distance being greater, our vessels are not so often entered. Both these circumstances give a false show to the amount of British tonnage, compared with the American. It is, however, very pleasing to the mind, to see that our tonnage exceeds the British in the European trade. For various reasons, some of which will be mentioned hereafter, the tonnage in the West India trade, is not the proper subject of calculation. In the European comparison, we have more tonnage in the British than in the French commerce; it is indeed more than four to one.

The great quantity of British tonnage employed in our trade is also, in a great measure, owing to the large capitals of their merchants, employed in buying and exporting our productions. If we would banish the ships, we must strike at the root, and banish the capital. And this, before we have capital of our own grown up to replace it, would be an operation of no little violence and injury, to our southern brethren especially.

Independently of this circumstance, Great Britain is an active and intelligent rival in the navigation line. Her ships are dearer, and the provisioning of her seamen is perhaps rather dearer than ours: on the other hand, the rate of interest is lower in England, and so are seamen's wages.It would be improper, therefore, to consider the amount of British tonnage in our trade, as a proof of a bad state of things, arising either from the restrictions of that government, or the negligence or timidity of this. We are to charge it to causes, which are more connected with the natural competition of capital and industry; causes, which in fact retarded the growth of our shipping more, when we were colonies and our ships were free, than since the adoption of the present government.

It has been said with emphasis, that the constitution grew out of the complaints of the nation respecting commerce, especially that with the British dominions. What was then lamented by our patriots? Feebleness

of the public councils; the shadow of union, and scarcely the shadow of public credit; every where despondence, the pressure of evils, not only great but portentous of civil distractions. These were the grievances; and what more was then desired than their remedies? Is it possible to survey this prosperous country and to assert that they have been delayed? Trade flourishes on our wharves, although it droops in speeches. Manufactures have risen under the shade of protecting duties, from almost nothing, to such a state, that we are even told we can depend on the domestic supply, if the foreign should cease. The fisheries, which we found in decline, are in the most vigorous growth: the whale fishery, which our allies would have transferred to Dunkirk, now extends over the whole ocean. To that hardy race of men, the sea is but a park for hunting its monsters; such is their activity, the deepest abysses scarcely afford to their prey a hiding place. Look around, and see how the frontier circle widens, how the interior improves, and let it be repeated that the hopes of the people, when they formed this constitution, have been frustrated.

But if it should happen, that our prejudices prove stronger than our senses; if it should be believed, that our farmers and merchants see their products and ships and wharves going to decay together, and they are ignorant or silent on their own ruin; still the public documents would not disclose so alarming a state of our affairs. Our imports are obtained so plentifully and cheaply, that one of the avowed objects of the resolutions is, to make them scarcer and dearer. Our exports, so far from languishing, have increased two millions of dollars in a year. Our navigation is found to be augmented beyond the most sanguine expectation. We hear of the vast advantage the English derived from the navigation act: and we are asked in a tone of accusation, shall we sit still and do nothing? Who is bold enough to say, Congress has done nothing for the encouragement of American navigation?

To

counteract the navigation act, we have laid on British, a higher tonnage than our own vessels pay in their ports; and what is much more effectual, we have imposed ten per centum on the duties, when the dutied articles are borne in foreign bottoms. We have also made the coasting trade a monopoly to our own vessels. Let those, who have asserted that this is nothing, compare facts with the regulations which produced them.

Is not this increase of American shipping rapid enough? Many persons say it is too rapid, and attracts too much capital for the circumstances of the country. I cannot readily persuade myself to think so valuable a branch of employment thrives too fast. But a steady and sure encouragement is more to be relied on than violent methods of forcing its growth. It is not clear, that the quantity of our navigation, including our coasting and fishing vessels, is less in proportion to those of that nation: in that computation we shall probably find, that we are already more a navigating people than the English.

As this is a growing country, we have the most stable ground of dependence on the corresponding growth of our navigation: and that the increasing demand for shipping will rather fall to the share of Americans than foreigners, is not to be denied. We did expect this from the nature of our own laws; we have been confirmed in it by experience; and we know that an American bottom is actually preferred to a foreign one.

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40

In cases where one partner is an American, and another a foreigner, the ship is made an American bottom. A fact of this kind overthrows a whole theory of reasoning on the necessity of further restrictions. It shows, that the work of restriction is already done. If we take the aggregate view of our commercial interests, we shall find much more occasion for satisfaction, and even exultation, than complaint, and none for despondence. It would be too bold to say, that our condition is so eligible there is nothing to be wished. Neither the order of nature, nor the allotments of providence, afford perfect content; and it would be absurd to expect in our politics what is denied in the laws of our being. The nations, with whom we have intercourse, have, without exception, more or less restricted their commerce. They have framed their regulations to suit their real or fancied interests. The code of France is as full of restrictions as that of England. We have regulations of our own; and they are unlike those of any other country. Inasmuch as the interest and circumstances of nations vary so essentially, the project of an exact reciprocity on our part is a vision. What we desire is, to have, not an exact reciprocity, but an intercourse of mutual benefit and convenience.

It has scarcely been so much as insinuated, that the change contemplated will be a profitable one; that it will enable us to sell dearer and to buy cheaper: on the contrary, we are invited to submit to the hazards and losses of a conflict with our customers; to engage in a contest of self-denial. For what-to obtain better markets? No such thing; but to shut up forever, if possible, the best market we have for our exports, and to confine ourselves to the dearest and scarcest markets for our imports. And this is to be done for the benefit of trade; or, as it is sometimes more correctly said, for the benefit of France. This language is not a little inconsistent and strange from those, who recommend a non-importation agreement, and who think we should even renounce the sea and devote ourselves to agriculture. Thus, to make our trade more free, it is to

be embarrassed, and violently shifted from one country to another, not according to the interest of the merchants, but the visionary theories and capricious rashness of the legislators. To make trade better, it is to be made nothing.

So far as commerce and navigation are regarded, the pretences for this contest are confined to two. We are not allowed to carry manufactured articles to Great Britain, nor any products, except of our own growth; and we are not permitted to go, with our own vessels, to the West Indies. The former, which is a provision of the navigation act, is of little importance to our interests, as our trade is chiefly a direct one, our shipping not being equal to the carrying for other nations; and our manufactured articles are not furnished in quantities for exportation, and if they were, Great Britain would not be a customer. So far, therefore, the restriction is rather nominal than real.

The exclusion of our vessels from the West Indies is of more importance. When we propose to make an effort to force a privilege from Great Britain, which she is loath to yield to us, it is necessary to compare the value of the object with the effort, and above all, to calculate very warily the probability of success. A trivial thing deserves not a great exertion; much less ought we to stake a very great good in possession, for a slight chance of a less good. The carriage of one half the exports and imports to and from the British West Indies, is the object to be contended for. Our whole exports to Great Britain are to be hazarded. We sell on terms of privilege, and positive favor, as it has been abundantly shown, near seven millions to the dominions of Great Britain. We are to risk the privilege in this great amount--for what? For the freight only of one half the British West India trade with the United States. It belongs to commercial men to calculate the entire value of the freight alluded to. But it cannot bear much proportion to the amount of seven millions. Besides, if we are denied the privilege of

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