which mention the succession, to take off, if possible, all manner of cavil; though, at the same time, I cannot but observe how ready the adverse party is to make use of any objections, even such as destroy their own principles. I put a distant case of the possibility, that our succession, through extreme necessity, might be changed by the legislature in future ages; and it is pleasant to hear those people quarrelling at this, who profess themselves for changing it as often as they please, and that even without the consent of the entire legislature.

SOME

REMARKS

ON THE

BARRIER TREATY

BETWEEN

HER MAJESTY

AND

THE STATES-GENERAL;

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

THE SAID BARRIER TREATY, WITH THE TWO SEPARATE ARTICLES; PART OF THE COUNTER-PROJECT; THE SENTIMENTS OF PRINCE EUGENE AND COUNT ZINZENDORF UPON THE SAID TREATY; AND A REPRESENTATION OF THE ENGLISH MERCHANTS AT BRUGES.

WRITTEN IN THE YEAR 1712.

THIS treatise may be considered as a continuation of the Conduct of the Allies. The complaints of the author against the continental alliance in general are here particularly concentrated and fixed upon the Barrier Treaty, which, to say truth, seems, at this distance of time, a most extraordinary production of diplomacy.

PREFACE.

WHEN I published the discourse, called The Conduct of the Allies, I had thoughts either of inserting, or annexing, the Barrier of Treaty at length, with such observations as I conceived might be useful for public information; but that discourse taking up more room than I designed, after my utmost endeavours to abbreviate it, I contented myself only with making some few reflections upon that famous treaty, sufficient, as I thought, to answer the design of my book. I have since heard, that my readers in general seemed to wish I had been more particular, and have discovered an impatience to have that treaty made public, especially since it has been laid before the House of Commons.

That I may give some light to the reader who is not well versed in those affairs, he may please to know, that a project for a treaty of barrier with the States was transmitted hither from Holland; but being disapproved of by our court in several parts, a new project, or scheme of a treaty, was drawn up here, with many additions and alterations. This last was called the counter-project, and was the measure whereby the Duke of Marlborough and my Lord Townshend were commanded and instructed to proceed in negotiating a treaty of barrier with the States.

I have added a translation of this counter-project in those articles where it differs from the barrier treaty, that the reader, by comparing them together, may judge how punctually those negotiators observed their instructions. I have likewise subjoined the sentiments of Prince Eu

gene of Savoy and the Count de Zinzendorf, relating to this treaty, written, I suppose, while it was negotiating. And lastly, I have added a copy of the representation of the British merchants at Bruges, signifying what inconveniences they already felt, and farther apprehended, from this barrier treaty.

SOME REMARKS, &c.

IMAGINE a reasonable person in China reading the following treaty, and one who was ignorant of our affairs, or our geography, he would conceive their high mightinesses, the States-General, to be some vast powerful commonwealth, like that of Rome, and her majesty to be a petty prince, like one of those to whom that republic would sometimes send a diadem for a present, when they behaved themselves well, otherwise could depose at pleasure, and place whom they thought fit in their stead. Such a man would think, that the States had taken our prince and us into their protection, and, in return, honoured us so far as to make use of our troops as some small assistance in their conquests, and the enlargement of their empire, or to prevent the incursions of barbarians upon some of their out-lying provinces. But how must it sound in a European ear, that Great Britain, after maintaining a war for so many years with so much glory and success, and such prodigious expence; after saving the Empire, Holland, and Portugal, and almost recovering Spain, should, toward the close of a war, enter into a treaty with seven Dutch provinces, to secure to them a

dominion larger than their own, which she had conquered for them; to undertake for a great deal more, without stipulating the least advantage for herself; and accept, as an equivalent, the mean condition of those States assisting to preserve her queen on the throne, whom, by God's assistance, she is able to defend against all her majesty's enemies and allies put together?

Such a wild bargain could never have been made for us, if the States had not found it their interest to use very powerful motives with the chief advisers, (I say nothing of the person immediately employed ;) and if a party here at home had not been resolved, for ends and purposes very well known, to continue the war as long as they had any occasion for it.

The counter-project of this treaty, made here at London, was bad enough in all conscience: I have said something of it in the preface; her majesty's ministers were instructed to proceed by it in their negotiation. There was one point in that project, which would have been of consequence to Britain, and one or two more where the advantages of the States were not so very exorbitant, and where some care was taken of the house of Austria. Is it possible, that our good allies and friends could not be brought to any terms with us, unless by striking out every particular that might do us any good, and adding still more to those whereby so much was already granted? For instance, the article about demolishing of Dunkirk surely might have remained, which was of some benefit to the States, as well as of mighty advantage to us, and which the French king has lately yielded in one of his preliminaries, although clogged with the demand of an equivalent, which will owe its difficulty only to this treaty. B b

VOL. IV.