Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB
[ocr errors][ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

nay, twenty thousand times; they will have the same difficulties to encounter; the same clashing interests to reconcile.

But, dismissing these reflections, let us consider how. far the arrangement is in itself entitled to the approba tion of this body. We will examine it upon its own

merits.

The first thing objected to, is that clause which allows a representation for three-fifths of the negroes. Much has been said of the impropriety of representing men, who have no will of their own. Whether this be reasoning or declamation, I will not presume to say. It is the unfortunate situation of the southern states, to have a great part of their population, as well as property, in blacks. The regulation complained of, was one result of the spirit of accommodation, which governed the convention; and without this indulgence, no union could possibly have been formed. But, sir,considering some peculiar advantages which we derive from them, it is entirely just that they should be gratified. The southern states possess certain staples, tobacco, rice, indigo, &c. which must be capital objects in treaties of commerce with foreign nations; and the advantage which they necessarily procure in these treaties, will be felt throughout all the states. But the justice of this plan will appear in another view. The best writers on government have held, that representation should be compounded of persons and property. This rule has been adopted, as far as it could be, in the constitution of New York. It will, however, by no means be admitted, that the slaves are considered altogether as property. They are men, though degraded to the condition of slavery. They are persons known to the municipal laws of the states which they inhabit, as well as to the laws of nature. But representation and taxation go together -and one uniform rule ought to apply to both. Would it be just to compute these slaves in the assessment of taxes, and discard them from the estimate

in the apportionment of representatives? Would it be just to impose a singular burden, without conferring some adequate advantage?

[ocr errors]

Another circumstance ought to be considered. The rule we have been speaking of, is a general rule, and applies to all the states. Now, you have a great number of people in your state, which are not represented at all; and have no voice in your government: these will be included in the enumeration-not twofifths-nor three-fifths, but the whole. This proves that the advantages of the plan are not confined to the southern states, but extend to other parts of the Union.

I now proceed to consider the objection with regard to the number of representatives, as it now stands; I am persuaded the system, in this respect, stands on a better footing than the gentlemen imagine.

It has been asserted, that it will be in the power of Congress to reduce the number. I acknowledge, that there are no direct words of prohibition. But I contend, that the true and genuine construction of the clause, gives Congress no power whatever to reduce the representation below the number, as it now stands. Although they may limit, they can never diminish the number. One representative for every thirty thousand inhabitants is fixed as the standard of increase; till, by the natural course of population, it shall become necessary to limit the ratio. Probably, at present, were this standard to be immediately applied, the representation would considerably exceed sixty-five. In three years it would exceed one hundred. If I understand the gentlemen, they contend that, the number may be enlarged or may not. I admit that this is in the discretion of Congress; and I submit to the committee, whether it be not necessary and proper. Still, I insist, that an immediate limitation is not probable, nor was it in the contemplation of the convention. But, sir, who will presume to say, to what precise point the representation ought to be increased? This is á

[ocr errors]

matter of opinion; and opinions are vastly different upon the subject. A proof of this is drawn from the representations in the state legislatures. In Massachusetts, the assembly consists of about three hundred -in South Carolina, of nearly one hundred-in New York there are sixty-five. It is observed generally, that the number ought to be large; let the gentlemen produce their criterion. I confess it is difficult for me to say what number may be said to be sufficiently large. On one hand, it ought to be considered, that a small number will act with more facility, system and decision on the other, that a large one may enhance the difficulty of corruption. The Congress is to consist, at first, of ninety-one members. This, to a reasonable man, may appear to be as near the proper medium as any number whatever; at least, for the present. There is one source of increase, also, which does not depend upon any constructions of the constitution; it is the creation of new states. Vermont, Kentucky and Franklin, will probably become independent; new members of the union will also be formed from the unsettled tracts of western territory. These must be represented, and will all contribute to swell the federal legislature. If the whole number in the United States be, at present, three millions, as is commonly supposed, according to the ratio of one for thirty thousand, we shall have on the first census, a hundred representatives. In ten years, thirty more will be added; and in twenty-five years, the number will double then, sir, we shall have two hundred, if the increase goes on in the same proportion. The convention of Massachusetts, who made the same objection, have fixed upon this number as the point at which they chose to limit the representation. But can we pronounce with certainty, that it will not be expedient to go beyond this number? We cannot. Éxperience alone must determine. This matter may, with more safety, be left to the discretion of the legislature, as it will be the interest of the large and in

[blocks in formation]
[ocr errors]

creasing states, of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, &c. to augment the representation. Only Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, and Maryland, can be interested in limiting it. We may, therefore, safely calculate upon a growing representation, according to the advance of population, and the circumstances of the country.

The state governments possess inherent advantages, which will ever give them an influence and ascendency over the national government; and will for ever preclude the possibility of federal encroachments. That their liberties indeed can be subverted by the federal head, is repugnant to every rule of political calculation. Is not this arrangement then, sir, a most wise and prudent one? Is not the present representation fully adequate to our present exigencies; and sufficient to answer all the purposes of the union? I am persuaded that an examination of the objects of the federal government will afford a conclusive

answer.

[ocr errors]

Many other observations might be made on this subject, but I cannot now pursue them; for I feel myself not a little exhausted: I beg leave, therefore, to waive for the present the further discussion of the question.

On the 21st, Mr. Hamilton' continued his remarks as follows

When I had the honor to address the committee yesterday, I gave a history of the circumstances which attended the convention, when forming the plan before you. I endeavored to point out to you the principles of accommodation, on which this ar rangement was made, and to show that the contending interests of the states led them to establish the representation as it now stands. In the second place, I attempted to prove, that, in point of number, the representation would be perfectly secure. Sir, no man agrees more perfectly than myself to the main principle for which the gentlemen contend. I agree

that there should be a broad democratic branch in the national legislature. But this matter, sir, depends on circumstances. It is impossible, in the first instance, to be precise and exact with regard to the number; and it is equally impossible to determine to what point it may be proper in future to increase it. On this ground I am disposed to acquiesce. In my reasonings on the subject of government, I rely more on the interests and opinions of men, than on any speculative parchment provisions whatever. I have found, that constitutions are more or less excellent, as they are more or less agreeable to the natural operation of things. I am therefore disposed not to dwell long on curious speculations, or pay much attention to modes and forms; but to adopt a system, whose principles have been sanctioned by experience, adapt it to the real state of our country, and depend on probable reasonings for its operation and result. I contend that sixty-five and twenty-six in two bodies, afford perfect security, in the present state of things; and that the regular progressive enlargement, which was in the contemplation of the general convention, will not leave an apprehension of danger in the most timid and suspicious mind. It will be the interest of the large states to increase the representation. This will be the standing instruction to their delegates. But, say the gentlemen, the members of Congress will be interested not to increase the number, as it will diminish their relative influence. In all their reasoning upon the subject, there seems to be this fallacy: they suppose that the representative will have no motive of action, on the one side, but a sense of duty; or on the other, but corruptions. They do not reflect, that he is to return to the community; that he is dependent on the will of the people, and that it cannot be his interest to oppose their wishes. Sir, the general sense of the people will regulate the conduct of their representatives. I admit that there are exceptions to this rule there are certain conjunctures, when it may be

1

[ocr errors]
« AnteriorContinuar »