Spain, Portugal and Denmark, and drew the conclusion that the system of Great Britain, not only as compared with that of France, was entitled to our preference, but that it was also greatly to be preferred to that of all the beforementioned nations, except perhaps the United Netherlands. He then continued his speech as follows:]

From the view which has been taken, this general reflection results, that the system of every country is selfish according to its circumstances, and contains all those restrictions and exclusions which it deems useful to its own interests. Besides this, a desire to secure to the mother country a monopoly of the trade of its colonies, is a predominant feature in the system of almost every country in Europe. Nor is it without foundation in reason. Colonies, especially small islands, are usually maintained and defended at the expense of the mother country, and it seems a natural recompense for that service, that the mother country should enjoy, exclusively of other nations, the benefit of trade with its colonies. This was thought reasonable by the United States, while colonies, even after their disputes on the point of taxation had begun : and however the question may stand between the mother country and its colonies, between the former and foreign nations, it is not easy to see how the equity of the exclusion can be contested. At any rate, its being the most prevailing system of nations having colonies, there is no room for acrimony against a particular one that pursues it. This ought not to dissuade the United States from availing itself of every just and proper influence to gain admission into the colony trade of the nations concerned; but this object ought to be pursued with moderation, not under the instigation of a sense of injury, but on the ground of temperate negotiation and reasonable equivalent.

These observations ought to produce two effects, to moderate our resentments against particular nations and our partialities for others. and to evince the im

practicability and Quixotism of an attempt by violence, on the part of this young country, to break through the fetters which the universal policy of nations imposes on their intercourse with each other.

Our moderation in this respect ought to be excited by another reflection-does not our own system present a number of exclusions and restrictions similar to those of which we complain? Let us look into our impost and tonnage acts; do they not exhibit a number of instances of duties prohibitory in their principle and extent? Do they not by additional duties on foreign vessels and on goods brought in foreign vessels, secure a decided superiority to our ships in the navigation between this country and all those to which they are permitted to go? If duties on goods of one country, imported into another, are oppressions and grievances, (as the Secretary of State seems frequently to suppose.) how few are the foreign articles brought into the United States, on which considerable duties are not laid.

The Secretary of State, after pointing out the exclusions, restrictions and burdens which prevent our enjoying all the advantages which we could desire in the trade with foreign countries, proceeds to indicate the remedies; these are counter-exclusions, restrictions and burdens.

The reason of the thing and the general observations of the Secretary of State, would extend the regulations to be adopted to all the nations with whom we have connexions in trade; but his conclusion would seem to confine them to Great Britain, on the suggestion that she alone has declined friendly arrangements by treaty, and that there is no reason to conclude, that friendly arrangements would be declined by other

nations.

The suggestion with regard to Great Britain, appears not to be well founded, if we are to judge from the correspondence with the British minister, Mr. Hammond, communicated by the president to the

house. Mr. Jefferson asks him, if he is empowered to treat on the subject of commerce; he replies, that he is fully authorized to enter into a negotiation for that purpose, though not as yet empowered to conclude. Upon further difficulty and objection on the part of Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Hammond renews his assurance of his competency to enter on a negotiation, which he rests on his commission, as minister plenipotentiary, and his instructions; Mr. Jefferson requires a communication of his full powers for that purpose, and declines the negotiation. This was by no construction a declining on the part of the British minister. Forms were the obstacle with the Secretary of State, whose zeal, at best, was not greater than Mr. Hammond's.

But with regard to Spain, these observations occur. A secret article with France, stipulated for Spain a right to become a party to our commercial treaty with France, on the same terms. She has never availed herself of the right. Do we not know, that measures have been since pursued towards forming a treaty of commerce with her? Do we not know that none has been formed? Have we not reason to suspect, that such a treaty, on eligible terms, could not be obtained but at a price which we should be unwilling to pay for it? Have no measures been pursued towards effecting a commercial treaty with a power so interesting to us as Portugal? What was the object of sending a minister there? How happens it, that there is no return? Is not there reason to conclude, from the long delay, that there are serious obstacles to the forming a proper treaty of commerce with that nation?

Why then is Great Britain selected, but that it is most in unison with our passions to enter into collisions with her?

If retaliations for restrictions, exclusions and burdens, are to take place, they ought to be dealt out, with a proportional hand, to all those from whom they are experienced. This, justice and an inoffensive conduct require. If. suffering equal impediments to our trade

from one power as another, we retaliate on one and not on another, we manifest that we are governed by a spirit of hostility towards the power against whom our retaliation is directed, and we ought to count upon a reciprocation of that spirit. If, suffering fewer from one than from another, we retaliate only on that party from whom we suffer least, the spirit of enmity, by which we were actuated, becomes more unequivocal. If, receiving a positively better treatment from one than another, we deal most harshly towards that power which treats us best, will it be an evidence either of justice or moderation? Will it not be a proof either of caprice, or of a hatred and aversion, of a nature to overrule the considerations both of equity and prudence.

Whatever questions may be raised about the preference due to the British commercial system, as compared with that of France, there can be none, comparing it either with that of Spain or Portugal.

Where then is the justification of the attempt to produce a war of commercial regulations with Great Britain, passing over greater objections to the policy observed toward us by other nations?

Commercial regulations ought to be bottomed on commercial motives: but if political grievances are to be implicated, is there no power proposed to be exempted, of whom we have cause to complain?

The propositions, (which may be considered as a commentary on the report,) do every thing but name Great Britain. Professedly confined to the powers with whom we have no treaties of commerce, the articles selected, as the objects of regulation, have scarcely any application but to Great Britain. This is but a flimsy cover; the design will be mistaken by no one, and there would have been much more dignity in naming the party with whom it was meant to contend.

The idea of an apportionment of retaliation to grievance is rendered impossible by our treaties.

These contain precise stipulations of mutual privileges, and in each case the general principle of the party being on the footing of the most favored nation.

But at least it might be done with regard to the powers with whom we have no treaties, and the not proposing it will be considered as a clear proof that the ostensible object is one thing, the real object another.

Will it be believed out of doors, that all this proceeds from a pure zeal for the advancement of commerce and navigation? Have the views of our public councils been uniform on this point? Have they never contributed to lose favorable opportunities for making such a treaty, by recalling powers for that purpose once given, by defeating efforts made to send them when they might have been useful?

Whatever may be the motive, the operation may clearly be pronounced to be a phenomenon in political history-a government, attempting to aid commerce by throwing it into confusion; by obstructing the most precious channels in which it flows, under the pretence of making it flow more freely; by damming up the best outlet for the surplus commodities of the country, and the best inlet for the supplies, of which it stands in need; by disturbing without temptation, a beneficial course of things, in an experiment precarious, if not desperate; by arresting the current of a prosperous and progressive navigation, to transfer it to other countries, and by making all this wild work in the blameable, but feeble attempt to build up the manufactures and trade of another country at the expense of the United States.

Let us take a closer view of the project. It has been proved that it does not rest on a basis of distributive justice, and observations have been made to evince its impolicy. But this demands a more critical examination.

Let it be premised, that it is a project calculated to disturb the existing course of three fourths of our import trade, two fifths of our export trade, and the