p. 54), for example, that the object stands 'in direct and immediate relation to the conscious mind,' and from quotations of the first series we have abundantly learned that the external reality itself is the immediate and only object of perception,' and that this object is 'only one.' We learn now, nevertheless, that this immediate and direct relation is a 'sum of elements,' of which elements, constitutive of the whole object of perception, the external reality itself is but one. It will suffice to point out this, however; we shall leave it to the reader himself to reconcile, if he can, a direct and immediate (and so, one would think, simple) relation, as well as an object which is described as one and only—we shall leave it to the reader himself to reconcile both with the many-ness and also-ness of a sum, and that too, as we shall presently see, a very complicated and peculiar sum.

But, again, it is said, 'mental modifications are dependent on certain corporeal conditions,' 'the mind perceives only through certain organs of sense, and through these different organs it perceives in a different manner.' Now, if mental modifications depend on corporeal conditions, surely a certain priority of existence is assigned to the latter by the very nature of the words themselves. Nor is it different with the accompanying allegation that the mind perceives through organs, and differently through the different ones: there too, surely, the very words ascribe priority to the organs, and not only priority, but action as well. (Difference of organ produces difference of object.) Hamilton, however, has no sooner committed

himself to such allegations, than he proceeds, as usual, directly to contradict himself. 'We have no reason whatever,' he says, 'to believe, contrary to the testimony of consciousness, that there is an action or affection of the bodily sense previous to the mental perception; or that the mind only perceives in the head, in consequence of the impression on the organ: whether the senses be instruments, whether they be media, or whether they be only particular outlets to the mind incarcerated in the body,-on all this we can only theorise and conjecture.' Now, if it is to the testimony of consciousness that Hamilton owes these latter statements, one would like to know what testimony he owes those former to. One sees that he is not entitled to doubt as to whether the senses are media, &c., for he has already pronounced them media, and media that operate difference. Perhaps to a mind so constituted as that of Hamilton to perceive immediately through media is not by any means a contradiction in terms! Even suppose him to perceive ‘at the point of contact,' is it so certain that he is not still in presence of a medium-the sensitive spot? Or, on the other aspect, suppose him to perceive the external reality itself—it quite directly, it all and it only-is he still free to name his perception phenomenal ?

Further, Hamilton, as we see from these extracts, rests what noumenalism they contain on two grounds: first, the testimony of consciousness; and second, the analysis and discrimination of philosophy. These grounds we have to see at full again; at present we remark only, firstly, that the testimony of conscious

ness, though Hamilton's loudest note-a note loud, indeed, only, so to speak, to the deafening and stunning out of all opposition-cannot surely be worth much, seeing that, maugre all the mighty things so defiantly ascribed to it, not only the analysis of philosophy is still necessary, but precisely that to and on which consciousness directly testifies and expressly reports remains 'incomprehensible,' 'incognisable,' 'unknown,' 'zero!' And secondly, that, if it is the business of philosophy to analyse and discriminate the elements of this same object of the testimony and report of consciousness, philosophy must be hardly yet fit for its business, not only because what it pretends to analyse and discriminate is admitted by itself to remain, all the same, incomprehensible, incognisable, unknown, zero, but because the actual analysis to which, despite this foregone conclusion of impossibility, it yet very strangely commits itself, is in itself so contradictory, unsatisfactory, and equivocal.

Of this analysis, for example-to dwell here a single moment—there are two different estimates actually given in! One is that the external reality is 6, the organ 3, and the mind 3; while the other, retaining the external reality and the organ, though at the new values of 4 each, substitutes for the mind all that intervenes between the reality and the organ-the air presumably and at a value also of 4! Now, the two estimates differing, we may reasonably conclude that the thing is, as the phrase goes, not quite reliable yet. But how different all this is to the standard of common sense which Hamilton himself sets up-how different

to his own express and most emphatic allegations elsewhere! How different to all his own 'natural convictions of mankind!' Common sense believes the book it sees just to be the book, and Hamilton asserts existence and cognition to be convertible-asserts the external reality itself to be only one object, and this only one object to be the only one object of perception. Yet here we find that when philosophy is put to ‘its business' by Hamilton, it results that, of the total object perceived, the external reality constitutes only a half, perhaps only a third! Again, we are told that the perceptive object is no modification of the ego, that it is only the non-ego: yet here the business of philosophy actually declares the ego to form a fourth, a third, or even a half of this same object! Philosophy, to be sure, only says this-philosophy cannot do this. Or, indeed, is any such power still retained among the initiated of the master? Will any descendant of the prophet kindly show us either the 6 or the 4 of the external reality-say the book? Either will satisfy us; we shall be quite contented with the 4. That being given us, we cheerfully promise not to say one word of either organ or mind-that being given us, indeed, we cheerfully promise to be silent even on the air! What was so emphatically declared one is now, indeed, triple, even quadruple; but this, too, we shall pass in silence—give us but the external reality itself, be it 6, be it 4, be it 1. If, on the other hand, it should appear that this cannot be done that the external reality itself, the substantia nuda, cannot be shown-unless the book itself, the whole book, and

nothing but the book be this-then will it be too much for us to say that, to declare a thing impossible, next, nevertheless, to call this thing the business proper of philosophy, and, lastly, to claim to perform this business, exhibit this thing, but in such manner as only to restore the initial impossibility—on all this it will be enough to say nothing.

Then, again, as regards consciousness, what, after all, are we to think of it? It is a small matter that this so autocratic and infallible consciousness stands in need still of the analysis of philosophy; but surely Hamilton himself would admit that the one and only object of the testimony-of the report of consciousness is the book and nothing but the book; surely he would admit that consciousness as consciousness-for it is to philosophy, and not to consciousness as consciousness (which is common sense, or 'the natural conviction of mankind'), that he attributes the analysis and discrimination-knows not that there is a 3 of the mind, a 4 of the air, or a 3 or 4 of the organ-knows not that what is truly external is, as estimated by Hamilton himself, but, or even, perhaps, but of what it discerns-knows not that this which it discerns is really 12! Surely this is so. But, if this is so, then consciousness errs. In assuming the whole 12 to be the external reality, which it most undoubtedly does, it errs by at least, and by at most! But, in such arithmetic, can either error be considered insignificant? Is it at all unfair to suggest, then, that, if consciousness errs in assuming or to be external reality which is not external reality, consciousness