"ring the whole life. Such is the result of the investigations "of Wenzel, and of others who have given their attention to "the anatomy of that organ. Now, if the understanding originated in the brain, why should it not be as perfect at the age of seven years as it is at the age of twenty? The organ "in which it resides is equally perfect at both ages.

We can

"account for the difference of bodily strength, at different "periods of life, from the organs not having arrived at their "full size and maturity, but we cannot account for the dis"tinctions in mental power." P. 99.

From the clearness and downright honesty of purpose with which Mr Rennell utters these absurdities, we have a very high opinion at least of his conscientiousness. He does not sophisticate, or shew a diffidence of his cause by entrenching himself in the ambiguity of words. He indicates no secretiveness, or concealed consciousness of writing nonsense; so that one is led to treat his errors with indulgence. We merely regret, therefore, that he should have oppressed a good cause by so foolish a defence. He affirms, that "the whole brain commonly arrives at its maximum at "the age of three years ;" and, in support of this and his other physiological statements, he refers to authorities; but where nature was within his reach, he was not entitled to venture on erroneous assertions, even although they were to be found in some obscure corner of some weak and unknown author. He required only to look at the first child he saw to learn the very erroneous nature of such a statement as the foregoing; or, if he could not depend on his own observation, he required only to go to a hat-shop, and ask whether hats and caps for children of three years of age are made of the same size as those for full-grown men? On the same authority he asserts, that the brain attains its maximum of weight at three years of age. This also is positively incorrect. Again, he states, that "the brain is equally perfect at the 66 age of seven as it is at the age of twenty." This also is an error which he can scarcely be excused for falling into, in a grave dissertation. He had only to compare the heads of children of the one age with those of men of the other, to see that the brain is far less in size in the former than in the

latter; and every anatomist will tell him, that at seven years the convolutions are not only less in size, but that they are also less in depth than at maturity, and that the anterior lobes of the brain, connected with the intellect, are not so large in proportion to the other parts of this organ at seven years as at twenty-one. Mr Rennell continues,

"Every one accustomed to train the youthful mind is well aware "that there are certain periods when its intellectual powers, the comprehension, the imagination, the judgment, develop them"selves in a manner, and to a degree, which cannot be accounted "for upon any external principle." "With the same external "advantages of education, and with the same readiness in imbib"ing knowledge, two different minds will experience this deve"lopment of power at two different periods of their existence. "Yet that there is the slightest possible change in the appear"ance, the consistency, or any other quality of the brain, at "these or any other similar periods, no physiologist will choose "to assert."

So says Mr Rennell. We, on the other hand, do not choose to assert any thing on the subject; but we are ready to produce positive evidence, that at this period of mental excitement, the cerebellum, for example, has attained a much larger size in proportion to the brain than it exhibited ten years before, and at this period it is known that the sexual feelings come into activity: in like manner, to shew by positive facts, that, at the age in question, the anterior convolutions of the brain, connected with the intellectual powers, have also attained a much larger development, in point of size, than they possessed before the period of mental excitement commenced; and, on dissection, we are able to shew, that the whole texture of the brain is firmer and more completely organized than in the early years of infancy, when the substance is pulpy, and the convolutions are very imperfectly unfolded. If, therefore, the doctrine of immortality were to rest on such arguments as these, it would stand. upon a frail foundation indeed.

To prevent misapprehension on this very important subject, we beg to repeat, in a few words, the substance of the doctrine now delivered.

1st, It appears to us that we know nothing whatever concerning the substance of the mind, that our faculties are not fitted to find it out, and, therefore, that it is mere self-delusion to pretend, either by observation or reasoning, to determine its essence. All discussion on this subject is, in our opinion, equally idle and vain, as that between the nominalists and realists, which now appears to the world as a piece of childish absurdity, altogether unworthy of fullgrown men. In like manner we anticipate that posterity will regard the angry dissensions of the present generation, about the substance of the mind, as equally ridiculous; and that they will form the reproach of our day, as the other disputes now alluded to, adhere as a stigma to a preceding generation.

2dly, That this ignorance is fraught with no evil consequence to the interests of individuals or of society; because, on the principles of a sound philosophy, there is no perceptible connexion betwixt the substance of the mind and its future destiny.

3dly, That while the interests of individuals and society are not in the least concerned in the substance of the mind, they are deeply involved in the question of its immortality ; but that the real evidence of its being destined for a future existence, so far as this can be derived from philosophy, is to be found in the aim of the faculties with which it is endowed, and in the relations which they bear to time and to eternity, and not in the discovery of the essence of which it is composed.

Before concluding, we have still a few words to address to each of the authors before us, on other points than the question of materialism. The great object of Mr Rennell's publication was scepticism, connected with the subjects of organization and life. In a note on "the System of Gall "and Spurzheim," he says, "It must certainly be allowed, "that this system does not, of logical necessity, terminate in "materialism." So we also think; but if this was the case, phrenology clearly lay out of the path of Mr Rennell; and

when he proceeded, nevertheless, to state that this system, "however ingenious or amusing in theory it may be, is "annihilated by the commonest references to fact;" when he talked of " the flimsy theories of these German illu"minati," and of their " absurdities," and of "this master"piece of empiricism," all without understanding one word of the subject, he acted very unlike a Christian, and very unlike a philosopher. If it was necessary to the success of his argument to attack phrenology, he was bound, by every consideration of common sense, as well as by a regard to his own reputation, before doing so, to study and endeavour to comprehend it; if, on the other hand, which he admits to be the case, it did not necessarily obtrude itself into his discussions, he was, if possible, more strongly called upon to understand it and treat it fairly; for, in assailing it without necessity and without provocation, he came forward as a knight errant to the combat; and a knight should be courteous and honourable as well as brave. Yet, so far from being acquainted with the science, he betrays the most palpable ignorance of its very elements. "Certainly," says he, "of the parts specified by Gall and Spurzheim, every one "has in its turn been found wanting, without any defi"ciency in that intellectual faculty, which they would repre"sent it either to produce or to sustain." In the phrenological system, not one-third part of the brain is represented as being in connexion with the intellectual faculties; and we defy Mr Rennell to point out a single authenticated case, in which the organs on both sides of the brain, which are really stated as related to these powers, have been found wanting, without any deficiency of the intellectual faculties occurring, and we shall at once yield to him the palm of victory. Two-thirds of the brain are stated in phrenology as constituting the organs of propensities and sentiments, and many cases are on record in which these parts were injured, without the organs of intellect being affected, and in which, in exact correspondence with the latter fact, the in

tellectual faculties were not impaired. Mr Rennell appears not to have been aware that, in the system in question, this large portion of the brain is represented as appertaining to the propensities and sentiments; and, in consequence, when he read of an injury of any part of the brain having occurred without intellectual derangement, he imagined that phrenology was overthrown!-Such cases, on the contrary, indirectly support it, for they are explicable upon the principles of this science, while they are at variance with every hypothesis which considers the whole brain as the single organ of mind. The public have been egregiously misled in regard to the real bearing upon phrenology, of the recorded cases of injuries of the brain as affecting the mental and we powers; refer Mr Rennell to an inquiry into this subject, by Mr Andrew Combe, published in the Transactions of the Phrenological Society, to enable him to manage his next attack upon phrenology with greater success.

In the next place, if respect to philosophy and to his own reputation did not prompt Mr R. to study phrenology before attacking it, regard to the sacred cause of religion, of which he is the advocate, ought to have led him not only to do so, but to make himself extremely certain that it was unfounded, before he connected an assault upon it with the holiest and most sacred of causes. It has been the misfortune of religion, in all ages, to be used, by indiscreet votaries, as a weapon with which to assail the most brilliant and useful discoveries in philosophy; by which conduct the profane have been furnished with plausible, though unfair pretences for representing the two as naturally hostile. The founders of phrenology, and all its supporters, proclaimed from the beginning, that it is an inductive science; and Mr Rennell is too acute and too learned, not to know, that, if this character truly belong to it, an ultimate triumph as certainly awaits it, as if all the schools of Europe had already pronounced it to be founded in nature. It was indiscreet in him, therefore, so far to contemn the intellect and honesty of the phrenolo