State of Maryland v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company State of Ohio, Neil, Moore & Co. v. Stewart etal., Hickey's Lessee v. Stewart etal, The Washington Bridge Company v. Stimpson. West Chester Rail-road Stokes, Kendall v. Stokes etal., Searight v. Swartwoit v. Gihon Taylor v.The United States United Sates, Chaires v. United States v. Freeman United States v. Gear United States v. Hodge United States v. King et al. United States v. Marvin United States v. Prescott et al. United States, Taylor v. United States, Winston v. .763 Vick et 1., Lane et al. v. 464 THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, AT JANUARY TERM, 1845 ANDREW ALDRIDGE AND OTHERS, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, V. NATHANIEL F. WILLIAMS. The act of Congress, of March 2d, 1833, commonly called the Compromise Act, did not, prospectively, repeal all duties upon imports after the 30th of June, 1842. Repealing only such parts of previous acts as were inconsistent with itself, it left in force, after the 30th of June. 1842, the same duties which were levied on the 1st of June, 1 12. Duties were directed by the act of 1833 to be levied according to a home valuation, "under such regulations as may be prescribed by law." This phrase embraces all regulations lawfully existing at the time the home valuation went into operation, whether made before or after the passage of the act of 1833. And the regulations established in the 7th and 8th sections of the act of 1832 are sufficient for the correct performance of the duty. The regulations prescribed by the secretary of the Treasury, und a power given to him by the 9th section of the act of 1832, are also "regulations prescribed by law." The court, in construing, an act, will not consider the motives, or reasons, or opinions, expressed by individual members of Congress, in debate, but will look, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed. THIS case was brought up by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, and involved the construction of the act of Congress of March 2d, 1833, commonly called the Compromise Act. Williams was the collector of the port of Baltimore, and the plaintiffs in error were importing mer chants, who sued to ecover duties paid under protest. The title of the act was "An act to modify the act of the 14th of Iuly, 1832, and all other acts imposing duties on imports." The 1st section provided that from and after the 31st of December, 1833, in all cases where cuties shall exceed twenty per centum on the value thereof, one-tenth part of such excess shall be deducted; from and after the 31st of December, 1835, another tenth-part; from VOL. III.-2 9 Aldridge et al. v. Williams. and after the 31st of December, 1837, another tenth part; from and after the 31st of December, 1839, another tenth part; from and after the 31st of December, 1841, one-half of the residue of such excess shall be deducted; and from and after the 30th of June, 1842, the other half thereof shall be deducted. The 2d section raised the duty upon certain woollens from five to fifty per centum. The 3d section was as follows: "That, until the 30th day of June, 1842, the duties imposed by existing laws, as modified by this act, shall remain and continue to be collected. And from and after the day last aforesaid, all duties upon imports shall be collected in ready money; and all credits, now allowed by law, in the payment of duties, shall be, and hereby are, abolished; and such duties shall be laid for the purpose of raising such revenue as may be necessary to an economical administration of the government; and from and after the day last aforesaid, the duties required to be paid by law on goods, wares, and merchandise, shall be assessed upon the value thereof at the port where the same shall be entered, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law." The 4th section exempted certain articles from duty during the interval between the 31st of December, 1833, and the 30th of June, 1842. The 5th section exempted certain articles from duty after the 30th of June, 1842, and concluded as follows: "And all imports on which the first section of this act may operate, and all articles now admitted to entry free from duty, or paying a less rate of duty than twenty per centum, ad valorem, before the said 30th day of June, 1842, from and after that day may be admitted to entry, subject to such duty, not exceeding twenty per centum, ad valorem, as shall be provided for by law. The 6th and last section was as follows: "That so much of the act of the 14th of July, 1832, or of any other act as is inconsistent with this act, shall be, and the same is hereby repealed: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent the passage, prior or subsequent to the said 30th day of June, 1842, of any act or acts, from time to time, that may be necessary to detect, prevent, or punish evasions of the duties on imports imposed by law, nor to prevent the passage of any act prior to the 30th day of June, 1842, in the contingency either of excess or deficiency of revenue, altering the rates of duties on articles which, by the aforesaid act of 14th of July, 1832, are subject to a less rate of duty than twenty per centum, ad valorem, in such manner as not to exceed that rate, and so as to adjust the revenue to either of the said contingencies." The statement of facts agreed upon in the court below was as follows: Aldridge et al. v. Williams. "In this case it is admitted that, on the 20th August, 1842, the plaintiffs in this cause imported into the port of Baltimore, from Liverpool, in England, a large quantity of goods, wares, and merchandise, and on the same day entered the same at the custom-house in the port of Baltimore; that the following is a true entry and list of said goods, their quality, character, and value. (Here followed a list of the goods, with their value, amounting to £8254 16s.) Adjustment. Value at Baltimore per appraisement 20 per cent.-am't duties paid collector under protest Value per invoice, £ str. 8254 16-0, or 20 per cent. Duty per home valuation Per invoice value $8,869 20 7,330 20 1,539 00 "That, on their entry, the defendant exacted and required of the plaintiffs to pay, as and for duties on said goods, the sum of eight thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine dollars and wo cents, which the plaintiffs first refused to pay, but not being able o get their goods without paying the same, they did pay the same under protest; that the value of the goods, by the true invoice cost, adding freight and other charges, was thirty-six thousand six hundred and fifty-one dollars, ($36,651 ;) that the home valuation in Baltimore, as fixed by the appraisers, was forty-four thousand three hundred and fortysix dollars, ($44,346;) that the duties upon the invoice cost and charges would have been seven thousand three hundred and thirty dollars and twenty cents, ($7,330 20.) "It is further agreed, that the duties, so collected as aforesaid by the defendant, were exacted under, and in pursuance of, orders and regulations from the Treasury Department of the government of the United States, and with the approbation, and sanction, and direction of the President of the United States. "And it is also admitted, that the amount exacted as aforesaid by defendant of plaintiffs, and by them paid him as aforesaid, was deposited. by the defendant in the Merchants' Bank of Baltimore, to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States, on the 29th August, 1842. "It is also agreed, that the court may infer, from the facts hereinbefore agreed upon, whatever a jury might infer. "If, upon the foregoing statement of facts, the court shall be of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the above sum of eight thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine dollars and twenty Aldridge et al v. Williams. cents, ($8,869 20,) or any part thereof, then judgment to be entered for the plaintiffs, for the amount so determined to be due, with interest; if they should be of opinion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover at all, then judgment to be entered for defendant. "It is further agreed, that this court enter up a judgment upon the aforegoing case stated, for the defendant, and that the plaintiffs be at liberty to appeal, or prosecute a writ of error to the like effect and purport, as if the above facts were stated in a bill of exceptions, and judgment rendered upon them for the defendant. "And it is further agreed, that either party shall be at liberty, in the Supreme Court, to raise and argue, in that court, any points or questions which, it may appear to that court, could be raised upon the aforegoing facts. 29th November, 1842. REVERDY JOHNSON, for plaintiffs, The court below gave judgment for the defendant, and a writ of error brought the proceedings up to this court. R. Johnson, for t'e plaintiffs in error. R. Johnson made three points. 1. That when the duties were exacted of the plaintiff by the defendant, there was no law imposing any duties upon such an importation. 2. That if there was, there was no law authorizing their being levied on the home valuation, and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the difference stated in the record of $1539. 3. That if such duties were in whole, or in part, exacted without law, the amount may be recovered in an action for money had and received, upon the facts of this case. He said that the judgment below was pro forma, and the question raised by the first point was now for the first time brought before any court. The amount in all the cases is about a million and a half. Before 1842, all duties were levied upon foreign valuation. There are two constructions of the Constitution; one, that under it, there is a power to collect revenue for the sake of the revenue only; the other, for protection. The act of 1833 was a compromise between these two. Each class was supposed to surrender something. The law was intended to terminate at a certain period, viz., 30th June, 1842, and the question is, what was the condition of the revenuesystem after that day. Was there any law to impose duties? We say not. From the history of the act and the act itself, we infer, that it was the intention of its framers to leave the subject wholly to Congress after 1842. The former attorney-general decided otherwise, and gave two opinions; but, upon examining them, we do not |