tion of their constituents, were necessary to give validity to the decisions of the states general. He then proceeded,]-Sir, these radical defects in their confederacy must have dissolved their association long ago, were it not for their peculiar position-circumscribed in a narrow territory; surrounded by the most powerful nations in the world; possessing peculiar advantages from their situation; an extensive navigation and a powerful navy-advantages which it was clearly the interest of those nations to diminish or deprive them of. Their late unhappy dissensions were manifestly produced by the vices of their system. We may derive much benefit from the experience of that unhappy country. Governments, destitute of energy, will always produce anarchy. These facts are worthy the most serious consideration of every gentleman here. Does not the history of these confederacies coincide with the lessons drawn from our own experience? I most earnestly pray that America may have sufficient wisdom to avail herself of the instructive information she may derive from a contemplation of the sources of their misfortunes, and that she may escape a similar fate, by avoiding the causes from which their infelicity sprung. If the general government is to depend on the voluntary contributions of the states for its support, dismemberment of the United States may be the consequence. In cases of imminent danger, those states alone, more immediately exposed to it, would exert themselves; those remote from it, would be too supine to interest themselves warmly in the fate of those whose distresses they did not immediately perceive. The general government ought therefore to be armed with power to defend the whole union.

Must we not suppose, that those parts of America which are most exposed, will first be the scenes of war? Those nations, whose interest is incompatible with an extension of our power, and who are jealous of our resources to become powerful and wealthy,

must naturally be inclined to exert every means to prevent our becoming formidable. Will they not be impelled to attack the most exposed parts of the union? Will not their knowledge of the weakness of our government stimulate them the more readily to such an attack? Those parts to which relief can be afforded with most difficulty, are the extremities of the country, and will be the first objects of our enemies. The general government, having no resources beyond what are adequate to its existing necessities, will not be able to afford any effectual succor to those parts which may be invaded.

In such a case, America must perceive the danger and folly of withholding from the union, a power sufficient to protect the whole territory of the United States. Such an attack is far from improbable, and if it be actually made, it is difficult to conceive a possibility of escaping the catastrophe of a dismemberment. On this subject we may receive an estimable and instructive lesson, from an American confederacy; from an example which has happened in our country, and which applies to us with peculiar force, being most analogous to our situation. I mean that species of association or union which subsisted in New England. The colonies of Massachusetts, Bristol, Connecticut and New Hampshire, were confederated together.

The object of that confederacy was primarily to defend themselves against the inroads and depredations of the Indians. They had a common council, consisting of deputies from each party, with an equality of suffrage in their deliberations. The general expenditures and charges were to be adequately defrayed. Its

powers were very similar to those of the confederation. Its history proves clearly, that a government, founded on such principles, must ever disappoint the hopes of those who expect its operations to be conducive to public happiness.

There are facts on record to prove, that instead of

answering the end of its institution, or the expectation of its framers, it was violated with impunity'; and only regarded when it coincided perfectly with the views and immediate interests of the respective parties.

The strongest member of the union availed itself of its circumstances to infringe their confederacy. Massachusetts refused to pay its quotas. In the war between England and Holland, it was found particularly necessary to make more exertions for the protection of that country.

Massachusetts being then more powerful and less exposed than the other colonies, refused its contributions to the general defence. In consequence of this, the common council remonstrated against the council of Massachusetts. This altercation terminated in the dissolution of their union. From this brief account of a system perfectly resembling our present one, we may easily divine the inevitable consequences of a longer adherence to the latter.

[Mr. Madison then recapitulated many instances of the prevalent persuasion of the wisest patriots of the states, that the safety of all America depended on union; and that the government of the United States must be possessed of an adequate degree of energy, or that otherwise their connexion could not be justly denominated an union. He likewise enumerated the expedients that had been attempted by the people of America to form an intimate association, from the meeting at New York in the year 1754, downwards : that their sentiments on this subject had been uniform, both in their colonial and independent conditions; and that a variety of causes had hitherto prevented the adoption of an adequate system. He then continued thus,]

If we take experience for our guide, we shall find still more instructive direction on this subject. The weakness of the existing articles of the union, showed itself during the war. It has manifested itself since the peace, to such a degree as can leave no doubt in any rational,

intelligent and unbiassed mind, of the necessity of an alteration: nay, this necessity is obvious to all America; it has forced itself on the minds of the people. The committee has been informed, that the confederation was not completed till the year 1781, when a great portion of the war was ended; consequently no part of the merit of the antecedent operations of the war could. justly be attributed to that system. Its debility was perceived almost as soon as it was put in operation, A recapitulation of the proofs which have been experienced of its inefficacy, is unnecessary. It is most notorious, that feebleness universally marked its character. Shall we be safe in another war in the same situation? That instrument required the voluntary contributions of the states, and thereby sacrificed some of our best privileges. The most intolerable and unwarrantable oppressions were committed on the people during the late war. The gross enormity of those oppressions might have produced the most serious consequences, were it not for the spirit of liberty, which preponderated against every consideration.

A scene of injustice, partiality and oppression, may bring heavenly vengeance on any people. We are now by our sufferings, expiating the crimes of the otherwise glorious revolution. Is it not known to every member of this committee, that the great principles of a free government were reversed through the whole progress of that scene? of that scene? Was not every state harassed? Was not Was not every individual oppressed and subjected to repeated distresses? Was this right? Was it a proper form of government, that warranted, authorized, or overlooked, the most wanton violations of property? Had the government been vested with complete power to procure a regular and adequate supply of revenue, those oppressive measures would have been unnecessary. But, sir, can it be supposed that a repetition of such measures would ever be acquiesced in? Can a government, that stands in need of such measures, secure the liberty, or promote the happi

ness or glory of any country? If we do not change this system, consequences must ensue that gentlemen do not now apprehend. If other testimony were necessary, I might appeal to that which I am sure is very weighty, but which I mention with reluctance. At the conclusion of the war, that man who had the most extensive acquaintance with the nature of the country, who well understood its interests, and who had given the most unequivocal and most brilliant proofs of his attachment to its welfare-when he laid down his arms, wherewith he had so nobly and successfully defended his country, publicly testified his disapprobation of the present system, and suggested that some alteration was necessary to render it adequate to the security of our happiness. I did not introduce that great name to bias any gentleman here. Much as I admire and revere the man, I consider these members as not to be actuated by the influence of any man; but I introduced him as a respectable witness to prove that the articles of the confederation were inadequate, and that we must resort to something else. His modesty did not point out what ought to be done, but said, that. some great change was necessary. But, sir, testimony, if wished for, may be found in abundance, and numerous conclusive reasons may be urged for this change. Experience daily produced such irresistible proofs of the defects of that system, that this commonwealth › was induced to exert her influence to meliorate it: she began that noble work, in which I hope she will persist she proposed to revise it; her proposition met with the concurrence, which that of a respectable party will always meet. I am sure if demonstration were necessary on the part of this commonwealth, reasons have been abundantly heard in the course of this debate, manifold and cogent enough, not only to operate conviction, but to disgust an attentive hearer. Recollect the resolution of the year 1784. It was then found that the whole burden of the union was sustained by a few states. This state was likely to be saddled with