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tion, we have the highest regard for his honesty, courage, and ability. The committee, on the other hand, found themselves in a trying position, in which they were sure to provoke unfavorable comment from one quarter or another, whatever they might say or fail to say. Until more is known, the less said in the way of criticism the better.
The correspondence, however, given to the public on the 23d of July raises some general questions regarding the relations of university officers to the governing body of an institution, on the one hand, and to its patrons and benefactors on the other, which deserve a careful consideration quite apart from the present case.
The statement which the committee made at Dr. Andrews' request calls attention to the loss of gifts and legacies, which the university has suffered on account of the President's advocacy of free silver. On this account it asks him to suppress his views on that question, and he very naturally hands in his resignation rather than do so. We need not necessarily infer that, because the financial consideration is the only one given in the committee's letter, it was the only one which influenced the minds of the corporation, but it was doubtless the reason which the committee held to be most conclusive. And it certainly will appeal strongly to a large body of people, especially business men. In commercial enterprises the question which must be raised regarding almost every project is: “Will it pay?" And if it does not pay a university to have a free-silver president, of course, many will argue, he ought to go.
There are, however, some forms even of business in which this criterion is not always applied. In journalism, e. g., we commonly condemn those editors who are guided purely by the views of their publisher, and praise those papers which allow their subscription list to fall, rather than keep silent on some matter of great public moment. Still less does this criterion prevail in our colleges and universities, which have usually been founded and managed, more with reference to the propagation of truth, as their managers understand it, than with reference to attracting endowments. Endowments are necessary, but they are not usually allowed to determine the expres
sion of opinions on the part of college officers. To base such a request as that presented to President Andrews solely on pecuniary considerations, not only invites the reproach of "mammonism," of yielding to a “capitalist oligarchy,” etc., (reproaches unjustly, as we believe, levelled at the trustees in the present case) but seems to countenance a policy, which, if at all common, would be fatal to independence of thought in our faculties. Suppose, e. g., that a rich man were to offer to endow a chair in a university, but were to object to the views of the present incumbent of that chair. Would it be right for the trustees to say to the professor: “We do not object to your views, but we cannot get this money unless you suppress them, and therefore we hope you will take the hint”?
The evil of such a course would not be confined to the fact that it would discourage first-rate men from aspiring to a university career. Nor would it stop at the institutions directly concerned. Its worst effect would be the lowering of the influence and authority of our universities generally in the mind of the public. Utterances, especially on questions of the day, made by scholars would be undeservedly suspected of being, not the real opinion of an honest and intelligent thinker, but the cautious deliverance of a toady. And the fear of saying something unpopular, which, in the political world, is already assuming the dimensions of a national vice, would be intensified.
We ventured the suggestion above that the loss of gifts was, perhaps, not the only objection to President Andrews in the minds of the corporation. It is at least difficult to believe that, if a majority of the board had been followers of Bryan, they would have taken the action they did. In other words, if they desired the president's retirement (or his silence), they probably desired it, not simply because his political utterances cost them money, but because they believed that, in a season of great political danger, he advocated a policy of repudiation, injurious to the country. The fact that the personal character of the president is of the highest, would only make his advocacy of such a policy the more harmful in the minds of those who believe him to be in the wrong.
Just how far such a difference of opinion may go without leading to an open rupture, is a very nice question which does not admit of any dogmatic answer. Much depends on circumstances. Divergence of views may become so great, and the feeling involved so intense, that harmonious co-operation is impossible. If, on this ground, a board of trustees desires to sever a relation which they consider compromising to the University and to themselves, they cannot unreservedly be blamed.
In emphasizing pecuniary considerations alone and omitting all reference to higher ones, the committee used, not their strongest, but their weakest, argument, and gave President Andrews the opportunity, of which he was not slow to take advantage, to lay stress on "that reasonable liberty of utterance," in the absence of which, as he well says, "the most ample endowment for an educational institution would have little worth."
THE PREVENTION AND RELIEF OF FAMINE IN
THE administrative problems connected with the occasional
failure of the food crops in India are so important and so complex that it is impossible for me to attempt to give more than a brief sketch of them in the present paper, and I must make the difficulty of my attempt my excuse for many observations which may appear trite to my readers, and for others which may appear obscure.
Speaking in general terms, the recurrence of famines in India may be said to be due to the fact that 9 persons out of every 10 of the dense population of India are dependent on agriculture, coupled with the fact that the peculiarities of the climate throughout the Indian peninsula restrict agriculturists greatly in their choice of crops, and render them more than usually dependent on the rainfall for their prosperity.
The density of the population varies greatly, from one or two hundred per square mile in some tracts, to one thousand per square mile in parts of Bengal, but the average density in the tracts liable to famine may be taken to be from 350 to 400 per square mile. There are few towns of any size, and scarcely any industries which are independent of agricultural prosperity, while the mass of the people, though industrious and experienced agriculturists, are poor and thriftless, and centuries behind the peoples of the west in the moral and intellectual development which would enable them to take action in their own defence against such calamities as famine. It is rarely indeed that the native peoples of India show any grateful appreciation of the action taken by government to protect them from famine, and still more rarely does that government receive any assistance from them. The important harvests are two in number, one in the late autumn, when the millets, rice and pulse, grown during the rainy months from June to November, are gathered in, and a second in the months of March and April, when the wheat and barley and other cold season crops are har
vested. Of these the autumn harvest is the most important in a large proportion of the tracts in which famine recurs, and a failure of the rain necessary in June and July, to enable this crop to be sown or planted out, or again in September and October, to fill the pods and ears, invariably reduces its outturn and causes distress. It is the failure of rain in September and October in 1896, coming after several indifferent years, that has caused the recent famine, perhaps the most serious of the century, extending over about 275,000 square miles, and affecting in different degrees some 80 millions of people.
It has been assumed by some writers recently that, because they have heard so much of famines in India during the past fifty years, that country was less subject to them under its native rulers in days gone by, and many a homily has been preached to Indian administrators from this text. It is true that the increase of population under our rule, due, among other causes, to the complete cessation of local wars within our borders, and the measures taken to cope with epidemic diseases and mitigate the loss of life due to them, makes the prevention and relief of famine a task of ever-increasing difficulty, but there is ample evidence to show that famines were of frequent occurrence before our occupation of India, and moreover that they caused inconceivable distress and loss of life, the measures taken to combat what was looked upon as a visitation from on high being half-hearted and wholly inadequate. But ever since British rule has become paramount in the country serious attention has been paid to the important problems connected with famine administration, and after much sad experience contributed by the occurrence of these calamities in various tracts throughout the empire, and experimental trial of almost every conceivable form of relief, it may at last be said that something has been done, and much is being done, to minimize the severity of the famines which lie in wait for us in the future, and to relieve the distress occasioned by them when they come upon us.
As recently as 20 years ago the government of India, with the assistance of a commission of experienced officers, formulated its conclusions as to the action to be taken for the miti