and the West, became for Hungary the sources of dread and the causes of suffering, and she turned towards the Sultans as to Protectors. This change occurred in the sixteenth century, when Turkey had ceased to be dangerous, but was still powerful. It was, in fact, at the instigation of the defeated competitor of Ferdinand (brother of Charles V) that the Turks invaded Austria and besieged Vienna. If Hungary did, under the most trying circumstances, preserve her ancient Institutions down to these evil days, it is to be attributed to that confidence, no less than to that Constitution's inherent worth.

So long as this latent alliance with Turkey imposed on Austria respect for the Constitution of Hungary, that country was the main strength of the Emperor at Vienna: its support was yielded to him' on every contingency, not by a blind and slavish submission, but by a free loyalty of the people, exercised through theorgan of their legitimate Representatives. Maria Theresa was enabled to maintain the seven years' war against Prussia, only after carrying her infant son to the Diet at Presburg, and entrusting him and herself to its chivalrous guardianship. Again, against Napoleon was Francis enabled to make head in consequence of the enthusiastic declaration of the Diet of Presburg and its steady refusal to accede to the overtures of France. But the circumstance peculiarly bearing upon present events, was the war of the Spanish succession. The Austrian encroachments had at that time driven Hungary into rebellion. Louis XIV did not neglect the occasion thus offered to him, not only of paralysing Austria, and depriving the Allies (England and Holland) of her support, but of subduing the Empire itself while securing the inheritance of Spain. There were, however, then in England, not Diplomatists but Statesmen: Bolingbroke was still writing despatches, and had not taken to essays. The Cabinet of St. James perceived that Austria could be no Ally if Hungary was her foe, and that Hungary could be her friend only on one condition, the preservation of her rights; therefore, on being applied to by the Hungarians,

it hastened to offer its good offices, which were successful in a settlement of differences between the two nations, Hungary and Austria, and the two Sovereigns, though one person, the King and the Emperor. This Treaty, concluded under the mediation of England, was signed at Szathmar, in 1711. In treating of Spain in 1834, we could find no reason for England's interference; in Hungary, in 1848, we are equally destitute of a reason for her non-interference; and if we accept the only reason suggested in the one case,-that of opposition to Russia where no Russia appeared, we can only be the more perplexed in accounting for the other.

Let us consider in what position Hungary will now stand to Austria in any future war. Let us take the cases of a rupture with Turkey, with France, and with Russia.

1. The sympathies between the Turks and the Hungarians, were, after all, one-sided. The recollections enduring in the hearts of the former, had in the latter been in recent times overlaid by their connection with Europe; thus Austria, in her last three wars with Turkey, found no difficulty in obtaining from the Diet its contingent in troops and its contribution in money. Were a war now to break out, she would be under no necessity indeed to apply to Presburg for a contingent, and the Hungarians would without opposi tion be enrolled, and sent forward to the frontier. Need I ask what effects would follow the first hostile shot?-even if the troops did not pass over to the Sultan, Hungary would rise as one man, to shake off the now detested yoke of Austria.

2. The Diet of Presburg, which declared against Louis XIV and Napoleon, no longer existing, the first symptom of a difference with France would force Austria to send all her disposable force away from the Rhine, and to concentrate it on the Danube. In such a war Hungary would no longer be the right hand of Austria, but the principal Ally of her enemy. She would be to Austria what Poland is to Russia, multiplied sevenfold.

3. Of a war with Russia I need not speak. If Russia's

whole disposable force was required to bring Hungary, even after an exhausting struggle, into submission to Vienna, how can Austria presume to stand a moment before that Ally, now backed by the Dependency which her own arms had before reduced.

Had England known that it was her own hand which had stifled Poland, Hungary might have been spared. If she could now understand that it was again her hand that had stifled Hungary, Austria and Turkey may hereafter be spared. I shall make the endeavour to put her in possession of this truth, from the Blue Books. We must first, however, glance at the petty treacheries within, by which armies were led to slaughter.

81

CHAPTER II.

Events in Hungary.

Ar the very moment of the dispersion of its Government Hungary was achieving at Pakozd its first victory. The vaunting Jellachich was absolutely beaten by a handful of men; he signed a suspension of arms, and decamped in the night, leaving ten thousand of his rearguard prisoners.

The Austrian Government, infuriated at the murder of Count Lamberg and the defeat of Pakozd, declared Jellachich, who had been so easily defeated, and so ignominiously driven out, Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, and reinforced his army with the garrison of the capital. A sanguinary Insurrection at Vienna itself was the result.

The Hungarian army had pursued Jellachich to the frontier; there it halted, waiting legal authority to cross. The Diet at Vienna gave an evasive answer, and enabled Windischgrätz to assemble and dispose his forces for the bombardment of the city. The Hungarian army arrived too late, and was placed by treachery in the power of the Austrians; its general, Moga, said before the court martial, by which he was afterwards tried, that the Austrian generals did not know how to take complete advantage of the opportunity he had given them.

Kossuth, on the field of battle (Schwechat), displaced Moga, and made over the command to Görgey: from that hour the Russian Intervention became inevitable. It has been supposed that the treason of Görgey was an afterthought I have it from Hungarian officers that, at that very moment, he spoke undisguisedly of the futility of the struggle;*

:

*He had personal ties with the establishment of the Archduke Michael. Strange expressions are attributed to him, which were interpreted as marks of genius, as those of Szechenyi were of madness.

yet it was the offer to lead the troops to Vienna that induced Kossuth to give him the command.

Görgey retreated across the frontier, followed by Windischgrätz; both armies then remained in inaction for weeks! In consequence of Görgey's representations of the necessity of concentration, the troops were collected from all parts, and placed under his command. Windischgrätz at last advanced. Görgey had drawn out his forces on an extended line-they were driven in upon every point, save one (Wieselburg); he announced to the Government this action as a victory, and retreated. First, he neglected to take up a position on the Lake Neusiedler, from which he could not have been dislodged; next, he passed through Raab, neglecting equally the intrenchments, which had, at great expense, been thrown up; then avoiding the impregnable position of Comorn, he made a straight course to Buda, as if, like the flying Scythian, to draw the Austrians on. Pertzel advancing with about 13,000 men, reached Moor, when Görgey was distant about fifteen miles, and making sure of support, engaged the advanced guard of Windischgrätzhe was left to be beaten. Himself neglecting the Capital, its defences, its defenders, and the Danube, passed by Buda in hurried flight, evacuated the town, and abandoned the defence of the river and of the castle. Had he made a stand anywhere, he would have been joined by Pertzel's, and other small corps then on their march; new levies were hastily being raised, and the army of 20,000 men in the south was marching to join him; even while his army was at the lowest number it could not have been left in the rear; had he stood still anywhere Windischgrätz could not have penetrated into Hungary.

Görgey had, during his retreat, written to the Committee of Defence to say that he could not insure the safety of the capital twenty-four hours: the Diet, in consequence, retired to Debretzin. He now issued a Proclamation, in which he charged the Diet with abandoning the army, and declared