or three years, plunder them again, to the same or a greater amount? Cannot the same apprehensions be revived with respect to the Indians, and will not the arguments then be as strong as they are now, for renewing the same treaty, or for making any other equal sacrifices that her purposes may dictate?

It has been asked-what will be the consequences of refusing to carry the treaty into effect? I answer, that the only supposable consequence is, that the executive, if governed by the prudence and patriotism, which I do not doubt will govern that department, will of course pursue the measures most likely to obtain a reconsideration and remodification of the offensive parts of the treaty. The idea of war as a consequence of refusing to give effect to the treaty, is too visionary and incredible to be admitted into the question. No man will say that the United States, if they be really an independent people, have not a right to judge of their own interests, and to decline any treaty that does not duly provide for them. A refusal, therefore, in such cases, can afford no cause, nor pretext, nor provocation for war, or for any just resentment. But, apart from this, is it conceivable that Great Britain, with all the dangers and embarrassments that are thickening on her, will wantonly make war on a country, which is the best market she has in the world for her manufactures, which pays her an annual balance, in specie, of ten or twelve millions of dollars, and whose supplies, moreover, are essential to an important part of her dominions? Such a degree of infatuation ought not to be ascribed to any country. And, at the present crisis, for reasons well known, an unprovoked war from Great Britain, on this country, would argue a degree of madness, greater than any other circumstances that can well be imagined.

With all the objections, therefore, to the treaty, which I have stated, I hope it will not now be carried into effect, and that an opportunity will take place for reconsidering the subject, on principles more just and favorable to the United States.

SPEECH OF WILLIAM B. GILES.

ON

THE BRITISH TREATY,

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, APRIL 18, 1796.

In committee of the whole on the following Resolution, Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that it is expedient to pass the laws necessary for carrying into effect the treaty with Great Britain Mr. Giles spoke as follows:

MR. CHAIRMAN,

:

It is much to be regretted that all the information which could throw light upon the subject of discussion, should not be before the committee. A sense of responsibility arising from the peculiarly delicate nature of the question, has induced the House to take every step with more than a common degree of caution. Before we proceeded to deliberate upon the expediency or inexpediency of providing for carrying the treaty into effect, we made a request to the President for the papers which attended the negociation. This request has been refused; not because the call itself contained any thing unconstitutional; not because the contents of the papers called for are of such a nature as to render the disclosure thereof at this time improper-neither of these causes being intimated in the message-but because, principles were advocated by individual gentlemen in the course of

the argument inducing the call, which the President thought not warranted by the constitution. I do not propose to animadvert upon the conduct of the Executive, in departing from the resolution itself, and in noticing the arguments of individual members; nor upon any other part of the proceedings of the Executive relative to the call of the House and his refusal. I only mean to remark, that being perfectly convinced of the propriety of the call itself, of the utility of the information embraced by it; and not being satisfied, by the arguments of the President, of the propriety of withholding the papers called for, I should myself have been willing to have suspended all further proceedings respecting the provision for the treaty, until the papers should be laid before the House. I would have firmly placed myself on that ground; and in that position hazarded my responsibility. The extreme sensibility excited on the public mind by the agitation of the treaty question, I had supposed, would have furnished an irresistible argument in favor of complying with the request of the House; provided no inconvenience would have attended the disclosure; and in my opinion, under all the circumstances of the case, the House would have been completely justified in suspending all further proceedings upon the question of providing for the treaty, until they received that information which they deemed necessary, to guide their deliberations. But as the House has thought proper to take a different course, and has proceeded to the consideration of the question, with such lights as they possess, I will explain the motives which will probably finally influence

my vote.

I shall discuss the subject in two points of view. I will first examine the contents of the treaty itself, and then the probable consequences of refusing, or of giving it efficacy.

In examining the contents of the instrument itself, I propose to go through it, article by article, unless the task prescribed to myself should exceed the bounds

usually allowed to members for the delivery of their sentiments. I shall do this, because I wish to treat the subject with the utmost candor, and to avoid any possible imputation of intending to exhibit the bad, and avoid the good parts of the treaty, if any such there are. I mean, however, to state merely the purport of many of the articles, without any animadversion, and to dwell only upon such as appear to me to be the most material.

The first object of the negociation respects the inexecution of the treaty of peace.

The preamble professes to wave the respective complaints and pretensions of the parties, as to the inexecution of the former treaty, and of course establishes a principle, as the basis of the present treaty, that either both parties were equally culpable or equally blameless, in respect to the inexecution of the treaty of peace. I do not mean to remark upon the propriety or impropriety of this admission on the part of the United States. I will observe, however, and I think with great force, that the stipulations in the present treaty do not correspond with the principle professed as its basis.

On the part of Great Britain, two articles have been unexecuted-the restoration of certain property in possession of the British at the close of the war, and the surrender of the Western posts. On the part of the United States, one article is said to remain unfulfilled; · it respects the promise, that no legal impediments should be thrown in the way of the recovery of debts due to British subjects.

The claim of compensation for the property carried away in contravention of the treaty of peace, is wholly abandoned, and the value of the surrender of the posts very much lessened, by the annexation of conditions which made no part of the stipulations of surrender in the treaty of peace. The United States are more than bound to fulfil the article heretofore unfulfilled by them; for, instead of continuing the courts open for the recovery of debts in the usual way, as was the

promise in the treaty of peace, they are made to assume the payment of all debts, interests and damages in cases of insolvencies, and a mode of adjustment is proposed for ascertaining the amount, which furnishes the greatest latitude for frauds against the United States which could be devised. This will appear in the further examination of the subject. Hence it is obvious, that the stipulations of the treaty abandon the very principle of adjustment assumed by a gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Swift,) in replying to a remark to this effect, made by a gentleman from Virginia he observed, that he believed if an inquiry were to be made into the first breach of the treaty of peace, it would not issue favorably to the United States; and he proceeded to argue upon the presumption, that the first breach was properly imputable to the United States. I think it requires very strong assurances to justify an imputation of this sort against the United States, such as I believe the present occasion does not afford. In the first place, the treaty itself disavows the imputation; all claims and pretensions arising from the first breach are disclaimed; of course it is unnecessary, if not improper, to defend the treaty on a ground disclaimed by itself.

But upon what ground does the gentleman place his admission of the first breach of the treaty of peace upon the United States? The gentleman denies the uniform construction, put upon the article for the restoration of certain property which was carried away from the United States at the close of the war, and asserts, that the article never was intended to bear that construction. If the gentleman can establish his assertion, and extend it to the other article, unfulfilled by Great Britain, he may probably establish his position.

I will first premise, that if the article does not intend the restoration of property mentioned in it, the insertion of it in the treaty is not only unnecessary.