Claiming the position of head of the Greek Church, Russia has long been suspected of seeking to restore, for her own advantage, the faded glories of the Empire of Byzantium. Cut off from the open highway of the ocean by the rigorous winter of the North, and to the south by a closing of the Bosphorus almost as effectual as when, in prehistoric times, no Bosphorus existed, she has been suspected of the design of forcing her way to the sea, and thus gaining a free and untrammelled outlet for the productions of the vast region she controls. Could we for a moment imagine our Atlantic ports hermetically sealed by ice during the greater part of the year, and the Lower Mississippi under foreign rule, we might perhaps be able to answer the question as to how long we would permit the control of New Orleans by another Power.

These dual qualities of Russia,-half European, half Asiatic,— the secrecy and mystery of her movements, her diplomatic astuteness, and the self-evident fact that to gain a secure outlet to the sea is a necessity for her existence and progress, probably suffice to explain the distrust with which she is regarded by many Europeans. Another point to which sufficient weight has not always been given is, that Russia is in direct contact with the Turks, both in Asia and Europe. The Asiatic, the Moslem, is an interloper in Europe. He fought his way thither at a time when the power of the Crescent and the warlike enthusiasm of its followers were at their height; when Christian Europe was too disunited to repel him. But he is none the less an interloper still; a foreigner whose existence as a governing power in Europe is in every sense prejudicial, for he has in no sense become Europeanized. There is no possibility of Moslem and Christian living together in harmony in Europe under Moslem rule. The question is not whether the Turk shall be driven out, but what shall be done with his country when that is accomplished. Hence the jealousy with which Russian movements are regarded.

Our readers are familiar with the circumstances which led to the existing war between Russia and Turkey. It is not within the scope of our intention to discuss the long negotiations and persistent efforts on the part of Europe through which they vainly sought to procure for the Christians in European Turkey the blessings of security for life and property. It is not our purpose to discuss the question as to who is right and who wrong; it

will suffice to accept the situation, and endeavor to throw what light we can upon the forces of the combatants, and the nature of the theatre of war, so that we may from time to time describe intelligibly the operations of the war as it progresses.

It is not easy to ascertain with accuracy the population of the Turkish Empire; but, omitting Egypt, Tripoli, and Tunis, as not to be depended upon for any considerable assistance, also Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro, there will remain not much over 30,000,000 for the available population; and if we further deduct the Christians and Jews of Turkey in Europe, there will not remain more than 24,000,000. It must also be remembered that there are some three and a half millions of Christians in Asiatic Turkey.

On the other hand, Russia, omitting Siberia and the other Asiatic dependencies, except the trans-Caucasus, has a population of some 77,000,000.

The financial condition of neither country is good, but Russia is less dependent upon foreign countries for supplies, and therefore better able to bear the strain of a long war, especially when the hearts of the people are in it.

The Turkish regular army consists of some 150,000 men, supported by perhaps some 200,000 trained Redifs, or reserves, and about 80,000 other Redifs whose term of service in the reserve has expired.

Habitually the regular army is divided into five corps, of which one is stationed at Constantinople; one in Roumelia, headquarters at Monastir; a third in Anatolia, headquarters at Erzeroum; the fourth in Irak, headquarters at Bagdad; the fifth in Arabistan, headquarters at Damascus. Each corps is commanded by a Mushir, or Marshal. From the nature of the case it is impossible to concentrate all the regulars and their reserves on the Danube and near Erzeroum; considerable bodies must be left in Constantinople, on the frontiers of Greece, Montenegro, and Servia, also in Syria and on the Persian frontier.

In addition to the regulars and their reserves, there is always available a large force of irregulars, known by the name of BaschiBazouks, etc. Some of these men, if well armed, would do good service in the defence of fortified positions, and as light troops covering the movements of an army; but they cannot be relied upon in the open field against regular troops. Within the last few years

the Turks have purchased large quantities of breech-loading rifles, metallic cartridges, and other ordnance supplies, so that they are well provided, for the present at least, in these regards. It is understood that they have armed their field batteries largely with the Krupp breech-loading steel gun. The Turkish fleet numbers more than twenty respectable ironclads, many of which are of English construction, beside light-draught vessels for river service. It is not probable that the Turkish army is in a high state of efficiency, judged from the European point of view; but the men are brave, and will always fight well. In the defence of fortresses and intrenched positions they are admirable, and they fight well enough in the open field until discouraged by reverses, when they are' apt to lose confidence, as was the case in the latter part of the campaign of 1829, after the battle of Kalewtcha.

Under the new organization the armed force of Russia is to consist of about a million and three fourths of men; but sufficient time has not yet elapsed to bring the present system fully into play, so that the number of instructed men now available must fall considerably short of the ultimate strength. In 1873 competent German judges were of the opinion that Russia could then bring into the field, for offensive operations, 534,000 infantry, 92,500 cavalry, and 1,572 guns; leaving a reserve of 83,500 combatants, exclusive of the reserve squadrons, batteries, and cadres of the "instruction troops," of the garrison troops (20,000 infantry and 50,000 artillery) in the fortifications and militia.

Glancing hastily at the new organization, we may be able to form an approximation to the number of troops now available.

The normal effective peace establishment is 750,000 men. The infantry portion consists of three divisions of guards, four of grenadiers, and fifty of the line; in all, twelve regiments of guards, sixteen of grenadiers, and two hundred of the line, each regiment having three service battalions of four line and one rifle company each. The infantry regiment is a little over 4,000 men. The cavalry consists of eighteen divisions, each having three regiments of regular cavalry and one regiment of Cossacks. Cossack regiments are also attached to the headquarters of the infantry divisions. The field artillery consists of fifty-seven brigades of foot artillery, each having five batteries of eight guns each, and one battery of Gatlin guns. The field-guns are rifled breech-loaders, of 9-pounder