find no other means. I ask myself a variety of questions applicable to the adopting states, and I conclude, will they repent of what they have done? Will they acknowledge themselves in an error? Or, will they recede to gratify Virginia? My prediction is, that they will not. Shall we stand by ourselves, and be severed from the union if amendments cannot be had? I have every reason for determining within myself, that our rejection must dissolve the union; and that that. dissolution will destroy our political happiness. The honorable gentleman was pleased to draw out several other arguments, out of order: that this government would destroy the state governments, the trial by jury, • &c. &c. and concluded, by an illustration of his opinion, by a reference to the confederacy of the Swiss. Let us argue with unprejudiced minds: he says, that the trial by jury is gone is this so? Although I have declared my determination to give my vote for it, yet I shall freely censure those parts which appear to me reprehensible. The trial by jury, in criminal cases, is secured; in civil cases, it is not so expressly secured, as I could wish it; but it does not follow, that Congress has the power of taking away this privilege, which is secured by the constitution of each state, and not given away by this constitution. I have no fear on this subject-Congress must regulate it so as to suit every state. I will risk my property on the certainty, that they will institute the trial by jury in such manner as shall accommodate the conveniences of the inhabitants in every state: the difficulty of ascertaining this accommodation, was the principal cause of its not being provided for. It will be the interest of the individuals composing Congress, to put it on this convenient footing. Shall we not choose men respectable for their good qualities? Or can we suppose that men, tainted with the worst vices, will get into Congress? I beg leave to differ from the honorable gentleman, in another point. He dreads that great inconveniences will ensue from the federal court; that

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our citizens will be harrassed by being carried thither. I cannot think that this power of the federal judiciary, will necessarily be abused. The inconvenience here suggested, being of a general nature, affecting most of the states, will, by general consent of the states, be removed; and, I trust, such regulations shall be made, in this case, as will accommodate the people in every state. The honorable gentleman instanced the Swiss cantons, as an example, to show us the possibility, if not expediency, of being in amicable alliance with the other states, without adopting this system. Sir, references to history will be fatal in political, reasoning, unless well guarded. Our mental ability is often so contracted, and powers of investigation so limited, that sometimes we adduce as an example in our favor, what in fact militates against us. Examine the situation of that country comparatively to us. Its extent and situation are totally different from ours; it is surrounded by powerful, ambitious, and reciprocally jealous nations: its territory small and the soil not. very fertile. The peculiarity, sir, of their situation, has kept these cantons together, and not that system of alliance, to which the gentleman seems to attribute the durability, and felicity of their connexion.

[Here Mr. Randolph quoted some passages from Stanyard, illustrating his argument, and largely commented upon them. The effect of which was, that the narrow confines of that country rendered it very possible for a system of confederacy to accommodate those cantons, that would not suit the United States: that it was the fear of the ambitious and warlike nations that surrounded them, and the reciprocal jealousy of the other European powers that rendered their union so durable; and that notwithstanding these circumstances, and their being a hardy race of people, yet such was the injudicious construction of their confederacy, that very considerable broils sometimes interrupted their harmony.]

He then continued-I have produced this example

to show, that we ought not to be amused with historical references, which have no kind of analogy to the points under our consideration. We ought to confine ourselves to those points solely, which have an immediate and strict similitude, to the subject of our discussion. The reference made by the honorablegentleman over the way, is extremely inapplicable to us. Are the Swiss cantons circumstanced as we are? Are we surrounded by formidable nations-or are we situated in any manner like them? We are not, sir. Then it naturally results, that no such friendly intercourse as he flattered himself with, could take place, in case of a dissolution of our union. We are remotely situated from powerful nations, the dread of whose attack might impel us to unite firmly with one another; we are not situated in an inaccessible, strong position we have to fear much from one another: we must soon feel the fatal effects of an imperfect system of union.

The honorable gentleman attacks the constitution, as he thinks it contrary to our bill of rights. Do we not appeal to the people, by whose authority all government is made? That bill of rights is of no validity, because, I conceive, it is not formed on due authority. It is not a part of our constitution: it has never secured us against any danger: it has been repeatedly disregarded and violated. But we must not discard the confederation, for the remembrance of its past services. I am attached to old servants. I have regard and tenderness for this old servant: but when reason tells us, that it can no longer be retained without throwing away all it has gained us, and running the risk of losing every thing dear to us, must we still continue our attachment? Reason and my duty tell me not. Other gentlemen may think otherwise. But, sir, is it not possible that men may differ in sentiments, and still be honest? We have an inquisition within ourselves, that leads us not to offend so much against charity. The gentleman expresses a necessity of be

ing suspicious of those who govern. I will agree with him in the necessity of political jealousy to a certain extent: but we ought to examine, how far this political jealousy ought to be carried. I confess that a certain degree of it, is highly necessary to the preservation of liberty; but it ought not to be extended to a degree which is degrading and humiliating to human nature; to a degree of restlessness and active disquietude, sufficient to disturb a community, or preclude the possibility of political happiness and contentment. Confidence ought also to be equally limited. Wisdom

shrinks from extremes, and fixes on a medium as her choice. Experience and history, the least fallible judges, teach us that in forming a government, the powers to be given must be commensurate to the object. A less degree will defeat the intention, and a greater will subject the people to the depravity of rulers, who, though they are but the agents of the people, pervert their powers to their own emolument, and ambitious views.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to be obliged to detain the house, but the relation of a variety of matters, renders it now unavoidable. I informed the house yesterday, before rising, that I intended to show the necessity of having a national government, in preference to the confederation; also, to show the necessity of conceding the power of taxation, and of distinguishing between its objects; and I am the more happy, that I possess materials of information for that purpose. My intention then is, to satisfy the gentlemen of this committee, that a national government is absolutely indispensable, and that a confederacy is not eligible, in our present situation. The introductory step to this will be, to endeavor to convince the house of the necessity of the union, and that the present confederation is actually inadequate and unamendable. The extent of the country is objected to, by the gentleman over the way, as an insurmountable obstacle to the establishing a national government in the United

States. It is a very strange and inconsistent doctrine, to admit the necessity of the union, and yet urge this last objection, which I think goes radically to the existence of the union itself. If the extent of the country be a conclusive argument against a national government, it is equally so, against an union with the other states. Instead of entering largely into a discussion of the nature and effect of the different kinds of government, or into an inquiry into the particular extent of country, that may suit the genius of this or that government, I ask this question-is this government necessary for the safety of Virginia? Is the union indispensable for our happiness? I confess it is imprudent for any nation to form alliance with another, whose situation and construction of government. are. dissimilar with its own. It is impolitic and improper for men of opulence to join their interest with men of indigence and chance. But we are now inquiring, particularly, whether Virginia, as contradistinguished from the other states, can exist without the union-a hard question, perhaps, after what has been said. I will venture, however, to say, she cannot. I shall not rest contented with asserting, I shall endeavor to prove. Look at the most powerful nations on earth. England and France have had recourse to this expedient. Those countries found it necessary to unite with their immediate neighbors, and this union has prevented the most lamentable mischiefs. What divine pre-eminence is Virginia possessed of, above other states? Can Virginia send her navy and thunder, to bid defiance to foreign nations? And can she exist without an union with her neighbors, when the most potent nations have found such an union necessary, not only to their political felicity, but their national existence? Let us examine her ability. Although it be impossible to determine, with accuracy, what degree of internal strength a nation ought to possess, to enable it to stand by itself; yet there are certain sure facts and circumstances, which demonstrate, that a