176 SIEGE RAISED. troops were becoming quite sickly, over fifty a day being sometimes reported on the surgeon's roll, their effective force being further weakened by the frequent desertions of non-commissioned officers and privates. Finding it impossible, therefore, to continue the siege with soldiers whose term of enlistment was mostly expired, with Indians sulkily retained by bribes, with cannon unequal to the task required, amidst the prostrating heats of an almost tropical sun, and without a blockading fleet, Oglethorpe ordered the siege to be raised on the 20th of July. Such of the train, ammunition and provisions as were serviceable, were embarked on board the men-of-war for Charleston; and breaking up his camp at Anastasia, he crossed over with his troops to the main land, and with drums beating and colours flying, marched in the day-time, within gun-shot of the castle, to his encampment, three miles distant. The next day he marched nine miles, and the day following reached the St. John's, having driven back a party of five hundred men who made a sortie upon his rear-guard. He reached Frederica the last of July, from which point the different corps returned to their several homes. The formal siege lasted thirty-eight days, from the 13th of June to 20th of July, during which the English lost less than fifty killed, including those in Fort Moosa, and about as many wounded, while the Spaniards, by their own account, lost four forts, with their ordnance, munitions and garrisons, and more than four hundred killed and taken prisoners. Though Oglethorpe failed to capture St. Augustine, the siege was yet very serviceable to the colony by deterring the Spaniards from their meditated invasion of Georgia, and restraining the negroes within the English borders. CAUSES OF FAILURE. 177 It is due to the general to say, that had his original plans been carried out, St. Augustine would in all human probability have fallen into his hands; but a series of events occurred, over which he could have no control, which frustrated one by one his well-laid schemes, until he was compelled to raise the siege and march back to Frederica. His first misfortune was in the tardy arrival of his troops. He purposed to attack the city in March, when he knew that its defences were imperfect and its supplies small; but the delay incident to raising, equipping and marching the Carolina regiment and the Georgia rangers, lost him nearly two months of most precious time, in an operation to be conducted in a climate the damps and heats of which presented such formidable obstacles. Having at last got the army in motion, his next misfortune was the failure of Colonel Vander Deusen to make the appointed junction, where he again lost several invaluable days of service. This was followed by the surprise and capture of Fort Moosa, in consequence of disobedience to his positive orders. But even this error and misfortune might have been retrieved had he possessed the thirty-six cannon promised by Carolina; instead of which, he had but twelve, with a few mortars and cohorns, all of which were illy mounted, badly served, and too light for breaching service. Nor would even these deficiencies have materially hindered the reduction of the city, straitened as it then was for provisions, had the blockade been vigilantly sustained, or had there been sufficient tenders of proper draught to have sailed inside the bar and met and driven away the half-gallies of the Spaniards; but the Matanzas inlet was not properly guarded, and the vessels 178 CAUSES OF FAILURE. of the English drew too much water to go in and cope with the well-protected gallies of the enemy. Besides these serious misfortunes, his Indian allies were discontented, the Carolina troops were refractory, the climate was unhealthy, the artillery was inefficient, the garrison had been succoured by adequate supplies, and there was no hope of reducing the place unless he had a sufficient battering force to break down the walls, or ability to invest their town until hunger forced them to capitulation. The former could not be obtained, the latter would consume the months of an ardent summer. What then could Oglethorpe have done? To have made a desperate assault without the support of artillery, would have been a wasteful expenditure of life. To have continued the siege without the blockading squadron, would have inevitably ensured his capture; and for the whole naval and military force to have remained, could only end in a warfare not so much with the Spaniards as with miasma, sickness, and death. The plans of Oglethorpe were eminently military and judicious; his valour was unimpeached; his zeal untiring, and his energy unexhausted. It was not, therefore, the fault of his skill or of his courage, that the expedition failed. The causes of this disaster were such as no commanding general could control, and for the results of which no one could be made responsible. It has been asserted by some historians, that the raising of the siege was owing to the defection of Colonel Vander Deusen and the Carolina regiment. On the contrary, he remained with Oglethorpe till the last, and General Oglethorpe acknowledged his anxiety to fight for his country, by saying that Colonel Vander CAROLINA REGIMENT. 179 Deusen had made several handsome offers of service, which necessity had compelled him to decline. Some of the South Carolina troops did, indeed, desert, but not more in proportion to their numbers than fell off from other corps. Colonel Vander Deusen remained in Florida until Oglethorpe left it, and did not, with his regiment, reach Charleston until the 13th of August, having lost only fourteen men by sickness and desertion. It is true that the people of South Carolina cast many unjust reflections upon Oglethorpe, and endeavoured to elevate the military character of Colonel Vander Deusen by building it up on the ruins of his commander-in-chief. The controversies were bitter, but worthless. Let us not exhume such a theme, long buried in the ivy-covered tomb of the past, but rather conceding to Colonel Vander Deusen the full share of honour which the Assembly of Carolina voted to him, award to Oglethorpe also the renown he so richly merits for his skill, valour, and untiring devotion to the protection and preservation of his beloved Georgia.33 33 Hewitt, vol. ii. 75-81; British Dominions in North America, part 2d, 162-166; Harris's Memorials of Oglethorpe, 223–240; and other writers, have given accounts of this siege, but the above is drawn from the official MS. papers of Oglethorpe and Montiano. This may account for any discrepancy between this and any previously published statement. CHAPTER V. SPANISH INVASION OF GEORGIA. THOUGH Compelled to abandon the long-cherished plan of capturing St. Augustine, Oglethorpe did not resign himself to inaction and repose. His position, however, was one of great trial-one which demanded peculiar virtues, such as are not often associated with high military daring or impetuous courage. His lot was to bear in patience, yet with firmness, the taunts of Spanish foes, the calumny of his Carolina enemies, the censure of those who could not comprehend his retreat; and yet, amidst it all, to sustain with a small force the posts he had established along our frontiers, protect Georgia from invasion, and rescue it from impending ruin at a time when even the smallest military knowledge conceded its almost defenceless state. The preservation of Georgia depended at this juncture upon the firmness, courage, and self-control of Oglethorpe. If he failed in any of these, all was lost. Fortunately he had the qualities required, and Georgia was saved from destruction. Unrelaxing in his vigilance, he still kept up parties of Indians hovering about the frontiers of Florida, who occasionally brought in a Spanish prisoner; he fitted |