case, in which governors have not claimed and exercised a qualified right over the labour or the property of the community: there has been no case, probably, in which this claim of the governor's has been practically resisted, by setting up, in opposition to it, an abstract principle of right. In all cases of resistance to Government, tyranny, either suffered or apprehended, excess in the use of power, not a false title to power, used wisely or with moderation, has been the true motive and reason for such resistance.

But suppose that the true title of a governor to exact labour from any individual, or to impose a tax on him, depends absolutely on that individual's consent. Observe the consequences to which this position must lead, and then judge how far it may be tenable. The country is invaded; they who choose may repel the invader;-a tax is necessary, let those pay it who will. Is it not plain, that to trust, in such cases, to the courage or to the patriotism of individuals, is to encounter evils far more destructive of right, far more fatal to liberty, than can be redeemed by any speculative independence of tyrannical or arbitrary institutions?

But this is allowed, and it is replied, that in such cases individuals must be bound by the act of the majority. True; we can propose no better expedient: but where lurks, meanwhile, our positive right? Why am I bound by the act of majority? Why must I submit rather to numbers than to force? Suppose that I deem the war to have been unwise, which terminated, in the year 1815, so much to the glory of England, but, at the same time, so much to the exhaustion of her finances, and that, during the course of it, I opposed, as much as I could, the expensive policy which the Government pursued. My personal labour, or my patrimonial estate, are now taxed immoderately, to pay an expence which I never consented to incur. Am I, though I allow the war to have been carried on with the implied consent of the majority of the nation, less injured by the actual burden so imposed, than I should have been had it been imposed by a single despot?

that system is, I believe, wisely devised, which gives to public opinion a decided influence on the choice of all measures in which the public is interested. It may be better to live where a majority makes the law, than where the law rests with a faction, or with an individual. The expediency, on the whole, of so living, reconciles me to single evils, which else, perhaps, I could not readily tolerate: but the might of numbers cannot make right, any more than the might of one.

And farther-over and above the submission which, on this theory of natural right, I am bound to pay to the will of the majority, a subinission which, in truth, cannot be ex◄ acted on any principle, but that, for certain cases, it is the best expedient which can be devised, (and so defensible, no doubt, on the score of expediency,) I am supposed to delegate also my own rights to a representative, (and that representative appointed also by a majority,) and to be bound by the acts of a majority of the representatives of the district or empire in which I live. On principles of expediency this is well: I may not have any better plan to propose: but duty, or loyalty, being here out of the question, this, assuredly, is my only reason for submitting to measures which I do not approve.

The case will be plainer if stated as follows: Richard and Thomas live on two sides of a ditch, the boundary of their respective parishes. We will suppose that the ruling powers in both parishes are possessed with a love of litigation. Thomas and Richard hate equally the going to law, but are totally unable to prevent the law-suit. Richard's parish is governed by a vestry appointed by the universal suffrage of the inhabitants, and he has ultimately to pay ten pounds to his lawyer. The other parish is ruled arbitrarily by the Squire, and Thomas has the luck to come off for forty shillings. Yet it is said that Richard's natural rights are respected, while Thomas is only a slave or a vassal.

Now, that Thomas is only a slave or a vassal, I must, of course, in these circumstances, concede. But surely Richard, as to this particular

Says Thomas, "Five times forty shillings is ten pounds."

"Yes," says Richard, "but we are governed by our representatives." "Yet ten pounds is still five times forty shillings. Besides, Richard, were your representatives all agreed to run into this foolish extravagance?"

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Agreed? No! The representative of our hamlet voted in a minority of five to six on the question."

"Then, truly, I cannot see how your rights are any better secured by representatives who are out-voted on such a question, than mine are, though I leave all to the Squire. Your member, however, I suppose, did all he could?"

"I know not: I expected but little from him. You remember, that at the election I voted against him." "You, therefore, properly, have no representative, since the representative who is returned by your hamlet is returned in opposition to your wishes and interest. It appears, also, that the member sent by your neighbours is powerless to protect your right. I still think, therefore, that I am as well off with the Squire."

"But I," says Richard, "have my natural right to be governed according to my own consent.'

"Against it," says Thomas, "is what you mean.'

"But I have a right to be govern ed by the majority.'

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And," quoth Thomas, "so has the Squire to govern me."

Who shall decide when doctors disagree? or how is the one right to be proved better than the other, except by showing that it is more conducive to happiness, that it is less likely that Richard's property will be dilapidated, or his essential interests violated, by representatives chosen by a majority of the parish, than Thomas's by an individual master? "Our lawyer," Richard may say, "is Lawyer Gripe, and I wish we were fairly out of his hands, and that the vestry would agree to choose

a better. They will not turn me, however, out of my farm. Though not composed of the men I could wish, they are too dependent on the public opinion to act so manifestly in the teeth of the common interest, while your Squire may send you adrift any day." If this be so, we turn the tables on Thomas; but it is necessary to see the true hinge on which they move.

Of the natural right to Annual Parliaments I need not now, I presume, be expected to speak.

SIR,

Letter IV.

I am, &c.

If it be thus shown that what is called equal representation cannot possibly, unless we prove its expediency, be assumed as the common birth-right of mankind; the next point is, whether any just title to it accrues by the law under which we happen to live. And here I ask, whether any fact can be plainer, than that the law limits the right of representation to men who have freeholds of a certain small value, and to those who have votes by prescription or charter in certain towns? By the law can accrue no more than it gives ; and, if it any where gives more than this, let it be shown.

But here we are referred to the times of the Anglo-Saxons, and to the many questions of great intricacy and doubtfulness which have been raised to the constitution of their Wittenagemote; an assembly which was, in fact, the Parliament of those times, and in which I would not venture to deny that some few members may have sat as the representatives of particu lar districts or boroughs; though I am fully persuaded that it was chiefly composed of nobles and clergy, who sat, not as deputies, but in their own right; and though, if it contained any popular representatives, all traces are yet indisputably lost of the principles on which the elections took place. Though we were to grant this body, therefore, to have been a body of representatives, yet, since we are ignorant of the mode in which it was formed, we cannot deduce, from the mere existence of such a body, any precedent as to the right of suf

frage in the people. Or, if it were otherwise, yet no right of those times, which may not have been exercised for at least eight hundred years, can still be regarded even as a dictum of law. Or, though we were to grant, that either personally, or by his representatives, every freeman had a voice in the Wittenagemote-a concession this the most gratuitous imaginable still we are to remember, that, in the period referred to, a great, and, as is usually supposed, the greater part of the community were absolute slaves; "in the same circumstances," as it is expressed by Dr Henry, "with the horses, oxen, cows, and sheep," of their masters, "except that it was not fashionable to kill and eat them." The slaves possessed no rights whatever, but those which were conferred by laws made by the freeman, or, as it may be far more correctly stated, conferred by laws which were made by the aristocracy; for, whatever may have been the composition of the Wittenagemote, it is altogether certain, that the more powerful nobles, and the superior clergy, who, at that time, were the great humanizers of society, and did much more than any other class of men to improve the condition of the lower ranks of the people, had a commanding influence on its decisions.

I shall be here asked, whether it is the jet of my argument, that, because a slave population then constituted a large portion of the population, a large portion of it ought to be slaves even now? Far from it; I would revive no precedents of antiquity, except for the sake of some manifest usefulness. And as for slavery, I hold fully, in the emphatic language of Locke, that "slavery is so vile and so miserable an estate of man, and so directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation, that it is hardly to be conceived that an Englishman, much less a gentleman, should plead for it."

But what I argue is, that although it should be conceded that, at the time when freemen were a privileged class, the law might have given to every freeman a certain share of political power or right, we cannot infer that the principle of that law applies, in the case where all are free, to the whole mass of the people. I do not

VOL. XIV.

mean that it ought not to be matter of consideration whether that principle may not be made to apply. There may be an analogy in it which deserves attention. But it does not follow, that because, in one state of society, a certain rule of law has been adopted, it must be adopted of necessity in a very different state, (for the natural right has been discussed already,) any more than it follows that, because the trial by jury is, in civil cases, the true birth-right of an Englishman, there cannot legally be such a thing as a court-martial.

Letter V.

I am, Sir, &c.

We now recur, then, to the true fountain of right-that Great Power who wills the happiness of mankind, and consequently the means of attaining and of preserving it. Prove that, on the whole, human happiness is promoted by an equality of political right, and I grant, on the whole, an incontrovertible claim to it. But this is the question of how far it is expedient? This expediency, though not the criterion of morals, yet is, in politics, always the true question to which, of necessity, we must come at last. By what means, therefore, is human happiness best promoted? Is it, in truth, by that equality of which we speak?

It

Here I admit, that, to provide for every man the free direction and employment of his own labour, and the unrestricted use of its produce, abstracting, on the whole, as little as possible, is one of the essential constituents of public happiness. may justly be said to be the great object of good government; and that every individual has, on this ground, a just right, or, as I would rather say, an equitable claim, to expect the law to provide accordingly; otherwise the government does not answer its end. I have no objection to take, as the criterion of good government, its tendency to this particular end. And it may be said, perhaps, that representative government is the sole method, or, at least, the best and the most effectual, by which this end can, in any case, be secured.

Provide then, if possible, a representative government. Still, how

A a

ever, you have this reserve to make, that, in the peculiar circumstances in which you are placed, neither the adoption of the principle itself, nor the application of it which you purpose to make, shall subject you to any particular inconveniences, of a nature adverse to the great end in view, and not to be compensated by the representative system. That particular inconveniences inay be found in a regimen which must, on the whole, be accounted salutary, is quite incontestable. Wine is good, but, if the patient be in a fever, it will not be prescribed by any sane physician. The exercise of walking strengthens the muscles of the leg; but still rest may be the true remedy for a sprain. And so in every other cure that can be named.

Granting the uses, therefore, of a representative system, and even, in general, of making its basis extensive, the indications in any individual case, that, if adopted, it will be found to answer its purpose, can be learned only by looking to particulars, to the habit and wants of the body politic, and the effect on its state or condition, which may fairly be expected from those measures which we would prescribe. The case in which we are most interested is our own. That to give more weight to the popular voice in elections would impede or not the real happiness of the public, is a question into which I do not enter. only pretend to show the true principles on which this question must be resolved, measuring happiness by the degree in which labour and property are respected, or are left uncontrolled, and are, at the same time, fully protected by the state.

I

It is said, then, that, under an equal representation, the representatives, emanating from the people at large, would be more tenacious, both of their freedom and of their property, and would afford a safeguard which we do not now possess, both from the evils of an aristocratical tyranny, and from those also of an excessive taxation.

is,-whether it would, in fact, be less arbitrary or less warlike-I say less warlike, because, in all our experience, war, and war only, seems to be the occasion of heavy taxes: or whether, on the contrary, a very popular Senate would not itself be a sort of tyranny of the mob, alternately fierce and timorous, and not so much a representative of the public mind, as a pander to all its worst vices?

The second question is, whether property or liberty would, on the whole, be benefited by having a body of representatives which might, in any considerable degree, be more susceptible than the English Parliament is found to be, of all changes which take place in public opinion? A rapid influence of public opinion in Parliament is one chief end which most reformers have in view. But it is at least a question which deserves serious consideration, whether the great advantage of having a body of representatives be, that such a body furnishes a convenient method of bringing into contact the Government and the people: whether it be not rather that of standing between the two, to prevent their coming into immediate collision: whether, though no doubt it ought, in the long-run, fairly and fully to express the public opinion, it ought not to accumulate some momentum in itself, and though it follow, at last, the public voice, yet follow slowly and cautiously? I pretend not here to say whether Parliament is or is not, as it is now constituted, exactly that index of opinion which is most wanted, or that it follows the variations of opinion either with too slow or with too rapid a pace; but only that a material question to solve is, whether, if made much more accessible than it now is, to all the fluctuations of public opinion, at all times, true freedom would not be essentially impaired by the very method taken to strengthen it? If a more popular constitution of Parliament would give to its acts more turbulence and uncertainty, such a

The first, whether this effect would really follow from rendering the Senate more popular than it now

ciples of liberty, be inexpedient in a very high degree. For no true liberty can be consistent with violence, or with that apprehension of it,

which necessarily accompanies a shifting and tumultuous national council. In the same manner, though such a constitution, once established, were to prove good, yet, if existing opinions or institutions should oppose, in any case, a strong obstacle to its establishment, the attempt to establish it may be unadvisable; and this even though those existing opinions be allowed to be merely prejudices, those institutions to be imperfect or corrupt. We have still to set against the good we project, or rather against our chance of obtaining it, the evils we may incur in making the trial.

I may add, that, conceding the existence of those dangers by which many persons apprehend our liberties to be menaced, nothing can be more certain, than that convulsion and tumult would infallibly make the matter much worse. This is confessed, indeed, by all those reformers who profess to trust the fortune of their cause to the eventual prevalence of reason and truth. But if this be so, nothing can be more unwise, than to attempt to parade the physical force of the country in a sort of defiance of the established authority. It is supposed, indeed, that no concessions to liberty will ever be made voluntarily by men in power; that such concessions can only be extorted by apprehension or terror: as we know that the independence of the Irish Parliament was yielded only to the armed force of Ireland, which sprung up during the American war. If, then, as, in some cases, terror certainly has had the effect of gaining objects which have been thought wanting for liberty; so, in the present case, it is sufficiently likely to have that effect, without our incurring too much risk by the way; we may concede, perhaps, even to the most turbulent demagogues, that they are the true and efficient patrons of liberty.

But it is necessary, before we concede so much, that we should examine carefully the following questions.

The first question is, whether the end which we propose is worth purchasing at the expence of a revolu

tion? If not, it is of course necessary to beware that we do not pay for it more than it is worth. We have to consider, also, how much, and how peculiarly, our own country would suffer from such a convulsion. There exists not any other country in the world in which so much property, which would be destroyed by a revolution, or which would at least migrate to other shores, is occupied in providing employment for industry, in the shape of commercial and manufacturing, and even of agricultural capital. The whole of the immense National Debt, burdensome and injurious as it is, is also, in some sense, capital of this kind, since its extinction would annihilate one great market in which industry is at present employed.

The second question is, whether a revolution would gain those ends of liberty which we have in view? And here, as I suppose, it is necessary to grant, that there may be cases in which Governments are so bad, so regardless, and so independent of pubfic

opinion, that a revolution becomes unavoidable. Yet it may be asserted confidently, that the tendency of revolutions, unless intercepted by some rare happiness of circumstances, is always to terminate in a military despotism,-a despotism which cannot give place to liberty, till after a long and painful agony of alternate "tossing and exhaustion, as on a bed of death." Is the state of England so much diseased as to justify so dangerous an experiment? an experiment which, as our own history may teach us, certainly does not always succeed. I do not allude to the expulsion of James II. The revolution which England would now imitate, if we should once more venture on so perilous a risk, is that revolution which was effected by Cromwell, and which we know ended in a complete tyranny of the army, and in a restoration which would have made the throne of the monarch one of the most arbitrary thrones in Europe, if Charles II. had been as artful as he was unprincipled. Nor does it yet appear, that, to make revolutions useful, in states where opinion has any influence on the Government, is a