...accept the welcome sweet constraint. But this is anthropomorphous ? Even Spencer makes the charge. " It seems somewhat strange that men should suppose...assimilating the object of their worship to themselves;" and he speaks of " attributes " of the First Cause as " not elevations but degradations." So they would...

...because it is in every respect greater than can be conceived ? And may we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the...of their worship to themselves. Not in asserting a transcendent difference, but in asserting a certain likeness, consists the element of their creed which...

...respect greater than can be conceived? And may we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to7t~any attributes whatever, on the ground that such attributes,...seems somewhat strange that men should suppose the highest-worship to lie in assimilating the object of tJigirlgQiahip to themselves! Not in asserting...

...altar " to the unknown and unknowable God :" and as to this unknown he thinks it right " to refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the...own natures, are not elevations but degradations" (p. 109). Looking to the interests both of philosophy and religion, it is of great moment to lay an...

...unable to conceive any such higher mode of being. . . . And may we not, therefore, rightly refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the...natures, are not elevations, but degradations?"— Pp. 108, 109. It is scarcely necessary to pronounce this pure, bold, blank Atheism with regard to the...

...organizing intellect which shall integrate Empiricism and » " And may we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the...own natures, are not elevations, but degradations 1" — First Principles, p. 109. Transcendentalism in a deeper and wider synthesis than any yet attempted,...

...altar " to the unknown and unknowable God :" and as to this unknown he thinks it right " to refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the ground that such attributes, derived aa they must be from our own natures, are not elevations but degradations " (p. 108). Looking to the...

...rather the reverse." " May we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to the 'ultimate cause' any attributes whatever, on the ground that such attributes,...our own natures, are not elevations but degradations ? " The way however to arrive at the object aimed at (ie to acquire the best 1 Loc. cit. p. 109. attainable...

...because it is in every respect greater than can be conceived ? And may we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the...not elevations but degradations ? Indeed it seems 8omewhat_strange that_ jnen_shquld suppose t-Ve highest ^CP£ehip to lie in assimilating the object...

...every respect greater than can be conceived (sic) ; and asks, May we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the...our own natures, are not elevations but degradations ? All that Mr Spencer says is the result of deep thought, and deserves to be pondered ; but would it...