a matter for the exercise of your judgment.

10. You will consider it one of the first objects of your solicitude to procure the release of British officers and soldiers, and their families and private servants and followers, who are held in captivity, and their delivery to you or to other British officers, at Peshawur, or other certain place of safety. The means of affecting this object must be left a good deal to your own discretion; your efforts will be cordially seconded by Mr. Clerk, and all other British functionaries, and your success may probably be best secured rather by reserve and delay than by apparent eagerness and ready expenditure, as any such eagerness would be likely to increase the difficulty, by encouraging extravagance in the demands of those who hold these unfortunate persons in confinement.

11. Mr. Clerk will be instructed to state to you without delay, his view as to the most proper and prudent means for pursuing this end, and you are authorised at once to give effect to the recommendations which he may offer to you, if they should meet with your concurrence. It appears to his Lordship in Council that arrangements for the purpose would most expediently be made, not through your direct official agency, but through private channels, such as Hindoo bankers and merchants, and other classes among the Affghans; and that all consideration for the release of any parties should be given only after these parties had been brought in security to British posts at Peshawur, or elsewhere on this side of the mountains.

12. His Lordship in Council is aware of the likelihood of private

agency and pecuniary means being applied directly or indirectly to this end for the release of particular individuals. Mr. Clerk and yourself, and the officers subordinate to you, will do well to watch such proceedings with care, so as to further them with judgment, and without augmenting the difficulty of procuring a general release of the prisoners, by the natural anxiety of parties to obtain the enlargement of their own friends by expending very large sums for that purpose.

13. The release of the widow of the late Envoy will be an object of prominent care and interest, though his Lordship in Council must look rather to the ultimate possibility of some general arrangement, than to any partial release of individuals; and with respect to the rescue of the prisoners generally, the discouragement to negotiation with Mahomed Akbar Khan might be so far modified as to admit of some competent officer treating with him, or with an agent on his part, for their delivery, if this can be effected without stipulation for the surrender of Dost Mahomed Khan; for that, you must be aware, is a proposition which you could not entertain as a part of a scheme for the exchange of persons held in detention, though if the state of things should appear to justify and require it, you would be authorised to speak of his release as an event which, under various contingencies of circumstances, might not be altogether impossible. Such a measure must be regarded as one of important state policy, and to be deliberately determined by the Government upon considerations affecting only the general well-being and advan tage of the empire.

14. On the whole, you will understand that the great present object of your proceedings in Peshawur, is, beyond the safe withdrawal of the force at Jellalabad, that of watching events, of keeping up such communications as may be admissable with the several parties who may acquire power in the northern portion of Affghanistan, of committing yourself permanently with none of these parties, but also of declaring positively against none of them, while you are collecting the most

accu

rate information of their relative strength and purposes for report to the Government, and pursuing the measures which you may find in your power, for procuring the safe return of our troops and people detained beyond the Khyber Pass.

15. In your intercourse with Rajah Golab Sing, and other Sikh officers at Peshawur, you should on all occasions observe a tone as conciliatory as possible, giving to them the consideration due to their rank and independent authority; but you will not require or rely upon the aid of the Sikhs, excepting on occasions when you may deem them perfectly trust-worthy, and for purposes towards the accomplishment of which you may consider such aid essential. On this head, as on all points connected with parties and proceedings within the Lahore dominions, you may always rely on the judicious advice of Mr. Clerk.

16. You will be particularly cautious to avoid, and yet more to repress in others, any indication which may lead to the adoption of a violent tone of national and religious animosity against the Affghans, such as in some of the correspondence of Captain Mackeson,

his Lordship in Council has seen with much regret to have been very injudiciously adopted; and with reference to allusions which have been made to the transfer of Jellalabad to the Sikhs, I am desired to inform you that the British Government could not be parties, actively co-operating in that measure. Such a scheme would be of doubtful expediency, even if we withdraw our own force from Peshawur, and his Lordship in Council apprehends that none of the Sikh leaders would be found in any haste to adopt it. Should we withdraw from Peshawur, his Lordship in Council would not, however, interfere in any way to prevent the Sikh government from following the course which it might think the best for itself in the maintenance, or the extension, of its boundaries in that quarter.

17. The Governor-General in Council continues to regard with very great anxiety the position of the British garrison of Ghuznee. He will not relinquish the hope that on the opening of the season efforts may possibly be made from Candahar, either for the support of Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer and his troops in the maintenance of their post, or to facilitate their retirement in that direction. But unless there should be an early dissolution of the confederacy of the hostile chiefs, this does not appear probable, and you should on your side omit no exertion to open a communication with Colonel Palmer. In this respect the Sikh government and officers might afford us the greatest assistance, by the conveyance of our letters through the Gahree Pass, and even by demonstrations, and the advance of a body of their own troops to support the retreat of

Colonel Palmer, if he is enabled to hold out till the return of spring, and resolves to attempt retiring by that route. Mr. Clerk will not have failed to take advantage of the return of some of the

Lohanee merchants from Hindoostan, to open through them a communication with Colonel Palmer. I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

Fort William, March 15, 1842. Sir, It appears to us that it would be convenient at this period to lay fully before your Excellency the deliberate views we entertain with respect to the measures now be pursued in Affghanistan; and we, therefore, transmit to your Excellency this letter, in continuation of those already addressed to your Excellency upon this subject.

2. The insurrection which has existed in parts of Affghanistan almost from the time of our obtaining possession of Cabul, which, in the summer of last year, led to more than one serious conflict with considerable bodies of men in the vicinity of Candahar; and, extending itself in October to the vicinity of Cabul impeded the march of Major-Gen. Sir R. Sale's brigade to Jellalabad; still more the revolution, rather than insurrection which commenced at Cabul on the 2nd of November, and which, after many disastrous and lamentable events, led to the ultimate destruction of a numerous division of the British army, a calamity wholly without parallel in our history in India; all these circumstances, followed as they have been by the universal hostility of the whole people of Affghanistan, united at the present moment against us in a war which has assumed a religious, as well as na

tional, character, compel us to adopt the conclusion, that the possession of Affghanistan, could we recover it, would be a source of weakness, rather than of strength, in resisting the invasion of an army from the west, and, therefore, that the ground upon which the policy of the advance of our troops to that country mainly rested, has altogether ceased to exist.

3. The information received with respect to the conduct of Shah Shooja during the late transactions, is necessarily imperfect, and moreover, of a somewhat contradictory character. It is not probable that the insurrection against our troops should have originated with him. It is most probable, and it is almost proved, that he has adopted it, and, powerless in himself, is prepared to side with either party by which he may hope to be maintained upon his precarious throne.

4. Certainly, as we are at present informed, the conduct of Shah Shooja has not been such as to compel the British Government, in blind and solitary observance of the Tripartite Treaty, of which the ground has ceased to exist, to peril its armies, and, with its armies, its Indian Empire, in his support.

5. Whatever course we may hereafter take, must rest solely upon military considerations, and

have, in the first instance, regard to the safety of the detached bodies of our troops at Jellalabad, at Ghuznee, at Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and Candahar, to the security of our troops now in the field from all unnecessary risk, and, finally, to the re-establishment of our military reputation by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Affghans, which may make it appear to them, to our own subjects, and to our allies, that we have the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities, and violate their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Affghanistan, not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we are satisfied that the king we have set up, has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he has been placed.

6. But, while the facts before us justify the withdrawal of our troops from Affghanistan, and the refusal of all further assistance to Shah Shooja, they are yet not such as to make it consistent with our reputation, to give our future support, as is suggested by Major Rawlinson, to Shah Kamran, and to make over Candahar to that nominal ruler of Herat, even were it consistent with prudence to engage in a new speculative enterprise beyond the Indus, which might render it necessary for us to retain, at an enormous cost, a large body of troops in the difficult country between that river and Candahar, for the purpose of maintaining in the country, so made over to him, a sovereign personally incapable, and for many years unknown to its inhabitants, otherwise than by the fame of his degrading vices.

7. We are of opinion that it

would be erroneous to suppose that a forward position in Upper Affghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Sikhs, or that a forward position above the passes of Lower Affghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Beloochees, and the Sindians, by the appearance of confidence and of strength. That which will really, and will alone controul the Sikhs, the Beloochees, and the Sindians, and all the other nations beyond and within the Indus, is the knowledge that we possess an army, perfect in its equipment, possessed of all the means of movement, and so secure in its communications with the country from which its supplies and its reinforcements are drawn, as to be able at any time to act with vigour and effect against any enemy.

8. In war, reputation is strength; but reputation is lost by the rash exposure of the most gallant troops under circumstances which render defeat more probable than victory; and a succession of reverses will dishearten any soldiers, and, most of all, those whose courage and devotion have been mainly the result of their confidence that they were always led to certain success. We would, therefore, strongly impress upon the commanders of the forces employed in Affghanistan and Sinde the im◄ portance of incurring no unnecessary risk, and of bringing their troops into action under circumstances which may afford full scope to the superiority they derive from their discipline. At the same time, we are aware that no great object can be accomplished without incurring some risk; and we should consider that the object of strikingadecisive blow at the Affghans, more especially if such blow could be

struck in combination with measures for the relief of Ghuznee,a blow which might re-establish our military character beyond the Indus, and leave a deep impression of our power, and of the vigour with which it would be applied to punish an atrocious enemy-would be one for which risk might be justifiably incurred, all due and possible precaution being taken to diminish such necessary risk, and to secure decisive success.

9. The commanders of the forces in Upper and Lower Affghanistan will, in all the operations they may design, bear in mind these general views and opinions of the Government of India. They will, in the first instance, endeavour to relieve all the garrisons in Affghanistan, which are now surrounded by the enemy. The relief of these garrisons is a point deeply affecting the military character of the army, and deeply interesting the feelings of their country; but to make a rash attempt to effect such relief, in any case, without a reasonable prospect of success, would be to afford no real aid to the brave men who are surrounded, and fruitlessly to sacrifice other good soldiers, whose preservation is equally dear to the Government they serve. To effect the release of the prisoners taken at Cabul, is an object likewise deeply interesting in point of feeling and of honour. That object can, probably, only be accomplished by taking hostages from such part of the country as may be in, or may come into, our possession; and, with reference to this object, and to that of the relief of Ghuznee, it may possibly become a question, in the event of MajorGeneral Pollock's effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale, whether the united force shall return to the

country below the Khyber Pass or take a forward position near Jellalabad, or even advance to Cabul.

10. We are fully sensible of the advantages which would be derived from the re-occupation of Cabul, the scene of our great disaster and of so much crime, even for a week, of the means which it might afford of recovering the prisoners, of the gratification which it would give to the army, and of the effect which it would have upon our enemies. Our withdrawal might then be made to rest upon an official declaration of the grounds upon which we retired as solemn as that which accompanied our advance; and we should retire as a conquering, not as a defeated power; but we cannot sanction the occupation of an advanced position beyond the Khyber Pass by Major-General Pollock, unless that General should be satisfied that he can, without depending upon the forbearance of the tribes near the Pass, which, obtained only by purchase, must, under all circumstances, be precarious, and without depending upon the fidelity of the Sikh chiefs, or upon the power of those chiefs to restrain their troops, upon neither of which can any reliance be safely placed, -feel assured that he can, by his own strength, overawe and overcome all who dispute the Pass, and keep up at all times his communication with Peshawur and the Indus; and we would caution Major-General Pollock, and all the officers commanding the troops in the field, not to place reliance upon, or to be biassed by, the representations of native chiefs who may have been expelled from their country, in consequence of their adherence to us, and who