terests and inclinations of that nation. What was the consequence? Precisely that which was anticipated. The then President of the United States, was necessitated to come to this House and recommend a suspension of the operation of that law, upon the openly avowed ground, of its being expedient to give that evidence, of a conciliatory disposition, really because, if permitted to continue in operation, negociation was found to be impracticable. After the suspension of that law, a treaty was formed. The merits of that treaty, it is not within the scope of my present argument to discuss. It is sufficient to say, it was deemed good enough, to receive the sanction of Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney. It arrived in America, and was rejected by the authority of a single individual, apparently because of the insufficiency of the arrangement about impressment: Really because a settlement with Great Britain, at that time, did not "enter into the scope of the policy" of the American cabinet. The negociation was, indeed, renewed, but it was followed up with the enforcement of the non-importation law, and the enactment of the embargo. Both which steps were stated, at the time, as they proved afterwards, to be, of a nature to make hopeless successful negociation.

In this state, the executive power of this nation formally passed into new hands, but substantially remained under the old principles of action, and subject to the former influences. It was desirable that a fund of popularity should be acquired for the new administration. Accordingly, an arrangement was made with Mr. Erskine, and no questions asked concerning the adequacy of his powers. But, lest this circumstance should not defeat the proposed arrangement, a clause was inserted in the correspondence, containing an insult to the British government, offered in the face of the world, such as no man ever gave to a private individual, whom he did not mean to offend. The President of the United States said, in so many words, to

the person at the head of that government, that he did not understand what belonged to his own honor, as well as it was understood by the President himself. The effect of such language was natural, it was necessary; it could not but render the British government averse to sanction Erskine's arrangement. The effect was anticipated by Mr. Robert Smith, then acting as secretary of state. He objected to its being inserted, but it was done, in the President's own hand writing. As Mr. Erskine's authority was denied by the British government, it is well known, that, in fact, on the point of this indignity, the fate of that arrangement turned. Can any one doubt, that our cabinet meant that it should have this effect? I send you word, Mr. Speaker, "that I have agreed with your messenger, and wish you to ratify it. I think you, however, no gentleman, notwithstanding, and that you do not understand, as well as I, what is due to your own honor." What think you, sir? Would you ratify such an arrangement, if you could help it? Does a proffer of settlement, connected with such language, look like a disposition or an intention to conciliate? I appeal to the common sense of mankind, on the point.

The whole state of the relations induced between this country and Great Britain, in consequence of our embargo and restrictive systems, was, in fact, a standing appeal to the fears of the British cabinet. For, notwithstanding, those systems were equal in their terms, so far as they affected foreign powers; yet their operation was, notoriously, almost wholly upon Great Britain. To yield to that pressure, or do any thing which should foster, in this country, the idea that it was an effectual weapon of hostility, was nothing more than conceding, that she was dependent upon, us. A concession which, when once made by her, was certain to encourage a resort to it by us, on every occasion of difficulty between the two nations. Reasoning, therefore, upon the known nature of things, and the plain interests of Great Britain, it was

foretold, that, during its continuance she would concede nothing. And the event has justified those predictions. But, the circumstance the most striking, and that furnishing the most conclusive evidence of the indisposition of the American cabinet to peace, and their determination to carry on the war, is that connected with the pretended repeal of the French decrees, in November, 1810, and the consequent revival, in 1811, of our restrictive system against Great Britain.

If ever a body of. men were pledged to any thing, the American cabinet, its friends and supporters were pledged for the truth of this fact, that the French decrees of Berlin and Milan were definitely repealed, as it respects the United States, on the first of November. 1810. If ever any body of men staked their whole stock of reputation upon any point, our cabinet did it on this. They and their partizans asserted and raved. They denounced every man as a British partizan, who denied it. They declared the restrictive system was revived by the mere effect of the proclamation. But, lest the courts of law should not be as subservient to their policy, as might be wished, they passed the law of the 2d of March, 1811, upon the basis of this repeal, and of its being definitive. The British government refused, however, to recognize the validity of this repeal, and denied that the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, as our cabinet asserted. Thus, then, stood the argument between the British ministry and our cabinet. The British ministry admitted, that, if the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, they were bound to revoke their orders in council. But they denied that repeal to exist. Our cabinet, on the other hand, admitted, that, if the Berlin and Milan decrees were not repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, the restrictive system ought not to have been revived against Great Britain. But they asserted that repeal to exist. This was, virtually, the state of the

question between the two countries, on this point. And it is agreed, on all hands, that this refusal of the British government to repeal their orders in council, after the existence of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, as asserted by the American cabinet, was the cause of the declaration of war between the two countries. So that, in truth, the question of the right of war depended upon the existence of that fact; for, if that fact did not exist, even the American cabinet did not pretend, that, in the position in which things then stood, they had a right to declare war on account of the continuance of the British orders in council.

Now, what is the truth in relation to this all-important fact, the definitive repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees on the 1st of November, 1810; the pivot upon which turned the revival of the restrictive system, and our declaration of war? Why, sir, the event has proved, that in relation to that fact, the American cabinet was, to say the least, in an error. Bonaparte himself, in a decree, dated the 28th of April, 1811, but not promulgated till a year afterwards, distinctly declares, that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not definitely repealed, as relates to the United States, on the Ist of November, 1810. He also, declares, that they are then, on that 28th of April, for the first time repealed. And he founds the issuing of this decree on the act of the American Congress, of the 2d of March, 1811. That very act, which was passed upon the ground of the definitive repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees on the 1st of November, 1810, and which, it is agreed on all sides, the American government, were bound in honor not to pass, except in case of such antecedent repeal!

Were ever a body of men so abandoned in the hour of need, as the. American cabinet, in this instance, by Bonaparte? Was ever any body of men so cruelly wounded in the house of their friend? This-this was "the unkindest cut of all." But how was it received by the American cabinet? Surely they

were indignant at this treatment. Surely the air rings with reproaches upon a man, who has thus made them stake their reputation upon a falsehood; and then gives little less than the lie direct to their assertions. No, sir, nothing of all this is heard from our cabinet. There is a philosophic tameness, that would. be remarkable, if it were not, in all cases affecting Bonaparte, characteristic. All the executive of the United States has found it in his heart to say in relation to this last decree of Bonaparte, which contradicts his previous allegations and asseverations is, that "This proceeding is rendered, by the time and manner of it, liable to many objections!"

I have referred to this subject as being, connected with future conduct, strikingly illustrative of the disposition of the American cabinet to carry on the war, and of their intention, if possible, not to make peace. Surely if any nation had a claim for liberal treatment from another, it was the British nation from the American, after the discovery of the error of the American government in relation to the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees in November, 1810. In consequence of that error, the American cabinet had ruined numbers of our own citizens, who had been caught by the revival. of the non-intercourse law; they had revived that law against Great Britain under circumstances, which now appeared to have been fallacious; and they had declared war against her on the supposition, that she had refused to repeal her orders, in council, after the French decrees were, in fact, revoked; whereas, it now appears, that they were in fact not revoked. Surely the knowledge of this error was followed by an instant and anxious desire to redress the resulting injury. As the British orders in council were, in fact, revoked on the knowledge of the existence of the French decree of repeal, surely the American cabinet, at once, extended the hand of friendship; met the British government half way; stopped all further irritation, and strove to place every