The truth is, that the difference in the tonnage duty, and the addition of one tenth upon the duties on goods imported in foreign bottoms, is a powerful encouragement to our shipping, and as it has not been of a magnitude to excite retaliation, it is much more likely to promote the interests of our navigation, than violent measures, which would compel to retaliation; prudence admonishes us to stop where we are, for the present, rather than risk the advantages we possess, in trials of strength, that never fail to injure more or less" both parties.

If we turn from our shipping to our agriculture, we shall find no reason to be dissatisfied.

The amount of our exports for the year, ending 30th September, 1792, as appears by the last return of exports to this house, exceeded the two preceding years by five hundred eighty-nine thousand, six hundred and one dollars and sixteen cents. It exceeded the mean of the two preceding years, by one million, five hundred ninety-seven thousand, nine hundred and eighty-three dollars and thirty-six cents. Our revenues are unquestionably more productive than was looked for. Those from imports have exceeded, in a year, four millions, six hundred thousand dollars. Of the increase of our manufactures we have no precise standard, but those, who attend most to the subject, entertain no doubt that they are progressive.

This certainly is not a state of things that invites to hazardous experiments. These are perhaps never justifiable, but when the affairs of a nation are in an unprosperous train.

We experience, indeed, some embarrassments from the effects of the European war, but these are temporary, and will cease with that war, which of itself offers us some indemnifications, I mean a freer trade to the West Indies.

I am greatly mistaken if the considerations, which have been suggested, do not conclusively prove the impolicy of the plan which is now recommended for

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our adoption. So strong and decided is my own conviction, that I cannot but persuade myself, that of the committee will lead to its rejection.

A few miscellaneous observations will conclude what I have to offer on this very interesting subject.

1. It has been made an objection to the present footing on which our trade is with Great Britain, that it is regulated by annual proclamation of the executive, instead of a permanent law. This was at first laid down by the secretary of state in terms so general as to include the West Indies; but he has since corrected the error, and told us that our trade with the British West Indies is regulated by a standing law. The fact itself, nevertheless, is of no real importance. The actual footing, on which we are placed, is the only material point; the mode of doing it is of little consequence. The annual proclamation of the British executive is equivalent to the decree, revocable at pleasure, of any single legislator, of the monarch of Spain or Portugal, and it may be added, of the French convention, which, though a numerous body, yet forming only one assembly, without checks, is as liable to fluctuation as a single legislator; and in fact, its resolutions have been found as fickle and variable, as it was possible for the resolutions of any single person to be. To prove this, if proof were required, it would be only necessary to refer to the frequent changes in the regulations they have made with regard to the trade of this countryto-day one thing, to-morrow another. Instability is more applicable to no political institution than to a legislature, consisting of a single popular assembly.

2. The additional duties proposed, are objectionable, because the existing duties are already, generally speaking, high enough for the state of our mercantile capital and the safety of collection. They are near twenty per centum on an average, upon the value of the objects on which they are laid; higher than the duties of several countries, and high enough for our present condition. To augment the rates materially will

be in the abstract to oppress trade; for we must have for our consumption the manufactures of the country on which they are proposed to be laid.

3. To serve as a contrast to the conduct of Great Britain, we are told of the liberal overtures for a commercial treaty lately made by France.

It has been already remarked, that the conduct of France towards us since the commencement of the revolution, is no basis of reasoning: it has undergone as many revolutions as their political systems: their measures at one period, with respect to our tobacco, were of a complexion peculiarly hostile to us. The duty of twenty-five livres per kentle on that article, carried in our bottoms to France, and of only eighteen livres fifteen sous on the same article, carried in French bottoms, amounted to a complete prohibition to carry our tobacco in our own bottoms.

The duty of twenty livres per kentle on foreign fish is another important instance of severity of regulations, a duty admitted by the secretary of state to be prohibitory.

If there have been regulations and propositions of a more favorable nature, they are to be ascribed to causes of the moment. During the continuance of the revolution, it is of necessity that we have carte blanche in the French West Indies. We know that we are getting admission into the British and Spanish Islands also.

And as to the overtures for a permanent system, Mr. Genet's instructions published by him explain the object. Privileges of trade in the West India Islands are to be the price of our becoming a party in the war. The declamations against the liberticide maxims of the ancient government and in favor of free principles of commerce, resolve themselves into this. This is a bargain which I trust a majority of this house will not be willing to make; I am sure our constituents would not thank us for it.

But it may be asked, are we to sit with folded arms and tamely submit to all the oppressions. restrictions

and exclusions to which our trade is subject-if not, what are we to do? I answer, nothing certainly at the present juncture. If the foundation of the question were more solid than I believe it to be, candidly and dispassionately considered, this is of all moments the most unfavorable for an experiment. Any movement of the kind would, as before observed, be construed into a political manœuvre and an attempt to embarrass one of the belligerent powers, and would interest the feelings of all those united with her, producing consequently either war or additional trammels in every quarter upon our trade; besides the weighty argument, that the great source of subsidiary supply to which we might have heretofore looked has been obstructed.

But I answer further, that we ought with great caution to attempt any thing at a future day, till we have acquired a maturity which will enable us to act with greater effect, and to brave the consequences, even if they should amount to war, and till we have secured more adequate means of internal supply; to which point we should bend our efforts, as the only rational and safe expedient, in our present circumstances, for counteracting the effects of the spirit of monopoly, which more or less tinctures not the system of Great Britain merely, but that of all Europe. But this it seems is not the favorite course, it is not high seasoned enough for our political palate; we not only turn aside from it with neglect, but we object away the plainest provisions of the constitution to disable ourselves from pursuing it.

Every year, for years to come, will make us a more important customer to Great Britain, and a more important furnisher of what she wants. If this does not lead to such a treaty of commerce as we desire, the period is not very distant when we may insist with much better effect on what we desire, without any thing like the same degree of hazard. This last observation is not meant to be confined to Great Britain, but to extend to any other power, as far as the stipulations of treaty may permit.

Wisdom admonishes us to be patient, "to make haste slowly." Our progress is and will be rapid enough, if we do not throw away our advantages. Why should we be more susceptible than all the world? Why should this young country throw down the gauntlet in favor of free trade against the world? There may be spirit in it, but there will certainly not be prudence.

But again it may be asked, shall we put nations, disposed to a more liberal system, upon the same footing with those differently disposed? Will not this tend to produce an unfriendly treatment from all?

I answer first, that I think it has been proved, that the nation against which we have been invited principally to aim our artillery, treats us with at least as much liberality as other nations, I mean in a commercial sense.

I answer secondly, that if there be nations, who are seriously disposed to establish with us more free and beneficial principles of trade, the path is plain; let treaties be formed, fixing upon a solid basis the privileges which we are to enjoy, and the equivalent. I have no objection to granting greater privileges to one power than to another, if it can be put on the stable foundation of contract, ascertaining the boon and the equivalent. But I think it folly to be granting voluntarily boons at the expense of the United States without equivalent. The mode of treaty secures the ground; it is inoffensive to any third power. Our reply to objections would in that case be, "here is the price to us clearly defined and fixed by treaty, for which we grant the greater advantages of which complain: give us the price, and the like advantages are yours." But capriciously to grant greater privileges by law to one nation than to another, when, upon a fair comparison, we are not better treated by one than by another, is neither equitable, politic, nor safe.

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Let us then leave changes for the present to the course of national treaties, and continue to proceed in the path in which we have hitherto found prosperity and safety.