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according actions affections agent allow appear appetite apply approve arising Aristotle association become Benevolence called cause Chapter character common condition conduct Conscience consequences considers consists constitution desire determined disposition distinction doctrine duty equal Ethics evil excellence exercise existence expressed external fact faculty fear feelings follow friendship gives ground happiness highest honour human idea individual intellectual interest judgment Justice kind knowledge less mankind matter means mind moral moral sense motive nature necessary never object obligation opinion original ourselves pain particular passions perfect person philosophy pleasure political position practical present principle proper Prudence punishment pure question rational reason reference regard relation remarks requires respect result right and wrong rules says sense sentiment society standard Stoics sympathy theory things tion true truth universal Utility virtue virtuous whole
Página 288 - The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
Página 135 - The RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which in his own judgment and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
Página 298 - Our notion, therefore, of the claim we have on our fellow-creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of our existence, gathers feelings around it so much more intense than those concerned in any of the more common cases of utility, that the difference in degree (as is often the case in psychology) becomes a real difference in kind. The claim assumes that character of absoluteness, that apparent infinity, and incommensurability with all other considerations, which constitute the distinction...
Página 319 - ... the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law.
Página 292 - The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same — a feeling in our own mind ; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility.
Página 132 - And last of all, men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, though never so absurd, and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak against them ; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but that they think so.
Página 292 - ... derived from sympathy, from love, and still more from fear; from all the forms of religious feeling; from the recollections of childhood and of all our past life; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally even self-abasement.
Página 292 - On the other hand, if, as is my own belief, the moral feelings are not innate, but acquired, they are not for that reason the less natural. It is natural to man to speak, to reason, to build cities, to cultivate the ground, though these are acquired faculties.
Página 245 - The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light.
Página 137 - ... and to have it as DUE. For the right is transferred in the propounding of the prize and in throwing down the money, though it be not determined to whom but by the event of the contention. But there is between these two sorts of merit this difference: that...