"

DISCOVERED BY ATTENTION TO THE SUBJECTS OF OUR CON

SCIOUSNESS, and afterwards to apply these laws as principles, "for the synthetical explanation of the more complicated phe66 nomena of the understanding.”

From these quotations no one could have the smallest doubt of the adequacy of Consciousness to afford us that information "concerning the laws of union and the mutual "influence of mind and body," which Mr S. justly declares to be so "necessary in the sciences of morals and medicine."What then must be our astonishment on finding, that, so far from Consciousness throwing any light upon the connection between different states of the mind, and different conditions of the material organ, it does not inform us even of the existence of the latter? This fact, however, furnishes a very simple and satisfactory explanation of the cause of the constant failure which has ever attended the efforts of the most profound and ingenious men, whose talents and industry have been expended during so many ages in the barren fields of metaphysical research; and it explains perfectly the superior success which has attended the labours of Gall and Spurzheim, conducted as they were with the most scrupulous and constant reference to the effects of the material organ. It was a deep conviction of the necessity of always keeping in view the influence of the organization, that induced Dr Gall to devote so much time and attention to the observation of the effects of different forms and conditions of the brain upon the power of manifesting individual mental faculties; and it was the extensive application to Nature of this better mode of investigation, that ultimately enabled him to establish the following principles, the most important of those upon which the new system is founded, viz.

1. That the mind is endowed with a plurality of innate faculties.

2. That each of these faculties manifests itself through the medium of an appropriate organ, of which organs the brain is a congeries.

3. That the power of manifesting each faculty bears a constant and uniform relation, ceteris paribus, to the size of

the organ, or part of the brain with which it is more immediately connected.

4. That it is possible to ascertain the relative size of these different organs during life, by observing the different forms of the skull to which the brain gives its shape.

Hence, if these principles are correct, by adopting the mode of inquiry to which they naturally give rise, by comparing development of brain with manifestation of mind, it becomes possible to discover the nature and number of the primitive faculties, with a degree of certainty absolutely unattainable by any other method. For, besides avoiding the great error of neglecting the influence of the organization, we also avoid another equally great, into which the metaphysical philosophers have fallen, in prosecuting their inquiries by reflection on Consciousness alone. It is that of each taking his own mind as the standard or type of those of the human race, and thus regularly beginning the erection of his own theory by the demolition of that of his predecessor; because, on account of the natural and undeniable differences between the minds of different individuals, Consciousness does not and cannot present the same results on the presentment of the same object to any two of them; and much less can the Consciousness of any one individual agree with that of all others at one or at different times; which it must necessarily be shewn to do, before laws or principles, applicable to all, can be deduced from the consciousness of one. Phrenology, on the other hand, explicitly lays down these differences, in disposition and talents, as natural, and one of its chief objects is to ascertain, by observation, the causes upon which they depend.

Some have been led to deny the truth of the observations of the phrenologists, because the results at which they have arrived often differ so widely from the opinions entertained by the most esteemed metaphysical writers, whom they have been accustomed to revere as the only legitimate authorities in the science of mind. But he, who contemplates for a moment the fundamental differences of the two modes of

inquiry, will pause before rejecting them on that ground alone, and will feel any thing rather than surprise, at a considerable difference of result. Phrenology is a science of observation, and its principles are a direct inference from facts in Nature, while that of metaphysicians is derived solely from reflection in the closet. No wonder then, that the phrenological mode of investigation should have led to the discovery of much that must have remained unknown to the metaphysician. It is like a new agent in chemistry, or a new power in mechanics, the results of which can be ascertained by experience alone, and not by deductions from the analogies of things essentially different.

It is so far fortunate for the new system, that, to disprove a science founded on observation, it is not sufficient merely to deny its truth; we must commence our operations on the facts upon which it is built, and, by confirming or undermining these, support or undermine the superstructure. This mode of proceeding ought invariably to be followed as the only one which is either philosophical or conclusive; and is that which I would adopt on the present occasion, if it were in my power to do so. Unfortunately, however, in as far as Phrenology is concerned, it can only be followed in the wide and varied field of nature, and not within the limits of a hall like this. I might, no doubt, go over a long detail of facts observed in that field by myself and others; but to the minds of those, who are not practically acquainted with the principles of Phrenology, so many sources of fallacy immediately present themselves, and so much calm reflection is, at first, required to perceive the relation of the facts to the principles, that such a detail would be tedious and uninteresting, and would, probably, seem inconclusive. The committee, who selected this question for discussion, seem to have been aware of this. They do not ask if Phrenology is founded on fact? because the affirmative or negative can be proved only by repeating the observations and verifying the facts themselves. But they very justly suppose, that if it has a foundation in nature, its doctrines

must be consistent with and explanatory of all the known phenomena of mind. They, therefore, ask simply if Phrenology affords a satisfactory explanation of these phenomena, trusting to the consistency or inconsistency which shall be shewn to exist between them for the strongest presumptive evidence of its truth or erroneousness which it is possible to obtain. To the examination of this kind of evidence, therefore, I shall strictly confine myself, and the order which I shall adopt is as follows:

Taking for granted, what nobody now thinks of denying, (and which those who do will find demonstrated in Mr McFarlane's excellent paper, read to this Society about two years ago,) that the brain is the organ of mind, I shall endeavour to shew that all the mental phenomena are explicable by, or consistent with the fundamental phrenological principles already mentioned as established by Dr Gall, while they are at variance with every theory which regards the organ of mind as single, or the mind itself as a single power existing in different states. And to prove that the individual faculties admitted as ascertained, are really necessary and original powers, I shall give a few examples of their application to the analysis of the moral and intellectual nature of man, as exhibited in the varied characters of individuals and of nations. I shall dwell most upon the proof of the principles, because they lie at the root of all the others, and, if once admitted and acted upon, will soon lead to the demonstration of what are primitive faculties and what

are not.

In endeavouring to shew that the mental phenomena are explicable by the principle of a plurality of faculties and organs, I shall begin with the consideration of the intellectual, and then proceed to that of the moral nature of

man.

The first order of intellectual phenomena, for the explanation of which the admission of the above principle is necessary, is that of the successive development of the dif ferent powers of the mind in infancy and youth. At

birth, the infant mind seems nearly insensible to surrounding objects. The powers of observation are then gradually developed, and mere existence is recognized long before an idea is formed of the qualities of objects. By and by the powers of perceiving the qualities of colour, of form, and also the relative positions of objects, are developed, while yet there is no idea of distance, size, or weight; and an object is thus grasped at when far beyond the reach of the infant. The faculty which, by comparing objects with each other, enables us to perceive resemblances, then comes into play, but long before that which leads us to attend to the distinguishing differences, so that one thing is often confounded with another to which it bears a very slight resemblance. It is only about the age of puberty that the reasoning power is possessed in much activity, and it is not till adult age that it arrives at maturity.

That this is the general order of the development of the mental powers, is proved by the progress of language, which is known to take its character from the nature of the predominant faculties of those by whom it is used. At first, it is merely a collection of nouns, of words denoting existence, and nothing more, as man, horse, tree. To these are soon added words expressive of qualities, and those expressive of colour and form are generally understood, and used with intelligence, before those of size, distance, or weight; and those expressive of resemblance precede those of differences; and those of individuals, those of abstracts or classes.

The same rule of successive development is observed to hold with regard to the moral sentiments and propensities, although it is more difficult to trace the order of their appearance. A single instance, however, is sufficient to prove the fact; and, as that is all we want at present, I shall merely mention it. It is that of the late development of the sexual propensity, which, however strong it may become in after life, is rarely perceptible before the age of puberty, and bears no constant relation to any other quality of mind at any period of our lives.