The proof of this explanation being the true one, is the fact of similar characters being met with in private life, whose sentiments, propensities, and intellect, are analogous, and produce corresponding effects, but on a scale proportioned to their rank and power, and the progress of civilization. On the same principle, the moral and devotional tendencies of the idiot mentioned by Dr Rush are easily accounted for.

The phenomena of dreaming and of somnambulism are also equally embarrassing for the metaphysicians, and equally consistent with Phrenology. Indeed, the unprejudiced mind can scarcely ask a more convincing proof, than that afforded by the phenomena of dreaming, of the existence of a plurality of mental faculties and organs. During that state several of the mental faculties, moral and affective, as well as intellectual, are evidently active, while the remainder continue dormant, just as we sometimes retain the sense of hearing awake when sight and smell no longer transmit ordinary impressions. This must be admitted, because if all our mental powers are awake, there can be no sleep; and if they are all dormant there can be no dream; and if some can be awake when others are dormant they must of necessity have different organs. The natural result of such an arrangement is, that we sometimes imagine ourselves engaged in actions, which, in our waking moments, we should never have undertaken, because, in the latter state, our decision would have been influenced by feelings or faculties now dormant. Thus, a person with a large and active endowment of Combativeness, but in whose waking hours it is regulated and kept in check by the higher sentiments and intellect, may, when these are inactive during sleep, frequently dream of being engaged in broils and battles. The restraining powers being dormant, and the propensity active, it takes its full swing. It happens occasionally, and for a similar reason, that a person whose reasoning powers are naturally very powerful, will dream of philosophy and serious reflection, as is recorded of Condillac and Franklin, and that reflection then going on undisturbed by other emotions or states of the mind will

produce better ideas than they could have invented when awake.

The phenomena of somnambulism admit of a similar explanation, as it is merely a variety of dreaming, in which one or more of the external senses are in simultaneous activity with some of the internal faculties, and in which the power of voluntary motion is possessed.

*

After having thus exposed the consistency and harmony which obtains between the principles of Phrenology and the sound phenomena of mind, we ought next to try their consistency with those of the diseased state, as the true theory of mind must always be consistent with nature. It has ever been a grievous defect in the theories drawn from the closets of the speculative philosophers, that not one of them was ever applicable to actual life, and that any attempt to reconcile their opinions with diseased phenomena of mind instantly laid their systems at their feet. It is the peculiar excellence of Phrenology that its doctrines have been drawn, not from the consciousness of individuals, erected into standards of the race, but from observations made upon the minds of thousands and of tens of thousands, and that they are found consistent not only in all their parts and in all their applications, but that they explain simply many of what were formerly considered the most intricate phenomena in the philosophy of mind. I regret, therefore, that want of time prevents me entering minutely upon this point, and forces me to confine myself to a very general outline.

In partial idiocy, for instance, the individual is exceedingly deficient in most of the intellectual powers, and frequently in some of the moral sentiments, and yet possesses a few of them in considerable vigour. Thus an idiot may have a talent for imitation, for drawing, or for music, and be incapable of comprehending a single abstract idea; or he may

• Hill, the well-known writer on Insanity, seems to be impressed with the same idea, when he says, at page 29, that "The Scotch philosophers, who may "hereafter wish to detect the fallacy of some of the most important tenets con"tained in their creed, must explore with unprejudiced zeal the history of the “diseases of man, which are productive of Dementia.”

manifest the sentiment of Veneration, or of Benevolence, or the feeling of Destructiveness, or Amativeness, and yet pos-sess no other power of intellect or of feeling in a perceptible degree. And in the state of partial insanity, the very name equally implies disease of a limited number of faculties, while others remain sound. Thus in melancholy, the whole intellectual powers seem sometimes to remain unimpaired, while sentiments only are diseased. Neither of these states could occur did all the faculties of the mind manifest themselves through the medium of a single organ, as is generally supposed. Even dissections, vague as they must yet be considered in reference to insanity and to Phrenology, confirm the truth of the fundamental principles of the latter; for Morgani* tells us, that there is no more striking characteristic of the brains of the insane than that of the variety of the states of their different parts; some being soft while others are hard; some of one appearance and some of another; and, when we recollect that madness is generally partial, this will be admitted to correspond in a remarkable degree with what a phrenologist would expect a priori. If the organ of mind were single, partial madness, i. e. madness limited to certain faculties only, would evidently be impossible, unless we admit of disease of the immaterial principle. On that supposition each faculty ought to be affected to an equal degree, and insanity could have no permanent or fixed character.

Having now shewn that the phrenological principle of a plurality of faculties and organs is indispensably necessary to explain the phenomena either of sound or diseased mind, we come next to inquire, whether the phrenological mode of investigation, viz. that of comparing development with manifestations, seems to be founded in reason, and to be adequate to the attainment of the end in view?

Philosophers of every creed now so generally admit the existence of natural differences in the talents and dispositions of individuals, that I shall, on the present occasion, and after what I have already said, take it for granted.

De Sedibus et Causis Morborum.

These differences can depend only on one of two causes; 1st, Either they are inherent in the nature of the immaterial principle; or, 2d, They are caused by corresponding differences in the condition of the brain, as the organ of mind. Now, although we are entirely ignorant of what the immaterial principle or mind is in itself, yet we have many weighty reasons for not believing the differences to be so inherent in its nature as to be uninfluenced by the organization. The chief of these, as mentioned in the beginning of this paper, are the successive development of the faculties corresponding to that of the brain, and the great changes produced by disease. As the immaterial principle is held to be unsusceptible of change, and as these phenomena can be simply accounted for by the changes in the state of the brain, which we observe to accompany the changes in the constitution of the mind, it seems much more philosophical to satisfy ourselves with an explanation which comes within the cognizance of our faculties, than to have recourse to one entirely hypothetical and incapable of proof; more especially, when the former accords strictly with facts which daily and hourly present themselves to our notice.....

Admitting the principle then, that each primitive mental faculty manifests itself by means of an appropriate and distinct cerebral organ, and that the energy and activity of its manifestations vary with the changes in the condition of the material organ, we have next to inquire, to what organic cause the natural facility which we possess of manifesting one faculty, or set of faculties, more powerfully than another, is to be attributed? Even reasoning a priori, we can see no other than that of size. General size of the brain, it must be observed, is distinctly recognized by the physiologist as an indispensable requisite for sound and vigorous manifestations, and the degree of general power is admitted to vary with the degree of size, from the small brain of the idiot up to the large brain of a Bacon or a Shakspeare. Now what applies to the brain as a whole must be equally true in regard to its parts. If we suppose

each organ, or part of the brain, to be equal in activity and equal in perfection of structure, it is difficult to see how there can be any inequality of function, or any possibility of manifesting one faculty more powerfully than another. But let us suppose one organ to be greater in point of size than the other, and all other things to be equal, we see at once, on the principle above stated, a possibility of its performing its functions with more energy.

To this it may, perhaps, be objected, that a faculty is sometimes very vigorously manifested during disease, although the size of its organ has undergone no change. This is perfectly true, but it is no less true, that if an organ of a larger size is subjected to the same degree of morbid excitement, its functions will be performed with still more energy. An important condition is changed. A small muscle, for instance, suffering from diseased excitement, will often operate more powerfully than a larger muscle in its healthy state; but no one doubts that, upon exciting the latter to the same pitch, it will operate with a greater degree of power exactly proportioned to its greater size; so that it may be safely admitted as a truth, that, ceteris paribus, the larger organ will always produce the greater result. Hence, the principle of size exerting an influence upon the energy of the mental manifestations is perfectly consonant to all the known laws of nature, and is no new nor idle proposition started to serve a particular purpose.*

This principle, I am perfectly aware, is ridiculed by many as too absurd to be entertained for a moment, and various authors are quoted to prove it to be so. For the sake of such persons I beg leave to subjoin a passage from a Report, by the celebrated Cuvier, to the French Institute, in 1822. Speaking of the cerebral lobes being the place "where all the sensations take a "distinct form, and leave durable impressions," he adds, "l'anatomie com"parée en offre une autre confirmation dans la proportion constante du volume "de ces lobes avec le degré d'intelligence des animaux." Thus admitting the influence of size of the cerebral organs upon the power of manifesting the mental faculties, as distinctly as Dr Gall himself can do. And it must farther be remarked, that Cuvier here speaks the sentiments of Portal, Berthollet, Pinel, and Dumeril, who, along with himself, formed a commission to examine and report upon the experiments of Monsieur Flourens. This statement, however, taken in detail, is not sufficiently precise, for, în point of fact, the de.