Mr. ALLEN of California. I would like to ask the gentleman to give the answer to one further question, and that is why the Congress at the time it adopted the language contrary to any degree of self-determination in the District--why did they do that, and that being so, why did they, and under what authority did they in 1801 set up a local government?

Mr. HARRIS. I would certainly like to have you answer it, too.
Mr. O'HARA. And what the language was.

Mr. HARRIS. And whether or not that was ever actually tested, and if the Supreme Court ever ruled on that delegation, whether it was rightly made.

Mr. ALLEN of California. May I ask whether the hearings of the committee during the Eightieth Congress are to be considered part of the record in the determination of this committee?

Mr. HARRIS. It is part of the record. I assume the hearings, any conference reports, or information, all that will be available to Members of Congress at any time, whether it was the Congress immediately preceding or perhaps a Congress many years ago.

Mr. ALLEN of California. I ask the question particularly because I had in mind a statement made by Engineer Commissioner Young of the District government. As I recall he made a statement to the committee on the subject and prefaced his remarks by referring to the organization of the District government as such "disorganization." Do you know whether those remarks are in the record?

Perhaps we can put this off the record.

(Disucssion off the record.)

Mr. HARRIS. That will be considered, and I would like to say we also have a report from the District Commissioners dated July 14, 1949, composed of seven pages, signed by John Russell Young, president of the Board of Commissioners, which without objection I would like to submit for the record and it will be put in the proper place. I have read it hurriedly. It is as follows:

JULY 14, 1949.

MY DEAR MR. MCMILLAN: The Commissioners submit herewith their report on H. R. 4981, Eighty-first Congress, a bill to provide for home rule and reorganization in the District of Columbia.

We do not believe that home rule would add anything to the cleanness, honesty, and freedom from graft and corruption of our city government. The example of other American cities certainly justifies this belief. Neverthless, local selfgovernment is the traditional heritage of every American. For this reason, as a matter of principle, we feel that our citizens should be given home rule, provided a responsible majority of them want it and provided there are adequate safeguards which will conserve the benefits bestowed on the city by its present form of government and grant to the citizens the right to govern their local affairs without administrative interference from Federal agencies, and yet will protect the paramount rights of the Federal Government in its own capital with respect to Federal matters.

Certain provisions of the bill the Commissioners believe should be given special consideration by the committee.

Section 302 (p. 9) prohibits a member of the District Council from holding an appointive office for which compensation is provided out of District funds. A member of the Council, however, may be an appointive officer or an employee of the United States, even an officer or employee of a governmental agency with which the District Government may have to enter into agreements. He may even be an officer or employee of the National Capital Park and Planning Commission, which will, under the bill, exercise extensive control over the District of Columbia Government. The question should be carefully considered as to whether this is advisable.

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Section 324 (b) (p. 11, lines 11 and 12) provides that "an ordinance (other than a zoning ordinance) shall take effect as law upon passage by the District Council." The question arises as to whether the Council can pass an ordinance and postpone the effective date under this provision since it is expressly provided in section 401 (c) (p. 19, lines 21 and 24) that legislative proposals may be made operative at a time later than the date on which they would otherwise take effect. It is frequently desirable to make ordinances effective only after the lapse of a certain time in order that the public may have ample notice of such ordinance and time within which to comply therewith. Also there are many statutes in the District giving the Commissioners authority to make regulations upon certain subjects, but which statutes provide that the regulations shall not be effective or enforceable until a fixed time after publication.

Section 333 (b) (p. 16, line 23) provides that if the National Capital Park and Planning Commission shall certify to the Council that a proposed zoning ordinance would adversely affect the interests of the Federal Government, such ordinance can only take effect if it is passed by the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the members of the Council then holding office. Such a certificate filed with the Council by the National Capital Park and Planning Commission would make it extremely difficult for the Council to pass the proposed ordinance and yet the property owners affected are given no right of hearing before the National Capital Park and Planning Commission. It must be remembered that the power to zone property in any particular way is not an absolute power. One's common-law right to use his property as he sees fit, so long as he does not violate the rights of others, can only be restricted or limited in the exercise of the police power. Zoning can be sustained only where it bears a reasonable relation to the public health, safety, or general welfare. Constitutional rights, as the Supreme Court has so often said, are a matter of degree. The hardship placed upon a property owner by a restriction upon the use of his property must be weighed against the benefit to others, but if the hardship placed upon the property owner is out of all proportion to the benefit to others, the zoning is confiscatory and void. To refuse arbitrarily to permit a man to use his property in a certain way merely because the interests of the Government might be adversely affected would violate the prohibition of the Constitution against the taking of property without due process of law and the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. This subsection also provides that if the zoning ordinance is passed it shall take effect on the day following its adoption. Here again it may be advisable to postpone the effective date to a later time.

Section 402 (p. 19, line 5) provides that if a legislative proposal made by the District Council is not disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress within 48 days or by the President within 10 days, the legislative proposal shall become law. There is a sharp conflict in legal opinion as to the constitutionality of this provision. Even though this provision should be held to be constitutional, until the question has actually been decided great uncertainty would exist in the District. Assume that a legislative proposal not disapproved should change the method prescribed by existing law for executing and acknowledging deeds to real estate. Until the constitutionality of the legislative proposal has been settled, one purchasing real estate would not know whether he should require the deed to be executed and acknowledged according to the present law or the law as set forth in the legislative proposal. Attention is invited to the fact that in the Auchincloss bill, H. R. 28, the legislative proposal does not become law until affirmatively approved by the Congress and the President. Also it may be pointed out that there is no provision for Congress amending the legislative proposal. If there is any provision in the proposal to which the Congress or the President objects, the proposal must be disapproved in toto. Very few bills pass Congress without amendment.

Section 403 (a) (p. 20, line 14) goes even further with respect to emergency legislation and permits a legislative proposal to go into effect immediately upon certification of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the necessity for the prompt taking effect of the legislative proposal.

Under sections 701 and 702, the District may issue bonds to finance capital projects, provided a legislative proposal so to do has become law and has been approved by a referendum. The amount of such indebtedness can equal in the aggregate 5 percent of the assessed value of the taxable real property in the District. This will permit the District to create a bonded indebtedness of nearly $80,000,000. Under section 731 (p. 37) the District Council is given authority, for the purpose of paying the principal of such bonds and the interest thereon, to levy ad valorem taxes without limit of rate or amount on all taxable property in

the District. The District Council is not given authority to levy new taxes or to increase the rates of any taxes now authorized other than ad valorem taxes. Thus the real estate and tangible personal property in the District are primarily charged with the payment of the bonds. Over 60 percent of the land in the District is exempt from tax. Thus there would be hanging over every real-estate owner in the District the threat of a substantial increase in his property taxes which might substantially affect property values.

Under the provisions of section 831 (pp. 45, 47) the District is required to pay 60 percent of the estimated expenditures of the "District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia" (the title of which has now been changed to the United States District Court. for the District of Columbia); 30 percent of the estimated expenditures of the "United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia" (the title of which been changed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit) and 60 percent of the estimated expenditures of the office of the United States district attorney for the District of Columbia and the office of the United States marshal for the District of Columbia. At the present time, the District receives the same percentage of the fees and fines collected by these courts and officers by section 832 (p. 49) provides that after June 30, 1951, the District shall receive no portion of such fees and fines.

Under section 903 (a) (p. 52) the functions of the Board of Public Welfare are transferred to the Director of the Department of Welfare. This Board under existing law is an independent agency, not under the Commissioners except for budgetary control. The Board is not abolished by the bill. If all of its functions are transferred to the Director it would continue to exist with no duties to perform. Section 904 (a) (p. 53) transfers all of the functions of the Recreation Board to the Director of the Department of Recreation but does not abolish the Board. This Board now exists as an independent agency. With its functions transferred to the Director it also would have no duties to perform. The act, however, contemplates its continuance since it abolishes the office of the member of the Board representing the Board of Commissioners and in his place is substituted a member of the National Capital Park and Planning Commission who resides in the District. The effect of this change is to give the District government no representative upon the Board, and, on the other hand, increases the representation of Federal agencies.

Section 907 (a) (p. 55) transfers the office of the Recorder of Deeds of the District to the Director of the Department of Law. The offices of the Corporation Counsel and Assistant Corporation Counsel are abolished, but the office of Recorder of Deeds is not. The Recorder of Deeds under existing law is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, whereas the Director of the Department of law will be appointed by the District Manager. This will create an anamalous situation in having an officer appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate under the direction of one appointed by lesser authority, the District Manager. Furthermore, we can see no reason for placing the office of the Recorder of Deeds in the Department of Law. Such an office is purely an administrative office. Its duties are such as are usually performed in the States by the clerks of the county courts. The Recorder of Deeds is not a law officer. The duties of the Director of the Department of Law of a legal nature will be sufficiently burdensome to require his full time and attention without further placing upon him the responsibility of supervising an administrative office which now consists of about 60 employees. The placing of the officer of the Recorder of Deeds in the Department of Law can hardly result in efficiency.

In section 909 (p. 57) the functions of the Board of Library Trustees are transferred to the Department of Librarian, but it is still left in existence with no duties to perform.

Section 910 (a) (p. 58) reads as follows:

"The functions

"(1) Of the Minimum Wage and Industrial Safety Board and the District Unemployment Compensation Board; and

"(2) Transferred to the Board of Education by section 1102 (a), with respect to the enforcement and administration of laws regulating child labor; are hereby transferred to the Director of the Department of Labor."

This subsection is not clear. Inasmuch as none of the functions of the Minimum Wage and Industrial Safety Board or the District Unemployment Compensation Board are transferred to the Board of Education, we assume that what is intended is that the functions of the Minimum Wage and Industrial Safety Board and the District Unemployment Compensation Board and the functions transferred to the Board of Education by section 1102 (a) with respect

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to the enforcement and administration of laws regulating child labor are transferred to the Director of the Department of Labor.

Section 911 (c) (p. 59) provides that the office of the member of the District Boxing Commission who is also a member of the Metropolitan Police force is abolished. The Boxing Commission strongly recommends that the police member of the Commission be retained, for the reason that it has found that undesirable characters unfortunately identified with various branches of sport make it a point not to apply for licenses in the District of Columbia, and the Commission feels that this is largely due to a member of the police force being on the Commission.

In section 1002 (f) the salary of each member of the Public Utilities Commission is fixed at the rate of $7,500 per annum. This salary, the Commissioners believe, is far too low to attract the caliber of men required to sit upon this Commission. The work is important and takes full time. The present salaries are $9,706.50 per annum each.

Section 1206 (b) (p. 81) fixes the qualifications of voters and requires with respect to residence either domicile or a place of abode in the District for 1 year. Whether the right to vote should extend to persons though they may be residents here who are not domiciled here and who retain a right to vote in another jurisdiction, is a highly controversial subject. However, it may be pointed out that temporary residents in the District will have a tendency to vote for the members of the District Council who promise most in the way of immediate public improvements to be financed by bond issues. Such temporary residents will not be concerned with the tax burden imposed upon the permanent residents and upon those who come into the District later, but will be concerned primarily with securing public improvements which they may enjoy at the present time. The Commissioners are opposed to extending the privilege of voting to those who are not domiciled in the District or who retain voting privileges elsewhere.

Section 1207 (a) (p. 82) provides that no person shall be registered as a voter unless, among other things, he executes a registration affidavit completed in his own handwriting, unless prevented by physical disability. This is apparently intended to limit voting to those who have received sufficient education at least to be able to write, and yet under the bill a totally uneducated person with a physical disability is entitled to vote.

Subsections (d), (e) and (f) of section 1211 (p. 85) set up the procedures to be followed where a vote is challenged. They, however, do not set up procedures whereby a certain ballot may be identified as the ballot of the person challenged and yet preserve the secrecy of the vote.

Section 1404 (p. 98) contains provisions relating to the Register of Wills and provides that the fees and emoluments from such office shall be paid to the Office of the Director of the Department of Finance. There is a bill now pending in Congress, H. R. 4706, to transfer the Office of the Register of Wills from the government of the District of Columbia to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for budgetary and administrative purposes, which bill passed the House on June 22, 1949, and has been favorably reported by the Senate District Committee.

Section 1405 (p. 99) contains provisions relative to the National Capital Park and Planning Commission. Attention is invited to the fact that a bill, S. 1931, has been favorably reported by the Senate committee changing the personnel and powers of this Commission.

In subsection (c) of section 1405 of the home-rule bill it is provided that the function of preparing, developing, and maintaining a comprehensive, consistent, and coordinated plan for the National Capital and its environs shall be exercised by the Commission on behalf of the District government as well as the Federal Government, and no officer or agency of the District may exercise any function in conflict with such function of the Commission. This subsection also provides that the term "comprehensive plan" as used in section 2 of the District of Columbia Zoning Act of 1938 shall mean the plan prepared, developed, and maintained by the Commission. Section 322 (a) of this bill (page 10) transfers the functions of the Zoning Commission to the District Council. The Zoning Commission, under existing law, is authorized to make regulations in accordance with a comprehensive plan but no such regulations may be adopted without a public hearing. The effect of subsection (c) of section 1404 of this bill is to require the Zoning Committee of the District Council to make its regulations pursuant to the plan adopted by the National Capital Park and Planning Commission, but no public hearing is required before that Commission; hence the property owners of the District

will be deprived of the protection which the present Zoning Act affords them of being heard on questions affecting the establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive plan. It would indeed be a strange situation if a law purporting to give our citizens greater control over their local government should place a large measure of that control in the hands of a Federal agency which is appointed by the President; which consists principally of nonresidents; and which has not the slightest administrative responsibility for the effect of its decisions upon the rights of property owners.

In section 1903 (d) it is again provided, with respect to those who may vote in the referendum to determine whether the charter shall be adopted, that a person shall not be registered unless he executes a registration affidavit completed in his own handwriting unless prevented by physical disability. Here again, under this provision one lacking all education may vote if physically disabled.

Time has not permitted the ascertainment of advice from the Bureau of the Budget as to the relationship of this report to the program of the President. Respectfully,

JOHN RUSSELL YOUNG, President, Board of Commissioners, District of Columbia.

Mr. O'HARA. May I ask my colleague a couple of questions which have been bothering me for a long time?

Of course this so-called Kefauver bill is not the same as the Auchincloss bill of the Eightieth Congress. The gentleman will agree that is correct?

Mr. DEANE. Yes.

Mr. O'HARA. And in the Kefauver bill it provides for the election of nine Council members and the appointment by the President of two Council members.

Mr. DEANE. Yes.

Mr. O'HARA. Does the gentleman see any reason for the appointment by the President of two Council members, if we are to have the voice of the people in home rule in the District of Columbia?

Mr. DEANE. Well, that came up for quite a lengthy discussion during our many days of hearings and we had many meetings that were not official meetings when we would go into a lot of these policy determinations; and the fact that we did not come to that conclusion is evidence that we felt that perhaps that was not in keeping with our views, at least at that time.

Mr. O'HARA. Under the Kefauver bill the election commissioners, as they are called, are to be appointed by the President. Do you think that should be, as a matter of principle or policy, or that they should be elected? In other words, why shouldn't they be elected by the people, the same as the members of the Council?

Mr. DEANE. It would certainly extend home rule quite definitely to elect the election officials. However, I do not know what was in the minds of members of the Kefauver committee. It may be they had the feeling, as I stated a moment ago, that we went too far in our considerations; that they felt that instead of going to the extent that we did, that they would reserve certain rights to the President that

we did not.

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Chairman, I noticed an editorial in the TimesHerald this morning entitled, "Somebody's Been Kidding," and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the record at this point. Mr. HARRIS. Without objection so ordered.

(The editorial is as follows:)