mal organs in general greatly preponderate in size over those of intellect and the moral sentiments. The latter skulls we have seen in the collection of the Phrenological Society, and the measurements are taken from that Society's transactions.

We can certify, without fear of contradiction, that the skulls of Gordon and Bellingham are very different in form from those of individuals who possess amiable natural dispositions; and as these Dublin skulls present a development inferior to them, we regard this as another, added to many previous examples, that the reports generally circulated concerning facts said to be inconsistent with phrenology have no foundation in nature, and originate entirely in want of knowledge of the subject in those on whose authority they rest. If any person wishes to learn the names of the gentlemen here referred to, with the view of verifying our report, we are ready to communicate them on application to the Editor.

ARTICLE XIII.

MATERIALISM AND SCEPTICISM.

REMARKS ON SCEPTICISM, especially as it is connected with the Subjects of Organization and Life. By the Rev. TнOMAS RENNELL, Christian Advocate in the University of Cambridge.-London, 1821. SOMATOPSYCHONOOLOGIA, shewing that the Proofs of Body, Life, and Mind, considered as distinct Essences, cannot be deduced from Physiology. By Philostratus. London,

1823.

THE objection, that phrenology leads to materialism, has been frequently urged against the science; and we embrace this early opportunity of discussing its merits. It appears singularly unphilosophical, even upon the most superficial consideration. Phrenology, viewed as the assertion of certain physical facts, cannot, if unfounded, logically lead to any result, except the disgrace and mortification of its supporters. On such a supposition, it cannot overturn religion, or any other truth; because, by the constitution of the human intellect, error constantly tends to resolve itself into nothing, and to sink into oblivion; while truth, having a real existence, remains permanent and impregnable. In this view, then, the objection, that phrenology leads to materialism, is absurd. If, on the other hand, the science is held to be a true interpretation of nature, and if it is urged, that, nevertheless, it leads fairly and logically to materialism, then the folly of the objection is equally glaring; for it resolves itself into this,-that materialism is the constitution of nature, and that phrenology is dangerous, because it makes this constitution known.

The charge assumes a still more awkward appearance in one shape in which it is frequently brought forward. The objector admits that the mind uses the body as an instru

ment of communication with external nature, and maintains that this fact does not necessarily lead to materialism. In this we agree with him; but we cannot perceive how it should lead nearer to this result, to hold that each faculty manifests itself by a peculiar organ, than to believe that the whole mind acts on external objects by means of the whole body or the whole brain. In short, in whatever point of view the system is regarded, whether as true or false, the objection of materialism is futile and unphilosophical; and we are grieved that it should have been brought forward in the name of religion, because every imbecile and unfounded attack against philosophy, made in this sacred name, tends to diminish the respect with which we desire to see it always invested.

The question of materialism itself, however, as a point of abstract discussion, has of late excited considerable attention; and we shall offer a few remarks upon its general merits. In entering on the subject, it is proper to take a view of the nature and extent of the point in dispute, and of the real effect of our decision upon it. The question then is, Whether the substance of which the thinking principle is composed be matter or spirit? And the effect of our decision, let it be observed, is not to alter the nature of that substance, whatever it is, but merely to adopt an opinion consonant with, or adverse to, a fact in nature over which we have no control. Mind, with all its faculties and functions, has existed since the creation, and will exist till the human race becomes extinct, and no opinion of man concerning the cause of its phenomena can have the least influence over that cause itself. The mind is invested by nature with all its properties and essences, and these it will possess, and manifest, and maintain, let men think, and speak, and write what they will concerning its substance. If the Author of nature has invested the mind with the quality of endless existence, it will, to a certainty, flourish in immortal youth, in spite of every appearance of premature decay. If, on the other hand, nature has limited its existence to this pass

ing scene, and decreed that it shall perish for ever when the animating principle passes from the body, then all our conjectures, arguments, discussions, and assertions respecting its immortality, will not add one day to its existence. The opinions of man, therefore, concerning the substance of the mind, can have no influence whatever in changing or modifying that substance itself; and if so, as little can these opinions undermine the constitution of the mind, or its relations to time and eternity, on which, as their foundations, morality and religion must and do rest as on an immutable basis. According to our view, morality and natural religion originate in and emanate from the primitive constitution of the mental powers themselves. Innumerable observations have proved, that faculties and organs of Benevolence, Hope, Veneration, Justice, and Reflection exist. Now, our believing that the mind will die with the body will not pluck these sentiments and powers from the soul; nor will our believing the mind to be immortal implant a single one more of them in our constitution. They would all remain the same in functions and constitution, and render virtue amiable and vice odious, although we should believe the mind to be made of dust, just as they would do were we to believe it to be a more immediate emanation from the Deity himself.

In short, therefore, this question of materialism has appeared to us one of the most vain, trivial, and uninteresting that ever engaged the human intellect; and nothing, in our opinion, can be more unphilosophical and more truly detrimental to the interests of morality and religion, than the unfounded clamour, or cant, shall we call it, which has been poured forth from the periodical journals about the dangers attending it. A manly intellect, instead of bowing before prejudice, would dissipate it by shewing that the question is altogether an illusion, and that, adopt what opinion we will concerning the substance of the mind, every attribute belonging to it must remain unaltered and unimpeached.

But not to stop in our investigation till we have reached the goal, we may inquire, whether it be possible to discover

the substance of which the mind is composed, whether it be material or immaterial? Previous to doing so, however, we ought to endeavour to ascertain what means we possess of arriving at a knowledge of the essence of the mind. All our knowledge must be derived either from consciousness or observation. Now, by reflecting on what we feel, we discover nothing concerning the nature or essence of the thinking being. We do not feel a spiritual substance stirring about within us, and elaborating sentiment and thought; and neither do we feel a material substance producing those effects. We are conscious only of feelings and emotions, of friendships and attachments, of high conceptions and glorious thoughts; but whether these originate from matter or from spirit; whether the first embryo substance of reflection dwelt lowly in the dust, or soared a pure ethereal essence amid the regions of boundless space, before it was constituted a part of us; whether God, in creating man, was pleased to invest his material organs with the property of thought, or to infuse into him a portion of immaterial fire;-on all these points consciousness gives us no information. A great deal of popular delusion, indeed, has been kept alive on this point, by the fact being overlooked, that we are not conscious of the operations of the brain. Men in general, because they are sensible only of thought and feeling, and not of the movements of any material organ performing these acts of the mind, imagine that it is necessarily an immaterial substance which is thinking and feeling within them; but they are equally unconscious of the contraction and relaxation of the muscles, and they might as well imagine that their arms and legs are moved, not by material organs, but by the direct impulse of spirit, as entertain the supposition in question. In short, the truly philosophical conclusion is, that by means of consciousness we are unable to discover of what substance the thinking principle is composed.

Does observation, then, throw a stronger and a steadier light upon this long-agitated question? The mental organs, while in health, and in the natural state in which their func