of proving, and the opposite conjecture, that medullary matter does not think, but is only the instrument of thought, is at least as sound and as well supported as his.

The second answer that might be given to him on the principles now laid down is this. Allow to him, for the sake of argument, that medullary matter does think, what then? Here, in our opinion, the great error of the friends of religion lies, in admitting, as they generally do, that if the mind be material, man must necessarily be neither immortal nor responsible, consequences which appear to us to be altogether illogical, and not deducible from the premises. Let us allow to the materialist, for the sake of argument, that the brain does think, what then? If in fact it does so, it must be the best possible substance for thinking, just because the Creator selected it for the purpose, and endowed it with this property. In this argument the religious constantly forget that the same Omnipotent hand made the brain that created the mind, and the universe itself, and that in the dedication of every cerebral convolution to its objects, be they thinking or any other process, the divine wisdom is as certainly exercised, as in impressing motion on the planets, or infusing light and heat into the sun. If, therefore, de facto, God has made the brain to think, we may rest assured that it is exquisitely and perfectly adapted for this purpose, and that His objects in creating man will not be defeated on account of His having chosen a wrong substance out of which to constitute the thinking principle. But what are His objects in creating man? This brings us to the jet of the question at once. Mr Lawrence, it is said, founds no moral doctrine on his opinions regarding the substance of the mind; but other materialists, who make these opinions the foundation of atheism, wish us to believe that the best evidence of the Divine intention in creating the human soul is to be found in discovering the substance of which it is made; and they insinuate, that if it is constituted of a very refined and dignified substance, the conclusion necessarily follows, that it is intended for magnificent destinies, while, if it

is composed of a rude and vulgar material, it must be intended only to crawl on this filthy world. Here, however, sense and logic equally fail them; for no principle in philosophy is more certain than that we cannot infer from a knowledge of the mere substance of any thing for what ends it is fitted. Exhibit to a human being every variety of imaginable essence, and if you allow him to know no more of its properties than he can discover from examining its constituent parts, he will be utterly incapable of telling whether it is calculated to endure for a day or to last to eternity. The materialist, therefore, is not entitled, even from the supposed admission that medullary matter thinks, to conclude that man is not immortal and responsible. The true way of discovering for what end man has been created, is to look to the qualities with which he has been endowed, trusting that the substance of which he is composed is perfectly suited to the objects of his creation. Now, when we look to the qualities with which man is endowed, we find the thinking principle in him to differ not only in degree but in kind from that of the lower animals. The latter have no faculty of Justice to indicate to them that the unrestrained manifestation of destructiveness or acquisitiveness is wrong; they have no sentiment of Veneration to prompt them to seek a God whom they may adore; they have no faculty of Hope, pointing out futurity as an object of ceaseless anxiety and contemplation, and leading them to desire a life beyond the grave; and we affirm it as an undeniable fact, that the convolutions of the brain, which in man form the organs of these sentiments, do not exist in the lower animals. Those organs also, which in man serve to manifest the faculties of Reflection, are, in the lower animals, eminently deficient, and their understanding, in exact correspondence with this fact, is so limited as to be satisfied with little knowledge, and to be insensible to the comprehensive design and glories of creation. Man, then, being endowed with qualities which are denied to the lower creatures, we are entitled, by a legitimate exercise of reflection, the subject being beyond the region of the external

senses, to conclude, on principles truly philosophical, that he is destined for other and higher objects than they are, whatever be the substance of which his mind is constituted, just as we infer from perceiving weights, wheels, and a pendulum combined, that a clock is intended to measure time, whether the structure be of wood, brass, or any other metal. The properties of things indicate the objects for which they are intended, better than the substance employed in producing them. Man may err in choosing a substance not calculated to answer his designs, and he may construct a piece of mechanism of timber which would have been more appropriately constituted of iron; but God cannot commit such mistakes; and when we see His purposes in creating man clearly indicated in the faculties with which we are endowed, it appears to us to be downright absurdity, and even profanity, to dispute whether the Creator has chosen a fit essence of which to create us, and to fear that His objects may be defeated by His having selected too frail and perishable a material for constituting our thinking principle.

While then we agree with Philostratus, that no legitimate inference concerning the ultimate destiny of man can be drawn from inquiries into the substance of which his mind is composed, we dissent explicitly from the conclusion that the discoveries of revelation in regard to the immortality of the soul are not capable of receiving any support by correct inductions from natural phenomena. They do not indeed require such aid; but as revelation proceeds from the Divine mind, it must harmonize with all His other works; and it is at once logical and useful to point out, as phrenology truly does, the existence of such natural principles in the mind of man, as coincide with the doctrines of revelation, and render his revealed destiny in itself a matter of high probability.

But to proceed; let us compare the foregoing answers, which might be given to the materialist, who pushes his conclusions to the extreme above alluded to, with those furnished by Mr Rennell. This gentleman endeavours to prove that the mind is independent of matter in this life, and ad

duces, as evidence of his proposition, the following circumstances, which, it will be observed, all relate to the present state of existence, and are intended to shew that the mind in this world may, and occasionally does, act independently of

organs.

"Let us take," says he, "a healthy man in sound sleep. "He lies without sense or feeling, yet no part of his frame is diseased, nor is a single power of his life of vegetation sus"pended. All within his body is as active as ever. The blood "circulates as regularly, and almost as rapidly, in the sleeping "as in the waking subject. Digestion, secretion, nutrition, and "all the functions of the life of vegetation proceed, and yet the understanding is absent. Sleep, therefore, is an affection of "the mind rather than of the body, and the refreshment which "the latter receives from it is from the suspension of its active " and agitating principle. Now, if thought was identified with "the brain, when the former was suspended, the latter would "undergo a proportionate change. Memory, imagination, per"ception, and all the stupendous powers of the human intellect,

are absent, and yet the brain is precisely the same,― the same " in every particle of matter-the same in every animal function. "Of not a single organ is the action suspended. When again "the man awakens, and his senses return, no change is produced "by the recovery,—the brain, the organs of sense, and all the "material parts of his frame, remain precisely in the same condi"tion." P. 92.

Before proceeding to analyze this passage, we beg to state, that what we condemn in Mr Rennell is the impolicy of first holding out the essence of thought as a matter ascertainable at all by our faculties, and representing it as of importance to religion, and thereafter endeavouring to arrive at this knowledge by a line of argument altogether unfounded. In the selection of his arguments there is the greatest want of judgment; for if the opponents succeed in exposing their absurdity, they immediately proclaim a triumph over the whole doctrine which they were adduced to support; and yet nothing is more easy than to prove the puerility of the statements here founded on in support of the mind's independence of matter in this life. 66 Sleep," says Mr Rennell, "is an affection of the mind rather than of the body." If this be so, we may ask, in the first place, what notion are we to form of an immortal and immaterial essence, which

requires to lay aside its powers for a great part of the time of its existence, and to pass into a state of utter oblivion for many hours out of every day? If it be so frail, and liable to such long suspensions, we may reasonably fear its utter extinction, amid the wreck of matter and the crash of worlds. But, in the second place, if sleep be an affection of the mind rather than of the body, how should it happen that the physician, by administering opium, should be able to produce it? or why should the stimulus of green tea, or the high delirium of a fever, drive it far from the eyelids? The assertion again, that when the man awakes, no change in the condition of the brain takes place, is also unfounded. In passing from the state of sleep to that of watching, we feel such sensations in the head as lead us, after we know the purposes of the brain, irresistibly to infer that a new condition-that of activity, is induced upon it in waking. To remove the drowsiness and confusion which succeed recovery from inebriation, some men wrap a cloth wet with cold water round the head, and it is known to restore and invigorate the activity of their mental powers; and does this fact correspond with the notion that sleep and drowsiness are affections of the mind rather than of the body? Who ever heard of an immaterial spirit having its suspended energies restored by being wrapt in a wet towel! and yet such must be the case, unless sleep is merely an affection of the organs. On this last supposition the action of the cloth is easily accounted for. The organs, being merely a material substance, obey an universal law of animated nature, in receiving an invigorating influence from the application of cold, after relaxation from excessive excitement and too much heat. Rennell, however, proceeds,

Mr

"In a child of eight years old, the limbs and all other parts "of the body are considerably smaller than in a man arrived

at maturity; hence they are not endowed with the same strength, nor capable of the same action, as at a more ad"vanced period. But the weight of the whole brain commonly arrives at its maximum at the of three years, "and all parts of the organ acquire their full dimensions at "the seventh year, after which no alteration takes place du

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