collateral suggestions. No sooner do the cabinet perceive that any potion, which they intend to administer, is loathed by a considerable part of the majority, and that their apprehensions are alive, lest it should have a scouring effect upon their popularity, than certain under-operators are set to work, whose business it is to amuse the minds, and beguile the attention of the patients, while the dose is swallowing. The language always is," trust the cabinet doctors. The medicine will not operate as you imagine, but quite another way." After this manner the fears of men are allayed, and the purposes of the administration are attained, under suggestions very different from the true motives. Thus the embargo, which has since been unequivocally acknowledged to have been intended to coerce Great Britain, was adopted, as the executive asserted, " to save our essential resources." So also, when the present war was declared against Great Britain, members of the House were known to state, that they voted for it under the suggestion that it would not be a war of ten days; that it was known that Mr. Foster had instructions to make definitive arrangements, in his pocket; and that the United States had only to advance to the point of war, and the whole business would be settled. And now, an army, which, in point of numbers, Cromwell might envy, greater than that with which Cæsar passed the Rubicon, is to be helped through a reluctant Congress, under the suggestion of its being only a parade force to make negociation successful; that it is the incipient state of a project for a grand pacification!

I warn also my political friends. These gentlemen are apt to place great reliance on their own intelligence and sagacity. Some of these will tell you, that the invasion of Canada is impossible. They ask, where are the men-where is the money to be obtained? And they talk, very wisely, concerning common sense and common prudence, and will show, with much learning, how this attempt is an offence against

both the one and the other. But, sir, it has been my lot, to be an observer of the character and conduct of the men now in power, for these eight years past: and I state, without hesitation, that no scheme ever was, or ever will be, rejected by them, merely on account of its running counter to the ordinary dictates of common sense and common prudence. On the contrary, on that very account, I believe it more likely to be both suggested and adopted by them. And, what may appear a paradox, for that very reason, the chance is rather increased, that it will be successful.

I could illustrate this position twenty ways. I shall content myself with remarking only upon two instances, and those recent ;-the present war; and the late invasion of Canada. When war against Great Britain was proposed, at the last session, there were thousands in these United States, and I confess to you, I was myself among the number, who believed not one word of the matter. I put my trust in the old fashioned notions of common sense and common prudence. That a people, which has been more than twenty years at peace, should enter upon hostilities against a people which had been twenty years at war; that a nation, whose army and navy were little more than nominal, should engage in war with a nation possessing one of the best appointed armies and the most powerful marine on the globe; that a country, to which neutrality had been a perpetual harvest, should throw that great blessing away for a controversy in which nothing was to be gained, and every thing valuable put in jeopardy; from these, and innumerable like considerations, the idea seemed so absurd, that I never once entertained it as possible. And now, after war has been declared, the whole affair seems so extraordinary and so utterly irreconcileable to any previous suggestions of wisdom and duty, that I know not what to make of it, or how to believe it. Even at this moment, my mind is very much in the state of certain Pennsylvanian Germans, of whom I have heard it as

serted, that they are taught to believe, by their political leaders, and do, at this moment, consider the allegation, that war is at present existing between the United States and Great Britain, to be a "federal falsehood."

It was just so with respect to the invasion of Canada. I heard of it last June. I laughed at the idea, as did multitudes of others, as an attempt too absurd for serious examination. I was, in this case, again beset by common sense and common prudence. That the United States should precipitate itself upon the unoffending people of that neighboring colony, unmindful of all previously subsisting amities, because the parent state, three thousand miles distant, had violated some of our commercial rights; that we should march inland, to defend our ships and seamen; that, with raw troops, hastily collected, miserably appointed, and destitute of discipline, we should invade a country defended by veteran forces, at least equal, in point of numbers, to the invading army; that bounty should be offered and proclamations issued, inviting the subjects of a foreign power to treason and rebellion, under the influences of a quarter of the country upon which a retort of the same nature was so obvious, so easy, and in its consequences so awful; in every aspect, the design seemed so fraught with danger and disgrace, that it appeared absolutely impossible, that it should be seriously entertained. Those, however, who reasoned after this manner, were, as the event proved, mistaken. The war was declared. Canada was invaded. We were in haste to plunge into these great difficulties, and we have now reason, as well as leisure enough, for regret and repentance.

The great mistake of all those, who reasoned concerning the war and the invasion of Canada, and concluded that it was impossible that either should be seriously intended, resulted from this, that they never took into consideration the connexion of both those events, with the great election for the chief magistra

cy, which was then pending. It never was sufficiently considered by them, that plunging into war with Great Britain was among the conditions, on which support for the presidency was made dependent. They did not understand, that an invasion of Canada was to be, in truth, only a mode of carrying on an electioneering campaign. But since events have explained political purposes, there is no difficulty in seeing the connexions between projects and interests. It is now apparent to the most mole-sighted, how a nation may be disgraced, and yet a cabinet attain its desired honors. All is clear. A country may be ruined, in making an administration happy.

I said, Mr. Speaker, that such strange schemes, apparently irreconcilable to common sense and common prudence, were, on that very account, more likely to be successful. Sir, there is an audacity which sometimes stands men in stead both of genius and strength. And, most assuredly, he is most likely to perform that, which no man ever did before, and will never be likely to do again, who has the boldness to undertake that, which no man ever thought of attempting, in time past, and no man will ever think of attempting, in time future. I would not, however, be understood as intimating, that this cabinet project of invasion is impracticable, either as it respects the collection of means and instruments, or in the ultimate result. On the contrary, sir, I deem both very feasible. Men may be obtained. For, if forty dollars bounty cannot obtain them, an hundred dollars bounty may, and the intention is, explicitly, avowed not to suffer the attainment of the desired army, to be prevented by any vulgar notions of economy. Money may be obtained. What, by means of the increased popularity, derived from the augmentation of the navy; what, by opening subscription offices, in the interior of the country; what, by large premiums, the cupidity of the monied interest may be tempted, beyond the point of patriotic resistance, and all the attained means being diverted

to the use of the army, pecuniary resources may be obtained, ample, at least, for the first year. And, sir, let an army of thirty thousand men be collected, let them be put under the command of a popular leader, let them be officered to suit his purposes, let them be flushed with victories, and see the fascinating career of military glory opening upon them, and they will not thereafter, ever be deficient in resources. If they cannot obtain their pay by your votes, they will collect it by their own bayonets; and they will not rigidly observe any air-lines, or water-lines, in enforcing their necessary levies; nor be stayed by abstract speculations concerning right, or learned constitutional difficulties.

I desire, therefore, that it may be distinctly understood, both by this House and this nation, that it is my unequivocal belief, that the invasion of Canada, which is avowed, by the cabinet, to be its purpose, is intended by it; that continuance of the war and not peace is its project. Yes, sir, as the French emperor said concerning ships and colonies, so our cabinet, the friends of the French emperor, may say, with respect to Canada and Halifax. "They enter into the scope of its policy."

[Mr. Quincy was here called to order by Mr. Hall of Georgia, for intimating that the members of the cabinet were friends of the French emperor.

Mr. Quincy said, that he understood that the relations of amity did subsist between this country and France, and that, in such a state of things, he had a right to speak of the American cabinet, as the friends of France, in the same manner as he had now a right to call them, the enemies of Great Britain.

The Speaker said, that the relations of amity certainly did subsist between this country and France, and that he did not conceive the gentleman from Massachusetts, to be out of order in his expressions. That it was impossible to prevent gentlemen from expressing themselves, so as to convey an innuendo. Mr. Quincy proceeded.]