⚫ be this as it will, it is humbly presumed, no wife or faith<ful chriftian will cenfure him, who endeavours to give a new and fatisfactory answer to every new attack; and, as often as the old objections are revived, fearches the armoury of the church for those weapons, wherewith the like affailants have been foiled in former times. To rub the ruft of antiquity, and of the schools from these; to give them a new edge; • and to wield and point them with skill against the prefent • adverfaries of our faith; is a work of no small service and merit. To be attacked, and not defended, is the fame as to be defeated. The adverfary does, and will attack; it follows therefore, that we muft either defend, or fubmit, and give a triumph to men who will not fail to vaunt it, to ⚫ the great emolument of a scheme and cause we still think pernicious.'

Upon reading this we expected to find the subjects our author treats of difcufs'd in a very fatisfactory way; great conciseness and perfpicuity in his method of illuftrating them, and a variety of new arguments urged in fupport of the fundamental articles of our faith. But after perufing his difcourfes with due attention, our expectations were much difappointed; he has advanced little that is new; and that little not much to the purpose; his manner is neither concife nor perspicuous; and he is, withal, dogmatical and arrogant; his ftile is rugged, and, in a word, both his fpirit and language, when he treats of controverfial fubjects, are fuch as might naturally be expected. from one of thofe divines, whom lord Bolingbroke denominates orthodox bullies.

His first volume confifts of controverfial difcourfes, chiefly on the evidences and fundamental doctrines of chriftianity. We fhall give a fhort view of fome of them, and refer those who are defirous of further fatisfaction to the author himself.

In his first difcourfe, he lays down fome rules to enable an honeft inquirer to find out what is the true religion. His firft rule is, that we must never receive a religion which con tradicts sense and reason. The fecond, that we must not receive any religion, which does not evidently prove itself to come from God. A religion which comes from God, we are told, must have thefe figns of its original; antiquity, miracles, edification, and power.

In the fecond difcourfe, he endeavours to prove that the true religion is revealed to us in the books of the old and new Teftament. And in the third, inquiries with what views, on what principles, with what difpofitions, and by what rules we ought to read thefe books. The fourth contains proofs

of

of the unity of God. That which demonftrates the being of a God, fays our author, points out to us, with equal clearness, his unity, and fhews us, that as there is a God, fo there can be precisely but one. Part of his reasoning on this fubject is as follows:

"That we ourselves, and all other things which fall under the obfervation of our fenfes, or offer themselves, by any me⚫dium of our knowledge, as objects of our mere internal facul<ties, one only excepted, are finite and bounded Beings, is a < truth which a very little reflection will convince us of. They are bounded in their extent, and paffive powers, if material; in their active powers, if mental. Such Beings could not have been the primary caufes, either of themselves or other things; of themselves they could not, because the act of cre⚫ating supposes existence in the agent, previous to that act; nor of other things, because it requires unlimited power to raise any thing out of nothing. Neither could they have been felf-exiftent, because in that cafe they mult have been unlimited, and independent as to exiftence, which is abfurd; < for no two things can be unlimited or infinite in any one respect, inasmuch as each could not poffefs the whole of any one attribute. Altho' it were poffible to conceive, that two or more Beings might have two or more attributes unli<mited, and that each of them might have a share of any one; yet to fuppofe, that each can have all, is a flat contradiction. But he who is felf-exiftent, hath independent, and therefore unlimited, exiftence; or, to exprefs it better, he hath perfect existence, which can neither be fo multiplied, or divided, as to leave perfect existence to another. A felf• exiftent Being must exist neceffarily and eternally; neceffarily, because if we take away the neceffity of his existence, it becomes indifferent whether he exifts or not, unless by the will of another, which is wholly contrary to the idea ⚫ of self-existence; and eternally, because no Being can arife out of nothing, but by the will and power of a prior caufe, which totally deftroys the fuppofition of felf-existence. A • neceffarily felf-exiftent Being muft therefore exist through all duration. He muft alfo exift through all space; for if we ⚫ could fuppofe him not to exift in any particular part of space, we might as well fuppofe him not to exift in another part of it, and fo on in all, which would take away the neceffity of his existence, and reduce him either to a dependent Being, or non-existence, Hence it appears, that there can be but < one infinite unlimited Being; and that all other Beings must ⚫ have had a beginning, and may have an end. They must ⚫ therefore have borrowed Being from fome fufficient cause. REVIEW, Jan, 1755.

1

But

• But what cause would have been fufficient to raise them out of nothing, and to bestow fuch beauty of form, fuch har< mony of qualities, fuch excellence of nature, on them? None lefs than infinite; infinite in duration, otherwise nothing could have been produced for want of a first cause : infinite in power and wifdom, or nothing could have been < produced so useful, so perfect, as the works of creation are • in their kind, nor fo good and happy as the intellectual part of it may be, for want of a fufficient cause.

From hence again it appears, that there can be but one • infinite, that is, one unlimited Being; and that two such are a contradiction, inafmuch as they muft limit each other. • Infinite is improperly attributed to creatures, and only in refpect to our limited capacities. Thus it is that matter is faid to be infinitely divifible. And even when infinity is • afcribed to space and duration, we afcribe them to nothing, and therefore speak abfurdly, if space and duration be not • confidered as attributes of the one real infinite. Abfolute, real infinity, can therefore be the attribute of one Being only, and can admit neither divifion nor multiplicity.

Neither can it admit defect in the smallest degree; becaufe defect implies limitation. Of all defects, folly and fin are the greatest inftances of weakness and limitation, and therefore the fartheft removed from the nature of a true infinite. Moral neceffity is the next, because it excludes liberty, whereas liberty is effential to an unlimited and un• bounded Being. These two pofitions, whereby we affert the neceffity of goodness, and of moral liberty, in the one <infinite Being, may feem contradictory to our narrow apprehenfions, which cannot conceive them confiftent in our• felves; but they are fo far from it, when attributed to the finite, that we fee they can be feparately demonftrated to be • neceflary attributes of that Being.'

Having endeavoured to prove that there is but one God, our author proceeds, in his fifth and fixth difcourfes, to fhew that Jefus Chrift is that only one God. He firft endeavours to remove the most material objections to his divinity, and then lays down the principal proofs of it, as they are found in fcripture. This he does by attempting to fhew that as Jefus is the Meffiah, the Word, and the fon of God, he must be God. Secondly, that the incommunicable attributes of God are given to him by the infpired writers. Thirdly, that the incommunicable name, or names, of God, are given to him by those writers. Fourthly, that he takes the fame to himself, and denies the being of any other God. And, laftly, that divine 9

worship,

worship, that is, the incommunicable worship of God, is actually given him by divine appointment.

In the feventh difcourfe, he examines the fcriptural proofs for the divinity of the Holy Ghoft, under the following heads, viz. his name, his attributes, his worship, his works or offices, and the divine ftile or title afcribed to him in the word of God. What he fays on the head of worship may fuffice as a fpeciHear him :

men.

He is proved to be God, from the divine worship prefcribed and paid to him in the holy fcriptures. The apoftles. were commanded, to go teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The facrament of baptism, we are fenfible, is a most folemn act ⚫ of worship, done in the name, and by the authority of God alone, wherein, at the fame time that the new christian is confecrated to him, the refpective bleffing of each perfon is invoked and conferred. Now, here the Holy Ghoft appears in equal authority with both the father and the fon, and is, by confequence, equally the object of that worship which is paid in this religious act; nay, fo far as it is an act of invocation, he seems to be peculiarly addreffed; because his ⚫ defcent on the perfon baptized immediately follows; as that ⚫ which diftinguishes the baptifm of Chrift from the baptifm • of John. In confequence of this initiation, we are to be• lieve in him, and to pray to him for grace and peace, as, ⚫ well as to the first and fecond perfons. Accordingly St. Paul prays diftinctly to the three perfons by name; the grace of • the Lord Jefus Chrift, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all.

It was for thefe and the like reafons, that the church, in every age, hath repeated hymns, and paid divine honours to the Holy Ghoft, as well as to the other perfons of the blessed trinity.'- This is an eafy way of getting over a difficulty, and is, no doubt, very perfpicuous and fatisfactory.

In the eighth difcourfe he endeavours to vindicate the doctrine of the trinity: part of his extravagant rant upon this fubject we fhall lay before our readers.

I may venture, fays he, to lay it down for a rule, that, in treating of God, and his revelation, especially of that which is moft myfterious in reference to either, we ought to proceed with at least as much method and caution as we do in lower fciences, wherein there is not fo great danger of error, nor so much mischief arifing from it. We are there• fore not to reafon about God without axioms to found our ⚫ reafonings on; nor to build on certain axioms at one time, C 2 • and

and to depart from them at another; juft as our caprice, or the pinch of an argument, may tempt us. Now what is the grand axiom of Christianity? Is it not agreed, that the Icriptures are the word of God, and, as fuch, implicitely to be believed? If this is the cafe, our apprehenfions have nothing to do, but to imbibe the plain notices of fcripture; nor our reafon, but to argue from fcripture. What master in any science difputes the axioms, or felf-evident principles of that science, or afks a reason for them? Who, in phyfics, afks a reafon why the whole is greater than any of its દ parts? And what Chriftian, in theology, fhall ask a reason for that which the fcripture affirms? Altho' what God • tells us in fcripture is not evident of itself, but requires his • veracity to evidence it; yet, when once it is fo evidenced, . common sense will allow it, it is then on a level with that which is felf-evident; or, rather, is more evident; for God's affirmation can give more evidence to a thing, than any thing can give to itself. We may take that for felf-evident which is not; but God cannot be mistaken.

Now I have given abundant proof, that God affirms his own unity, as alfo the divinity of the Son, and Holy Spirit. To afk a reafon for either, or how the one can confift with the other, is to speak like a deift, or an atheist; is to doubt whether the fcriptures are the word of God; or to • deny the veracity of God, and to prefer reafon, in a matter confeffedly above reafon, to his word and affirmation. Let

our opponents, therefore, tell us, whether they mean to en⚫ter into debate with us, as Chriftians, or deifts, (for it is, indeed, no eafy matter to diftinguish, when we are every moment to be dodged from bare reafon to fcripture, and back again from fcripture to independent reafon) that we may know under what principles or axioms we are to difpute. If they declare for Chriftianity and fcripture, and then tell us our doctrine of the Trinity is unintelligible and inconfiftent; we confidently anfwer, there is not a more intelligible doctrine in the world, than that of the Trinity, as we hold it.

And do we not underftand the doctrine of the Trinity? Can any thing be more eafily understood than these propofitions? There is but one God. The Father is that one The Holy Ghost is that and the Holy Ghost are

God. The Son is that one God. one God. The Father, the Son, three diftinct perfons.

This is the doctrine of the Trinity, which every clown can underftand; and our adverfaries perfectly well underftand it, or they could not afk us to account for the con

• fiftency