EXAMINATION

CHAPTER VI.

OF SOME

OBJECTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN

MADE TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

THERE are many who, not appreciating rightly the arguments given in the last chapter, do not recognise the importance of political economy and are averse to its being studied. These persons, in different ways and with different objects in view, have waged a somewhat furious war against it. Some declare it to be an impossible science; others hold it to be at the best useless; others finally condemn it for many reasons as dangerous. A separate examination of the principal objections of this nature will show that they all lead to absurdities:

Whately, Introductory Lectures on Political Economy. London, 1831.

F. Ferrara, Importanza dell' Economia politica. Turin, 1849.

J. Kautz, Die National-Oekonomik als Wissenschaft. Vienna, 1858, pp. 423-442, and the authors referred to there.

The most radical objection, resolving itself into a denial of the existence of any theory of political economy, is that which asserts that there is no basis

for its solid construction as a science. It is attempted to prove this in two ways. Some, reasoning à priori, say that political economy cannot exist; others, following the à posteriori method, say that it does not exist.

The first observe that facts of the industrial class are of their nature complicated and changeable, because they depend partly on very different local circumstances (such as country, climate, &c.), and partly on the free will of man modified by education, habits, opinions and prejudices. This makes it impossible to study and to estimate them correctly. Phenomena so variable and interests so complicated cannot have constant laws nor be referred to invariable principles.

It may be answered that the complication and changefulness of social facts in general, and of economic facts in particular, in no way exclude similarities and analogies between certain effects nor their recurrence on the repetition of certain causes. These prove that economic phenomena as a whole form a wise and well-ordered organism. For the same reasons anatomy and physiology are not rendered impossible by the fact of physical dissimilarities between individuals, or of the constantly recurring effects of disease. It ought then to be clear that variations in particular cases do not prevent the existence of general laws of value, price, wages, interest and profits. For the rest, even the variations and perturbations of the economic organism succeed one another with a certain regularity and present even in their anomalies something normal which obeys constant laws. Among the medical sciences we have morbid anatomy in addition to normal anatomy, and pathology in addition to physiology, both describing the organs and functions of the human body in a state of disease. So in political economy we

have a theory of perturbations (e.g. famines, monetary and commercial crises, &c.) which is a necessary complement to the theory of the normal development of economic functions.

Those who are satisfied with a merely empirical demonstration of the non-existence of political economy cite in support of their position :

1. The hypotheses on which it is founded;

2. The abstractions which it uses;

3. The problems which it leaves unsolved; 4. The disputes which it fails to settle.

As to the said hypotheses, we can at once reply that this is not the case with the whole science. It results from what has already been stated in discussing its method, that many economic principles are deduced from truths which are either self-evident or susceptible of strict proof by means of observation. We may add that hypotheses, when they are not arbitrary, may be the instruments of most valuable scientific discoveries. Those that are wholly gratuitous and irrelevant will always be found to have originated with some incompetent exponent of the science. For the rest the history of the physical and mathematical sciences teaches us that, though they are truly called positive sciences, many of their theorems rest upon purely hypothetical bases, and many which were once held to be axioms are now called in question.

If we have no abstractions, no analyses, no formation of genera and species, but content ourselves with the mere verification of individual cases, we can have no science, but only a barren empiricism. Grammar, logic, algebra, law, also make use of abstractions, which are not only useful but indispensable. And if abstractions, like

enlighten the future. It ought to recognise the necessity for temporary expedients no less than the universality of certain scientific principles, and hence to perceive that the narrow point of view of the historic school must lead to errors. It will suffice to compare the two first volumes of Roscher's system,-essentially in accordance with the views of more orthodox economists, -with the books of the ablest followers of the so-called philosophic school. We shall thus be convinced that the many excellent illustrations set before us in his work have not been able to effect any substantial modification of the general principles taught in Germany itself by Hermann and Rau.

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CHAPTER V.

IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

WHAT has been said in the preceding chapters as to the definition of political economy, its divisions, its proper method and its relation to other sciences, will have already given an idea of its importance. In speaking especially of this subject, let us remark that this importance arises from the nature of the subjectmatter of which it treats, from its general point of view, from the function which it exercises, and from the aim of its inquiries.

Hence it may be inferred that political economy has a twofold importance; theoretical with regard to the pure science and to the usefulness of the knowledge it gives; practical with regard to the applied science, and the advantage which may be drawn in public and private life from the guiding principles which it points out.

The pure science of political economy has a large general utility, because it constitutes an indispensable element of wide and solid culture, which cannot be attained without competent knowledge of the laws governing the social ordering of wealth. That complicated and very interesting mass of phenomena,