to market, is the faculty to find new resources of trade, and to bear the temporary suspension of existing ones; that in proportion to the habitude of a nation to endure taxation, is the facility of a government to find substitutes for revenues lost; that in proportion to the energy of a government and the habits of obedience of a people, is the chance of perseverance on the part of such government, in measures producing inconveniences to the community.

Great Britain then would have less to resist and more means of resistance than the United States; the United States more to resist and less means of resistance than Great Britain. Which party are the chances against in such a contest? Can any one say that the United States ought, in such a comparative situation, to count on success in an experiment like that proposed, with sufficient assurance to be justified in hazarding upon it so great a derangement of its affairs, as may result from the measure?

The main argument for the chance of success, is, that our supplies to Great Britain are more necessary to her than hers to us. But this is a position which our self-love gives more credit to than facts will altogether authorize. Well informed men in other countries, (whose opportunities of information are at least as good as ours,) affirm, that great Britain can obtain a supply of most of the articles she obtains from us, as cheap and of as good a quality elsewhere, with only two exceptions, namely, tobacco and grain, and the latter is only occasionally wanted: a considerable substitute for our tobacco, though not of equal quality, may be had elsewhere and even admitting this position to be too strongly stated, yet there is no good reason to doubt that it is in a great degree true. colonies of the different European powers on this continent, some countries on the Mediterranean, and the northern countries of Europe, are in situations adapted to becoming our competitors.

The

On the other hand, the manufactured articles which

we do not make ourselves, (the greatest part of which are, in civilized countries, necessaries,) are as important to us, as our materials for manufacture (the only articles for which her demand is constant,) are to Great Britain. The position is as true, that no other nation can supply us as well as that country, with several essential articles which we want, as that no nation can supply her equally well with certain articles which she takes from us; and as to other articles of subsistence, it is certain that our demand for manufactured supplies is more constantly urgent than her demand for those articles. Where indeed shall we find a substitute for the vast supply of manufactures which we get from that country? No gentleman will say that we can suddenly replace them by our manufactures, or that this, if practicable, could be done without a violent distortion of the natural course of our industry. A substitute of our own being out of the question, where else shall we find one?

France was the power which could best have filled any chasm that might have been created. But this is no longer the case. 'Tis undeniable that the money capitals of that country have been essentially destroyed; that manufacturing establishments, except those for war, have been essentially deranged. The destruction to which Lyons appears to be doomed, is a severe blow to the manufactures of France; that city, second in importance in all respects, was perhaps the first in manufacturing importance. It is more than probable that France, for years to come, will herself want a foreign supply of manufactured articles.

At a moment then, when the manufactures of Great Britain have become more necessary than ever to us, can we expect to succeed in a contest, which supposes that we can dispense with them?

It may be said that the resolutions proposed do not suppose this; but they do suppose it, for they ought to proceed upon the possibility, nay, probability, that a system of commercial retaliation will be adopted by

Great Britain, in which case we must inevitably sustain a defeat, if we cannot dispense both with her supplies and with her market for our supplies.

Will it be answered that her manufactures will find their way to us circuitously, and our supplies to her in like manner? If so, what are our regulations to produce but distress and loss to us? The manufactures of Great Britain will still be consumed, and our materials will still nourish those manufactures.

The manufactures we take from her being less bulky than the supplies we send her, the charges of a circuitous transportation would be less than those of a like transportation of our commodities. In all the cases therefore, in which those charges fall upon her, they would be lighter than in the cases in which the latter charges fell upon us. Moreover, as the articles of Great Britain would meet less competition in our markets than ours in hers, the increased charges on her manufactures would much oftener fall upon us than those upon our materials would fall upon her. So that both ways we should sustain loss.

But, it may be asked, what are the regulations Great Britain could adopt to counteract ours?

I answer, she could, (among other conceivable things,) prohibit or lay prohibitory duties on her commodities to this country, and on ours to her, in our bottoms; and she might in addition, temporarily grant the same privileges to Dutch or other friendly bottoms which are now granted to those of the United States in the trade between us and herself; or she might go no further in this particular than to permit the importation of our commodities in some of those bottoms. This, it is true, would be a departure from the system of her navigation act; but when the question was, whether she should surrender it permanently to us by extortion, or temporarily to a power more friendly to her, till the issue of the experiment could be decided, who can doubt what would be the course which interest and resentment would dictate?

But there are numerous other regulations which could be adopted, and which equally with the foregoing would have the effect of transferring the trade between the two countries to the management of some third party; for after all, it is not improbable this will be the result of the contest, that instead of the United States and Great Britain carrying on jointly as they now do the trade between the two countries, it will be carried on either directly or circuitously by some third power, more to our detriment than to that of Great Britain.

The manufactures of that country will get to us nearly in the same quantities they now do, with the disadvantage of additional charges; such of our commodities, as she cannot have of equal quality elsewhere, will get to her also: the rest will be supplanted by the like commodities of other nations, and we shall lose the best market we have for them.

Those who advocate the system of contention, should tell us where a substitute will be found. The merchants, who know that it is now difficult enough to find markets for our surplus commodities-that France, in ordinary times, affords a very contracted one, and that the French West Indies are not likely, in settled times, to be as good customers as they have been for some time past, cannot desire to see the sphere abridged, and our landholders will quickly reprobate the plan. Thus it appears, that the contest would be likely to issue against us, and to end in defeat and disgrace.

What would be our situation if we should make an attempt of the kind and fail in it? Our trade would then truly be in the power and at the disposal of Great Britain.

3. The third ingredient stated, as necessary to justify the proposed attempt, is this; that the prospect of advantages should be at least an equivalent for those in possession, which would be put in jeopardy by the experiment.

It has been shown, that in fact there is no real pros

pect of advantage, but a considerable one of inconvenience and loss. This puts an end to comparison. But it may be added, that our situation is precisely such an one as to forbid experiments. It is so, from the stage at which we are, as a people, too little advanced, too little matured for hazardous experiments of any sort.

This is not all: our general situation at this time is an eligible one; we are making as rapid a progress in most of the great branches of political prosperity as we can reasonably desire, and it would be imprudent to hazard such a situation, upon precarious speculations of greater advantage. The prosperity of a nation is not a plant to thrive in a hotbed; moderation in this respect is the truest wisdom; it is so plain a path, that it requires a peculiar sublimation of ideas to deviate from it.

It is agreed on all hands, that all our great national interests, our population, agriculture, manufactures, commerce and our navigation, are in a thriving and progressive state, advancing faster than was to have been expected, and as fast as can reasonably be desired.

Our navigation, in the short space of three years, ending the 31st of December, 1792, has increased in the ratio of nearly one fifth.

The proportions of our tonnage have been as follows:

In 1790 1791

1792

tons 479091

501790 showing an increase of 89192 tons. 568283

The proportion of foreign tonnage during the same years, has been

In 1790

1791

1792

tons 258919

240799 showing a decrease of 14656 tons. 244263

This proves that our present system is highly favorable to the increase of our navigation, and that we are gradually supplanting foreigners.