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fluence of analogy. It seems, in fact, the most natural assumption that doíny remained (i. e. did not become dózy) because it formed part of a series doiμev, doîte etc. The case is the same with the is of the genitive in noctis (cf. CURTIUS in the above article, page 22), which was retained in consequence of the innumerable is's in the genitive, while no similar analogy prevailed to an equal extent in the nominative; the same is also true with regard to the of púλat, which was more protected than that of eví, etc. Different explanations may be found for other points introduced by CURTIUS; thus, as he himself intimates, in explaining the different forms of prepositions, we must take into account the difference of accent, according as they are or are not used as proclitics. In this case, since the accent is a very important factor in the phonetic aspect of a word, we must seek the explanation on the phonetic side. Of course I am unable to solve many of the unexplained difficulties which CURTIUS brings forward in the article mentioned above; but I can at least assert that no conclusive proof has yet been given that those sounds which were felt to contain the chief significance were occasionally preserved, in direct opposition to prevalent phonetic laws.

I am therefore of the opinion that we have not yet the right to admit this idea into the répertoire of philology.

Analogy, the second of the notions emphasized by CURTIUS, has already been mentioned in its historical development. I will here repeat that this principle was not ignored in earlier times 1), but that lately it has been much more frequently applied, owing to various causes, among which are the example of modern tongues, the conviction that the new formations of individual languages depend upon imitative formation, and above all, the attempt to establish exceptionless rules in the case of phonetic change. The question arises

1) In MISTELI's article, BENFEY might have been' quoted, as well as POTT and CURTIUS, since as early as the year 1865, in the Orient und Occident, 3, page 225, he spoke as follows regarding the Vedic language: "It is not without a purpose that throughout this essay I have called attention to the examples of false analogy, by which the Vedic language is forced into the most diverse channels."

whether and in what way this frequency of application can be justified, and whether it is possible to set certain limits to the employment of the principle of analogy, and within these to hold fast to certain distinctions and divisions.

In regard to the first point, the demarcation of the field, so far as I can see, no practical directions have hitherto been given. It is true that Misteli in the article quoted above, page 410, laid down the principle that not too many and not too complicated workings of analogy must be assumed for the individual instance; but this general direction is no help in the individual instance, since in each case the question "what is many?" and "what is complicated?" will find various answers.

Another suggestion seems more plausible at the first glance. It is natural to assume that the forms which exercise the attractive force (i. e. produce the analogy) must be more numerous than the attracted ones. But on closer examination this reasoning is found to be invalid. In my opinion, at least, BRUGMAN is right when he argues (in Kuhn's Zeitschrift, 24, page 50, and Morph. Unters., 1, page 82 seq.) that the action of analogy takes place gradually, that is, one form may attract a second to it, these two a third, fourth and fifth, and these further the following ones, up to the thousandth, etc., so that we can easily imagine that a mere handful of forms may have served as the model for thousands. Such cases do actually occur; thus, BRUGMAN adduces the fact, already established by other scholars, that "four Old Slavonic verbs, jesmi, věmi, dami and jami, have brought it to pass that in New Slovenian and New Servian the verbs of all the conjugational classes end in -m in the first person singular", -and similar examples. (Cf. Morph. Untersuch., 1, page 83.)

It seems to me, therefore, that hardly any practical suggestions have been offered in regard to the boundaries within which the action of analogy takes place.

Perhaps it would be easier to say something of the various kinds of formation by analogy. Since a formation by analogy is a change of form which occurs in consequence of an association of ideas, we can make a classification from three following points of view: from the nature of the psychic processes which play a part in such a formation; from the constitution

of the words in question; and from the result attained by the action of analogy. I will discuss these three points briefly in the above order.

First, in regard to the classification according to the psychic processes: much that MISTELI has brought forward on this subject may serve to introduce its discussion, which has not yet begun in earnest. I will only emphasize one point here it is important to distinguish whether a transfer of form has taken place of itself, so to speak (as is the case in the greater majority of instances), or whether the speaker, finding the form which is demanded by the phonetic laws for some reason inconvenient, seeks for some other formation, and as the result of this search a transfer of form takes place./ An example of the latter sort is the Latin dative and ablative plural in -abus, which frequently occurs in deabus, filiabus and libertabus, and in isolated instances in other words. As is most clearly shown by the passages in NEUE'S Formenlehre der lateinischen Sprache, 2nd edition, 1, page 22, these dative-ablative forms arose where a distinction from the corresponding forms of the masculine was needed. There was no objection to saying di deaeque, deorum dearumque, deos deasque; but what should be said in the dative and ablative, dis disque? There was a similar drawback to the use of filia in wills or other provisions quae pertinent ad necessitatem juris. Suppose, for example, provision must be made in case a son or sons, a daughter or daughters are living. Should it be worded: "filio seu filiis, filia seu filiis exstantibus"? It was evidently in such and similar predicaments that the forms in -abus originated, and the process can hardly have been other than the following: another form is sought instead of dis and filiis, which in special cases could not be employed; and this form is suggested in consequence of the connection subsisting in the mind of the speaker between the series filiae, filiarum, filiis, filias, and duae, duarum, duabus, duas. In ordinary speech the ablative duabus can exercise no attractive force on mensis and the rest, because their is is protected by connection with the is of the second declension, which has the same significance. Not until this connection is for some special reason dissolved, does duabus exert its attractive force. The old grammarians are

therefore quite correct in saying that the forms deabus etc. were created differentiae causa; but the impulse toward differentiation was not able to evolve new and original formations, only imitative ones, after existing models. This impulse to differentiate can accordingly be classed among the motives which are active in the construction of forms by analogy. (Cf. MISTELI as quoted above, page 472.)

We find a second ground of classification in the constitution of the words in question, that is, in the conditions which must be present in the words before any action of analogy can take place. Under this head we must ask first of all whether words connected only by sound, and also whether words connected only by sense, can influence each other through the working of analogy. I should be inclined to answer the first question in the negative, the second in the affirmative. To illustrate the first, Misteli gives a good example (page 434), which I will repeat here:

“Although καθίζω, ἐκάθισα forms in the future καθιῶ, -θιeis, -diei, as if xad were the root and to the ending, as in Badilw, Badiouμat, so that scarcely a shadow (in the ) of the root sed remains; yet despite the identity of ending, xáde, καθίζον, -θίζω, -θίζων, -θίζοις have not the remotest connection with, for example, a πρόρριζε, πρόρριζον, -ρίζω, -ρίζων, -pilots; the gulf between noun and verb cannot be bridged over by any amount of phonetic identity, and it is only because we regard this as self-evident that we can speak of purely phonetic analogy."

As to the second point, it is at least clear that endings whose function is identical enter into association, even without phonetic similarity; thus, dyovos arises from analogy with the dative plural in -ots, while there is no seductive similarity of form between σɩ (in άywot) and ots. Whether the same can be observed in word-stems (e. g. whether the form of the adjective "good" can influence the form of the adjective "bad", or the like) must be more accurately investigated. CAROLINA MICHAELIS (Studien zur romanischen Wortschöpfung, page 35) assumes such an attractive force in the case of the Italian greve, which would accordingly owe its e to the influence of the e of leve. In the second place, we must remark that in

inflected words the associative action can start either from the word-stem or from the endings, and in this connection a distinction must be drawn between material and formal analogical construction.1) An example of material formation by analogy is the Greek oo, which came from the previously existing form ἡδύσι through the influence of ἡδέος, ἡδές, ἡδέων. In the singular the forms ἡδύς, ηδύ, ἡδύν were able to resist the attractive force (although ośa does occasionally appear); but in the plural, where, after the assimilation of the accusative to the nominative, duo was the only case with u, that constituent part of the forms (all belonging to one series) which was felt to contain the chief significance was made uniform. The innumerable formal constructions by analogy are illustrated by forms like ayavots, Herzens etc.

A third ground of classification is found in the result of the transfer of form, according as the original form is wholly supplanted by the imitative formation, as is the case with ἐλύσαμεν, which probably took the place of an older *ἔλυσμεν; or both forms exist side by side, as in the genitive senatus and senati. The question also comes up, whether an intermediate form can arise through the mutual influence of two forms, a species of formation which has received the name of "formation by contamination" [Contaminationsbildung]. An example would be the Latin jecinoris by the side of jecur. As the Sanskrit shows, where the stems yakan and yakṛt exist side by side, the Latin paradigm was once jecor, *jecinis, and jecinoris is "contaminated" from both stem-forms.

But these and similar attempts, which may possibly be made, to classify the whole mass of analogical formations, cannot possess any considerable value for the practical application of the science, since the first task must be to collect material systematically in the newly explored field. I think such a collection would have the greatest likelihood of success if the inflectional forms of a definite linguistic period could be taken up, and the inquiry instituted, in what analogical formations each individual form was either actively or passively involved. This would be the easiest way to obtain a comprehensive view

1) OSTHOFF in particular (following PAUL) called attention to this classification in the lecture we shall mention below.