of court and restricting the powers of judges and court in contempt proceedings." It divides contempt of court into two classes, direct contempts, those committed during the sitting of the court or of a judge at chambers in his presence-as to which the law is left practically untouched-and indirect contempts, which are all those not committed in presence of the court. In these the process of summary punishment or restraint of liberty upon ex parte affidavits is entirely done away with. Nothing can be done in case of "indirect contempt," even when the person guilty be a party to the suit, except upon return of an officer on a process or an affidavit duly filed; thereupon a writ of attachment must issue, and the person be duly arrested and brought before the court; thereupon a written accusation must be filed, in effect an indictment, and the accused required to answer the same by an order which shall fix the time therefor and the place of hearing; only after this answer or failure to answer can the court proceed; and even then only to a hearing; and if the accused answer, the trial must proceed upon testimony as in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to be confronted by the witnesses against him, and may always apply for a jury as in ordinary criminal cases; the testimony must be preserved, and the order or sentence is subject to review or writ of error. Now as, upon allowance of such appeal or writ of error, the statute requires that the execution of the judgment must be stayed upon the giving of such bond as the court may require, that is, upon the giving of an ordinary appeal bond, it will be easily seen that the effect of this statute is to take away all the force of equity process at the time it is needed, viz., while the riot, strike or boycott is going on. The striking leaders are very important persons at that moment; but it is not likely that the district attorneys, still less the juries, will trouble themselves with following them up when the appeal term arrives, many months after the labor difference which caused the trouble has been adjusted. Debs, for instance, who was arrested and confined at the time of the Chicago riots, could not practically have been reached under this law. Equity jurisdiction in Kansas, so far as it applies to persons, may be said to be at an end. Moreover, the statute

concludes with the provision that the act shall apply to all proceedings for contempt in all courts of Kansas; and as the ordinary doctrine of procedure of the United States courts is that it must conform to the legal procedure of the State courts at least in matters of form if not of substance, it will be seen that the statute attempts also to destroy the same jurisdiction in the federal courts when sitting in the State of Kansas. Whether the federal courts will submit to having their equity powers thus nullified remains to be seen.

Notwithstanding the late decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri that a statute making it a criminal offence for an employer to choose his employees from non-union labor exclusively, or to discharge union men for that cause, or to make it a condition of employment that a man should not join a labor union, is unconstitutional, Kansas (Laws 1897, Ch. 120) has copied this statute; and moreover the "person injured," i. e., the employee not employed or discharged, may sue the employer and recover exemplary damages up to two thousand dollars. Kansas has also passed a blacklisting statute making it a misdemeanor for any employer, having discharged a person, to prevent or attempt to prevent him from obtaining employment from any other person "by words, sign or writing," except by furnishing in writing, on request, the cause of his discharge, which all employers are now bound to do; a statute which must put them in something of a quandary, for it will hardly do for them to say that they have discharged an employee without cause, while if they state any cause in writing they lay themselves open to a suit for libel by the employee, or, if he be a member of a labor union, as is likely, he can always claim that that was the true cause of discharge and sue them for exemplary damages accordingly. The person or corporation found guilty of offending against this statute is further liable to the party injured in triple damages. Connecticut (Laws 1897, Ch. 184) and Oklahoma (Laws 1897, Ch. 13) have also passed blacklisting statutes; but they simply provide that an employer who shall blacklist an employee with intent to prevent him from securing any other employment shall be subject to a fine of one hundred dollars, or guilty of a misdemeanor.

Several States have adopted the ordinary union trade-mark statute, which protects the trade-mark of union-made labor. These are Washington (Laws 1897, Ch. 47), Idaho (Laws 1897, P. 112) and Oklahoma (Laws 1897, Ch. 40).

The western States are beginning to adopt the hours-of-labor laws protecting child labor. Thus, in Missouri (Laws 1897, p. 143) the employment of children under fourteen in manufacturing or mechanical establishments is prohibited; and in Illinois (where the factory act as applying to women and children was held unconstitutional) a new statute (Laws 1897, p. 90) prohibits the employment of children under fourteen in factories and shops; and requires that persons between the age of sixteen and fourteen shall not be employed more than ten hours a day. So, Indiana (Laws 1897, Ch. 65) has adopted a general factory act limiting the labor of women under eighteen, or of any persons under sixteen, to ten hours a day, and prohibiting the employment of children under fourteen, with the usual factory regulations. With the statute is incorporated a sweat-shop act providing that no room in any dwelling-house shall be used for the manufacture of clothing, feathers, artificial flowers, or cigars, except by the immediate members of the family living therein; and there must be 250 cubic feet of air-space for each person employed in a workshop; or 400 cubic feet in rooms where persons are employed at night.

California (Laws 1897, Ch. 170) has a monthly payment act, applying to corporations only, with provision that wages must only be paid in money or checks payable on demand; and New Mexico (Laws 1897, Ch. 11) requires mines and agricultural establishments to pay wages in money or checks, with provision against company stores; and a law to the same effect has been enacted in Kansas (Laws 1897, Ch. 145).

Several States have adopted general laws for the regulation of mines (Kan. 1897, Ch. 159; Ind. 1897, Ch. 111; Illinois 1897, pp. 268-270; Ala. 1897, Ch. 406; Wash. 1897, Ch. 45; N. C. 1897, Ch. 251). The Alabama law forbids women from working in or about any mines, and boys under the age of twelve. North Carolina has found it necessary to adopt a statute forbidding the working of women in the streets in chain.

gangs. South Carolina has adopted a statute making it a misdemeanor for agricultural laborers working under express contracts to break them wilfully, provided the contract, if parol, be made with two witnesses (Laws 1897, Ch. 286); and South Carolina has also passed a statute limiting the hours of street railway employees to twelve hours per day, and prohibiting contracts for a greater period. Illinois (Laws 1897, p. 231) forbids the garnishment of the wages of a person who is the head of a family, and residing with the same, up to the amount of eight dollars per week for any length of time. Idaho (Laws 1897, p. 5) has adopted a drastic statute against the employment of aliens, which forbids not only municipal corporations, but any private corporation in the State to employ an alien who has neglected or refused to become naturalized or to declare his intention so to do; and all such aliens now under employment must be discharged upon complaint of any person under penalty to the employer as for misdemeanor. A similar statute to this was some years ago declared unconstitutional in the federal courts in California, and it is possible that this will meet a similar fate.

Indiana (Laws 1897, Ch. 88) has followed the example of other western States in creating a labor commission of two persons appointed by the Governor, one an employer, one an employee, not members of the same political party; and these commissioners are vested with the usual powers of State boards of arbitration and conciliation as to strikes and lockouts. A State board of arbitration has also been created in Idaho (Laws 1897, p. 128) consisting of three persons appointed by the Governor, one an employer, one an employee, and the third upon their recommendation. In Montana (Laws 1897, p. 110) and Washington (Laws 1897, Ch. 29) the Board of Agriculture, Labor and Industry now consists of a commissioner and clerk; and in Montana the same statute makes it lawful for the council of any city to establish a free public employment office, and to provide for its expense out of the city revenues. This statute is somewhat of a new departure. If not a step in the direction of State socialism it is, at least, significant of the growing impression in the popular mind that it is the duty of

the State to find employment for its members. The State of Washington has further an extraordinary statute (Laws 1897, Ch. 17) by which it is made a misdemeanor in the officers, managers, directors, stockholders or employees of any street railway to employ any but "experienced and competent men" as conductors or motormen under penalty of fine or imprisonment. As every accident brings up the charge that the conductor or motorman was not competent or experienced, it would seem that the lot of the stockholder in a Washington State railway company was not a happy one.

The iniquitous principle of State bounties received further encouragement in the Territory of New Mexico, although only by an exemption from taxation for six years of all beet sugar plants, woolen mills and smelting works; and in the State of Washington (Laws 1897, Ch. 81) a State bounty is given squarely to the producers of beet sugar; but in Kansas this experiment, at least in the direction of silk culture, has been given up, and the money appropriated for the State silk plant and for the education of reelers, etc., has been ordered sold for what it will bring or "donated" to the National Government-provided they will run it free of expense to that State. Kansas and Washington had populistic legislatures, consequently, the legislation of these two States is much the most radical of any we find.

The States continue passing more and more complicated, drag-net statutes against trusts, or, as they are usually termed in the captions of the laws, "combines"; doubtless led to this by the signal failure of all anti-trust acts hitherto adopted. So far as appears in the court decisions, the only effective consequence of any anti-trust act hitherto passed has been that of the national statute, sometimes called the Sherman Act, in bringing laboring men under the summary jurisdiction of the federal equity courts in cases of strikes or combinations affecting interstate commerce. Nevertheless, our legislatures go on undismayed. Kansas leads off (Laws 1897, Ch. 265) with a new and elaborate general act which defines a trust to be a combination of capital, skill or acts, where two or more persons, firms, corporations or associations combine for either or all