without which, as they own no land thereon, they could not have navigated it. Nor is this all. Upon a supposition that the Mississippi does not extend so far northward as to be intersected by a line drawn due west from the Lake of the Wood, or, in other words, upon a supposition that Great Britain has not a claim even to touch the Mississippi, we have agreed, not upon what will be the boundary line, but that we will hereafter negociate to settle that line. Thus leaving to future negociation what should have been finally settled by the treaty itself, in the same manner as all other differences were, is calculated for the sole purpose, either of laying the foundation of future disputes, or of recognizing a claim in Great Britain on the waters of the Mississippi, even if their boundary line leaves to the southward the sources of that river. Had not that been the intention of Great Britain, the line would have been settled at once by the treaty, according to either of the two only rational ways of doing it in conformity to the treaty of 1783, that is to say, by agreeing that the line should run from the northernmost sources of the Mississippi, either directly to the western extremity of the Lake of the Wood, or northwardly till it intersected the line to be drawn due west from that lake. But, by repeating the article of the treaty of 1783; by conceding the free use of our ports on the river, and by the insertion of the fourth article, we have admitted, that Great Britain, in all possible events, has still a right to navigate that river from its source to its mouth. What may be the future effects of these provisions, especially as they regard our intercourse with Spain, it is impossible at present to say; but although they can bring us no advantage, they may embroil us with that nation; and we have already felt the effect of it in our late treaty with Spain, since we were obliged, on account of that clause of the British treaty, to accept as a gift and a favor the navigation of that river which we had till then claimed as a right.

The seventh article of the treaty is intended to ad

just those differences which arose from the effects of the present European war. On that article it may also be observed, that whilst it provides a full compensation for the claims of the British, it is worded in such a manner, when speaking of the indemnification for spoliations committed on the American commerce, as will render it liable to a construction very unfavorable to our just claims on that ground. The commissioners, to be appointed by virtue of that article, are to take cognizance and to grant redress only in those cases where, by reason of irregular or illegal captures or condemnations, made under color of authority or commissions from the king of Great Britain, losses have been incurred, and where adequate compensation cannot now be actually obtained by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. If Great Britain should insist that, since the signing of the treaty, they had, by admitting appeals to their superior courts, afforded a redress by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings; if those courts were to declare, that the captures, complained of, were neither illegal, nor made under color, but by virtue of authority or commissions from the king, and if that construction should prevail with the commissioners; the indemnification which our plundered merchants would actually receive, in consequence of the provisions of this article, would fall very short of their expectations and of their just claims. Yet this article, considering the relative situation of the two countries, at the time when the negociation took place, is as much as could reasonably have been expected by America. When a weak nation has to contend with a powerful one, it is gaining a great deal, if the national honor is saved even by the shadow of an indemnification, and by an apparent concession on the part of the aggressor; and however objectionable the article might appear at first view, I am, on the whole, satisfied with it.

The remaining provisions of the treaty have no connexion with past differences; they make no part of

the convention which was the avowed object of Mr. Jay's mission: they apply solely to the future intercourse of the two nations as relating to commerce and navigation; and had they been entirely omitted, our differences would have been nevertheless adjusted. It is agreed on all hands, that, so far as relates to our commerce with Great Britain, we want no treaty. The intercourse, although useful perhaps to both parties, is more immediately necessary to England, and her own interest is a sufficient pledge of her granting us at all times a perfect liberty of commerce to her European ports. If we want to treat with her, it must be in order to obtain some intercourse with her colonies, and some general security in our navigation.

The twelfth and thirteenth articles were obtained by our negociator with a view to the first object. The twelfth article, however, which relates to our intercourse with the West Indies, is found, upon examination, to be accompanied by a restriction of such nature, that what was granted by Great Britain as a favor, has been rejected by the senate as highly injurious. The thirteenth article, which relates to the East Indies, and remains a part of the treaty, is, like the twelfth, conferring a favor limited by restrictions, and so far as I can depend on the opinion of the best informed judges on this subject, these restrictions put the trade in a more disadvantageous situation than it was before the treaty. As the West India article declares, that we shall not re-export any produce of those isl ands to Europe, so the East India article, at the same time that it grants us the privilege, which we enjoyed before, and which we enjoyed because it was the interest of the East India company to grant it to us-that of being admitted into the British sea-ports there— prohibits our carrying any articles from thence to any place except to America; which regulation amounts to a total prohibition to export East India articles to China, or to obtain freights back to Europe; and upon the whole, I cannot help thinking, from what has fallen

on this floor, and what I have heard elsewhere, from gentlemen of great commercial knowledge, that if the East India commerce had been as generally understood in America as the West India trade, that so much boasted of article would have met the same fate in the senate with the twelfth article.

But if, leaving commercial regulations, we shall seek in the treaty for some provisions securing to us the free navigation of the ocean against any future aggressions on our trade, where are they to be found? I can add nothing to what has been said on the subject of contraband articles: it is, indeed, self-evident, that, connecting our treaty with England on that subject with those we have made with other nations, it amounts to a positive compact to supply that nation, exclusively, with naval stores, whenever they may be at war. Had the list of contraband articles been reduced-had naval stores and provisions, our two great staple commodities, been declared not to be contraband, security would have been given to the free exportation of our produce; but instead of any provision being made on that head, an article of a most doubtful nature, and on which I will remark hereafter, has been introduced. But I mean, for the present, to confine my observations to the important question of free bottoms making free goods. It was with the utmost astonishment that I heard the doctrine advanced on this floor, that such a provision, if admitted, would prove injurious to America, inasmuch as, in case of war between this country and any other nation, the goods of that nation might be protected by the English flag. It is not to a state of war that the benefits of this provision would extend; but it is the only security which neutral nations can have against the legal plundering on the high seas, so often committed by belligerent powers. It is not for the sake of protecting an enemy's property; it is not for the sake of securing an advantageous carrying trade; but it is in order effectually to secure ourselves against sea ag

gressions, that this provision is necessary. Spoliations may arise from unjust orders, given by the government of a belligerent nation to their officers and cruizers, and these may be redressed by application to, and negociation with, that order. But no complaints, no negociations, no orders of government itself, can give redress, when those spoliations are grounded on a supposition, that the vessels of the neutral nation have an enemy's property on board, as long as such property is not protected by the flag of the neutral nation; as long as it is liable to be captured, it is not sufficient, in order to avoid detention and capture, to have no such property on board. Every privateer, under pretence that he suspects an enemy's goods to be part of a cargo, may search, vex and capture a vessel; and if in any corner of the dominions of the belligerent power, a single judge can be found inclined, if not determined, to condemn, at all events, before his tribunal; all vessels so captured will be brought there, and the same pretence which caused the capture will justify a condemnation. The only nation who persists in the support of this doctrine, as making part of the law of nations, is the first maritime power of Europe, whom their interest, as they are the strongest, and as there is hardly a maritime war in which they are not involved, leads to wish for a continuation of a custom, which gives additional strength to their overbearing dominion over the seas. All the other nations have different sentiments and a different interest. During the American war, in the year 1780, so fully convinced were the neutral nations, of the necessity of introducing that doctrine of free bottoms making free goods, that all of them, excepting Portugal, who was in a state of vassallage to, and a mere appendage of Great Britain, united in order to establish the principle, and formed for that purpose the alliance known by the name of the armed neutrality. All the belligerent powers, except England, recognized and agreed to the doctrine. England itself, was