta's movements, his present situation, and his future intentions. As it is impossible for us just at present to make use of the bridge of boats at Almaraz, I have desired General Craufurd to take the boats out of the water, and to remove them to a place where they will be protected from the effects of the enemy's fire.

The bridge over the little stream is left standing, as General Craufurd found the water so shallow, that it was a matter of indifference whether the bridge was there or not. The pontoon carriages are at the river side, and it would probably be desirable that the mules should be sent there also, in order to move them with greater facility, if necessary, for the defence of the passage at Almaraz.

In respect to the bridge of Arzobispo, the only view in which I think it would be advisable to destroy it is, that you might prevent the enemy from bringing his artillery against your posts at Mesa de Ibor, and in the mountains, which I conclude you will continue to hold. But upon this point the first question is, whether the enemy can bring artillery from the bridge of Talavera, along the left bank to Arzobispo ? the next, whether they can bring artillery across the ford at Azutan, or any other ford above Arzobispo? If they can, it is hardly worth while to destroy the bridge of Arzobispo.

VOL. V.

C

If they cannot, it is an object of importance to the defence of your posts in the mountains that it should be destroyed.

It is very clear to me that there is no difficulty in moving artillery of any dimensions from Arzobispo to the Ibor; and that being the case, the destruction of the bridge would depend upon the possibility of moving the artillery on the left. bank to Arzobispo. If you should be obliged to withdraw your posts from Arzobispo, I conclude that you will take care of your right flank, towards the Puerto de San Vicente. Believe me, &c.

• General O'Donoju.

6

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P.S. General Beresford, who is in the Puerto de Perales, informs me that the Duque del Parque occupies the Puerto de Baños. The enemy have no troops in Castille, and have passed 34,000 men from thence through the Puerto de Baños. All were through by the 3rd instant; Soult, Ney, Mortier, and Kellermann command these corps; some of them returned yesterday to Plasencia.'

• MY LORD,

To his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, K.P.

'Deleytosa, 9th August, 1809. I have not received any communication from General Cuesta since the morning of the 6th, (when at Peraleda de Garbin I saw General O'Donoju,) until I received this morning from Lieut. Colonel Roche a letter, of which the enclosed is a copy. I did not even know that General Cuesta had moved his head quarters from the bridge of Arzobispo, much less that any disaster had happened to his troops, even to the limited extent stated by Lieut. Colonel Roche.

About three o'clock this day, however, the Duque de Alburquerque arrived here and informed me, that the French cavalry had surprised the Spanish outposts at the bridge of Arzobispo, by crossing the river at a ford immediately above the bridge, at half past one; that the Spanish troops had given way, and that the French had possession of the bridge, of the cannon destined to its defence, and of five pieces belonging to the Duque's division which were left behind.

The Duque de Alburquerque states his belief that the French were in Peraleda de Garbin this morning, where your Excellency will have observed that General Cuesta's head quarters were yesterday afternoon.

· General Cuesta has since sent me a message by one of his aides de camp and Colonel Roche, from whom I understand that the General had not, to the moment of their departure from Mesa de Ibor at ten o'clock in the morning, brought any of his artillery or of his carriages across the Ibor.

On this side that river there is a high mountain, up which it is impossible to draw artillery, excepting by the assistance of men; and it is obvious that unless the General has saved Peraleda de Garbin and the positions between the Ibor and that village, the Spaniards must lose their artillery, although they may hold the position of the Mesa de Ibor.

I enclose to your Lordship the copy of a letter which I wrote to General O'Donoju on the 7th, and of another which I have just dispatched to him; but I acknowledge that I am apprehensive that the Spanish army will lose, or rather has lost, its artillery before this time.

I can do nothing to assist them; and indeed in any case it would have been impossible for me to do anything for their assistance, excepting by persuading General Cuesta to adopt early measures to pass his heavy artillery over the Ibor. 'I have the honor to be, &c.

• Marquis Wellesley.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Brigadier General Robert Craufurd.

'MY DEAR GENERAL,

Deleytosa, 9th August, 1809.

I have just received your letter, and conceive that you have done quite right in not destroying the little bridge. I have written to General Cuesta respecting mules to draw the pontoon carriages.

I have not yet been able to send you guns, as our horses were so much fatigued by the passage of the defiles. I hope I shall be able to send you some this evening.

I find that the Spanish head quarters were yesterday at Peraleda de Garbin, and I think it probable that they may have moved last night to Mesa de Ibor.

The French cavalry had crossed yesterday at a ford at Azutan, above Arzobispo; but the Spanish division under Bassecourt still held the bridge. I intended going to see

you this morning, but I do not like to be out of the way till the Spanish army is landed somewhere.

The Spanish advanced guard was surprised yesterday at the bridge of Arzobispo, in the middle of the day, and gave way, leaving in the enemy's hands the cannon for the defence of the bridge, and five pieces belonging to the Duque de Alburquerque's division.

Cuesta's head quarters were then at Peraleda de Garbin, and he moved them last night to Mesa de Ibor. He has now his advanced guard on the high ground on the right bank of the Ibor, the main body on the left bank, and the enemy have not this day pressed the advanced guard. The artillery and carriages of the Spanish army were still at four this morning in the low ground on the Ibor; and it is not improbable that if the enemy should attack and drive in the advanced guard, they will take the whole of it. In this case I am convinced that the Spanish army will disband. If they would make any exertion to get their artillery out of the Ibor this night, they ought to be able to defend themselves on the Mesa de Ibor, and possibly will do so.

If, however, I should find that they retire from that strong post, either by being beaten from it, or from any other cause, it will be very obvious to the whole world that they cannot fight for themselves. My intention is, in that case, to collect the British army at Jaraicejo; to send you orders to fall back upon that place; and then to march the whole to Truxillo, and thence by the high road to Badajos and Elvas.

I think it will be desirable for you to have an eye upon the road by which you marched from Mesa de Ibor to Romangordo; as should the enemy carry the Mesa de Ibor, it is not impossible that they might push something that way, which would lay very awkwardly upon your flank as you would draw out of the Puerto.

I have desired the Spaniards to occupy Val de Casas, as

part of their position at Mesa de Ibor, but I hardly expect they will. The guns will go to you in the morning.

SIR,

up

6

To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.

'Mesa de Ibor, noon, 10th August, 1809.

Having been down to the Ibor, I observed, that although the whole of the artillery, and the carriages of your Excellency's army, have crossed the river, they are not yet brought the hill. Your Excellency will find the mules and horses quite incapable of drawing them up; and that to attempt it by their means will destroy them. I should therefore recommend to your Excellency to employ working parties of 300 or 400 men each, of the troops, who would complete the work in a few hours.

It will also be necessary that your Excellency should send a battalion to the river at the bottom of the hill at Campillos, as there is on that hill, near the river, a turn in the road, at which all the guns must be unlimbered; and they can be drawn past that turn by hand only by the troops. I mention these circumstances, as, having passed through the defiles with the British artillery, I am acquainted with the mode in which the passages of your Excellency's carriages will be facilitated.

I conclude that your Excellency will occupy the right of the Ibor in strength, till your artillery shall have passed through the defiles; afterwards, I should conceive that one division of infantry, with the advanced guard at Mesa de Ibor, one division at Campillos, one division at Fresnedoso, and the main body with the cavalry at Deleytosa, would secure the right flank of the combined armies. By repairing the road from Deleytosa to the river at the bottom of the hill of Campillos, before referred to, and particularly by an alteration of the turn near the river, artillery may be employed in the defence of all these posts, with the certainty of being able to withdraw it, while the enemy can employ none in the attack.

I propose to move the head quarters of the British army to-morrow morning to Jaraicejo, in order to make room for