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quasi-primary qualities, apprehended through the locomotive faculty, and our consciousness of its energy; as sensations, as secondary qualities, they are apprehended as modifications. of touch proper, and of cutaneous and muscular feeling. (Reid's Works, p. 864.) The secondary, as manifested to us, are not, in propriety, qualities of body at all... they are only subjective affections. . . of which alone we are immediately cognisant, the external concause of the internal effect remaining to perception altogether unknown. (Reid's Works, p. 854.) The more determinate senses are no less subjective than the others. (Reid's Works, p. 855.) [And he passes in review sight, hearing, &c., asserting of each and all that the sensible affection may be excited by a variety of stimuli, external and internal, that it does not cease with the presence, and, therefore, does not demonstrate the quality of the external object.'] The secundo-primary qualities have all relation to space, and motion in space; and are all contained under the category of resistance or pressure. On their primary or objective phasis, they manifest themselves as degrees of resistance opposed to our locomotive energy; on their secondary or subjective phasis, as modes of resistance or pressure affecting our sentient organism. (Reid's Works, p. 848.) On space are dependent what are called the primary qualities of body, and space combined with degree affords, of body, the secundo-primary qualities. (Disc. p. 607.)

These extracts will make the various qualities -primary, secondary, and secundo-primary-plain. Evidently, too, any consideration that may decide on the two former will equally decide on the last as but a together of both. Now, as we soon learn, a certain fine, free, easy ascent over Kant is one of Hamilton's commonest grand airs. We have seen, indeed, how, when requiring his testimony to relativity, he sweetly named him the philosopher of Königsberg. This is by no means, however, his usual

tone. No; on the contrary, the ascent alluded to is generally effected in a mood of the loftiest censure, of the most gravely assumed reprobation. Nevertheless, it is quite plain from these extracts that, on his own showing, Hamilton, so far as he goes in perception, (or all reference to the categories apart), is not in any respect at least, any respect that is not a mistake of his own-different from Kant. They are agreed, namely, on the fact of an external world. They are agreed on the secondary qualities, which are to both but states of our own dependent on unknown stimuli. They are agreed on the primary qualities,—both reducing them to space. And they are agreed lastly, as Hamilton also unequivocally declares, on space itself; so far, that is, as it is to both a native, necessary, and à priori cognition of the mind. Hamilton, however, preserves still his horror of the cosmothetic idealist-pushing him off, indeed, by the infinite breadth of a whole real space; but this concerns only the already mentioned mistake. In a word, Hamilton conceives Kant's space to be wholly inner, sees not that it is outer as well; and so, supervacaneously doubling it, adds on another unnecessary space of his own. Or Hamilton, accepting Kant's space, insists on botching it with an empirical side which it already abundantly possesses. An extract will explain:

That the notion of space is a necessary condition of thought, and that, as such, it is impossible to derive it from experience, has been cogently demonstrated by Kant. But that we may not, through sense, have empirically an immediate perception of something extended, I have yet seen no valid reason to doubt. The à priori conception does not

exclude the à posteriori perception. (Reid's Works, p. 126, note.) Our cognitions of extension and its modes are not wholly ideal; although space be a native, necessary, à priori form of imagination, and so far, therefore, a mere subjective state, there is, at the same time, competent to us, in an immediate perception of external things, the consciousness of a really existent, of a really objective extended world. (Reid's Works, p. 841.) The doctrine of Kant [with which Hamilton concurs]-that time is a fundamental condition, form, or category of thought. (Reid's Works, p. 124, note.) On this principle [Necessity], as first evolved,—at least, first signalised by Kant, space and time are merely modifications of mind. (Disc. p. 273.) [See also Reid's Works, pp. 343, 847, and Meta. i. 403; ii. 114, 166-170.]

Now, it is quite certain that Kant would not have rejected these expressions of Hamilton in regard to our having through sense an empirical perception of something extended, of a really objective extended world, &c. To Kant, as little as to Hamilton, were our cognitions of extension wholly ideal; and no more to the latter than to the former did the à priori conception exclude the à posteriori perception.

We are not left any room to doubt, then, of the state of Hamilton's mind in reference to the mentioned doctrines of Kant. Conceptively, he accepts them: perceptively, he-not rejects them-but knows them not. Hamilton, in fact, has never dreamed that the time and space of Kant are perceptive and not-we may, indeed, say this-conceptive. To him, time as understood by Kant is only 'a condition, form, or category of thought;' space, similarly, is only 'a condition of thought,'' a form of imagination,' ' an à priori conception, not an à posteriori perception.' He, for

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his part, and as, in his own idea, opposed to Kant, holds that space and time, as given, are real forms of thought and-conditions of things' (Meta. i. 403); and (same page), he says of Kant: 'if he does not deny, he will not affirm the existence of a real space external to our minds.' It is in a similar frame of mind that, referring to Kant as holding the subjective nature of space, he adds, but in this he varies,'meaning, evidently, that he knows of Kant speaking at times as if he held space to be objectively existent. Now, if he had not insinuated, but openly announced this, he would only have stated the truth. Kant, in fact, always says this, and varies never.

In short, Hamilton knows only the subjective, intellectual, and conceptive side of Kant's space and time; he knows only one side, he knows not the other; he knows not that these intellectual, à priori forms are, in actual, empirical fact, sensuously or à posteriori presentant;-he knows not that there is a provision in the theory of Kant whereby they become externalised, materialised, realised, or, as Hamilton might say, objectivised - though their veritable source and seat be subjective, ideal, internal, all the same. It is from this misconception and mistake that he finds Kant to vary,' and that he can come to say of him, if he does not deny, he will not affirm,' &c.

But this side existing in the theory of Kant, Hamilton's supposed complement is perceived at once to be neutralised and negated even by its own excess; and for excision of the excrescence, Kant himself (quite as

much as, and in priority to, Hamilton) will extend to us the law of parsimony-Occam's razor!

But this side does exist in the theory of Kant. We are not called upon to demonstrate here: it is sufficient to indicate. Kant's time and space are of this nature, then, that, ideal, perceptive forms, native to the mind-sensuous spectra, optical discs-they, on hint of the stimuli of special sense, present themselves to the mind by or through special sense, as external recipients in which these stimuli (or their effects) dispose themselves before us in such manner that the peculiarity of their arrangement in space and time is due to their own secret nature, at the same time that the general fields of space and time are really furnished to them by the mind itself.

There is no occasion, then, to burthen such a space and time with the superfluity of Hamilton's addition. The empirical side which is all that that addition proposes to extend to them-this they already possess in themselves; and Hamilton would never have thought of it, had he at all seen the true scope of the theory. Not only, then, has Hamilton perpetrated a glaring blunder in respect to Kant, not only has he with a most redundant prodigality carried coals to a Newcastle already filled, but he has done worse: he has exposed himself to the edge of Occam's razor, and not only in that respect but also in this, that he has granted Kant's doctrine to be a demonstrated doctrine, and yet has generously given it in gift the very articles it supposed itself to have abolished and supplanted! Why-in the name of all parsimony, in the name of

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