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phers, and means that knowledge which the mind intuitively has of its own operations; for the term Reflection, under any other application of it, would imply an operation of the judgment, and that, again, would involve the notion of Propositions, every act of the judgment being equivalent to an affirmative or negative proposition; which meaning would, in the instance before us, be absurd and ridiculous. Assuming, then, this definition of the term as correct, it follows that the intuitive and certain knowledge which the mind has of its own operations, cannot be accurately described as an original source of ideas, excepting in so far as it brings the mind acquainted with those ideas which existed previously in itself, and which can no more be separated from the essential constitution of the thinking principle within us, than matter can be conceived without the primary quality of extention. The remaining link, in the chain of classification, and which was obviously omitted by Locke, it was reserved for the German philosopher, Kant, to supply; and he has demonstrated that there are ideas in the mind independently of either sensation or reflection; and which, arising from the constitution of the mind itself, and bearing no relation to antecedent sensation, or subsequent consciousness, except as mere occasions of developement, but being, in fact, identified with the essence of the understanding itself, he has appropriately denominated IDEAS OF PURE REASON. It will not be pretended, for example, that the complex ideas involved in the following elementary propositions are the result of either sensation or reflection in the sense ascribed to that word by all those philosophers who have employed it upon the same analogy with Mr Locke:-" It is impossible to be in a state of existence and non-existence at the same moment of time :"-" Whatever is,

is :"- "A body cannot pass from a state of rest to motion, or from motion to rest, except in time," &c. &c. But it may be said, and truly, that, in the first and third of these propositions, the idea of time is involved, and is necessary to the developement of the elementary principle, while it is apparent that we come by the idea of time, by the aid of memory, which enables us to attend to intervals, and to mark successions. That there is more involved in the idea of time than mere sequence of increments, we firmly believe; but, passing from this, it will hardly be denied, that the truth of these propositions does not depend on reflection. They are true, though man had never been created a percipient of truth, and anterior to all consciousness. We are conscious of them solely because they are true, as we are of their opposites, solely because they are false. The consciousness, or the knowledge which the mind has of its own operations, is one thing, and the eternal truth of the proposition another. We are only conscious of the existence of the idea, but the truth, or falsehood, depends on its being an Idea of Pure Reason (as it has been called), which cannot but be perceived and acknowledged by every rational creature the moment it is enunciated in the form of a proposition. Hence Mr Locke's theory errs in defect, and makes no account of a large class of our ideas which spring up in the mind the moment an occasion is furnished, because, to use a homely but expressive phrase, they are part and parcel of the mind itself *.

The reader must not suppose, from what has been said, that we are partizans of Innate Ideas. The dispute on this point, into which Mr Locke entered with so much zeal, is now agreed, on all hands, to be purely verbal. If any of our readers should happen to entertain doubts on this head, we cannot do better than quote the words of Mr Hume: "It is probable that no more was meant by who denied innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impressions; though it must be confessed, that the terms which they employed were not chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined, as to prevent

variety of senses this word has hitherto been employed, we quote the following passage from one of Pope's Letters: "An honest mind is not in the power of a dishonest; to break its peace there must be some guilt, or consciousness" This certainly is the literal meaning: mens all mistakes about their doctrine. For

conscia sibi recti, &c.

what is meant by innate? If innate be

Having said so much to shew in what respects we think Mr Locke's classification of the Sources of our Knowledge defective, we cannot help remarking, with astonishment, the misapprehensions long, and, we fear, in some degree still prevalent on the Continent on this most difficult, important, and interesting of all metaphysical questions; misapprehensions which have been countenanced by no less an authority than Leibnitz, who has uniformly represented Locke as a partizan of the maxim of the schools, Nihil in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, upon which Leibnitz himself, after Aristotle, makes the following commentary, admirably and strikingly illustrative of our observations immediately preceding:"Nempe" (inquit Leibnitzius,) "nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, nisi ipse intellectus.""The remark is excellent," says Mr Stewart," and does honour to the acuteness of the critic; but it is not easy to conceive on what grounds it should have been urged as an objection to a writer who has insisted so explicitly and so frequently on reflection as the source of a class of ideas essentially different from those which are derived from sensation. To myself it appears, that the words of Leibnitz only convey, in a more concise and epigrammatic form, the substance of Locke's doctrine. Is any thing implied in them which Locke has not more fully and clear

equivolent to natural, than all the percep. tions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate, or natural, in whatever sense we take the word, whether in opposition to what is uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If, by innate, be meant contemporary to our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word idea seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense,

by Locke and others: as standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations, and

passions, as well as thoughts. Now, in this sense, I should desire to know what can be meant by asserting, that self-love, or resentment of injuries, or the passion between the sexes, is not innate ?" (Essays and Treatises on several Subjects, by David Hume, Esq. Note A. to Vol. II. Edin. 1809.)

ly stated in the following sentence? External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations."-(Locke's Works, Vol. I. p. 79.) Had Mr Locke never propounded his ideas in any other more technical form than that of the passage just quoted, Kant's pretensions to originality would not have been so readily acknowledged among profound thinkers; but the truth seems to be, that Locke allowed his judgment to be warped by his love of simplification, and by the technicalities of a system which involved consequences he did not foresee, and was afterwards made the groundwork of a system of complete and universal scepticism. It is only by casting off the trammels of system, by abjuring all regard to mere hypothesis, and by a steady survey of the intellectual phenomena with the

single eye" of the Inductive Philosophy, that any valuable or important advances will ever be made in the Science of Metaphysics. At the time when Leibnitz wrote, the rust of the schools still adhered to the minds of philosophers, who had not yet been able wholly to emancipate themselves from the prejudices which had so long obstructed the progress of true science, and which kept men fighting and struggling about unintelligibilities, absurdities, or subjects placed infinitely beyond the reach of the human faculties. To this cause probably we are to ascribe the pertinacity with which Leibnitz represented Locke as a partizan of a maxim to which the whole of his book is in direct opposition, and which he has never countenanced, either by explicit statement, or fair virtual inference.

Of Mr Locke's Tracts on Education, and the Conduct of the Understanding, Mr Stewart says little, but that little is extremely pertinent and judicious. In our opinion, which, however, we express with great deference, the Tract on Education is the tritest and most common-place of all his works, to say nothing of the errors into which he has fallen from want of practical acquaintance with the subject; for it can hardly, we think, admit of question, that a mere

speculative philosopher, who has not studied human nature in its actual operations, is a very unfit person for doing more than merely laying down general principles on this subject. It is no proof of the unsoundness of our opinion, that Leibnitz thought this the best and ablest of all Mr Locke's works. It was a moral weakness of that truly great man, that he could never be made to perceive merit in any literary or scientific performance which had pretensions to rival any of the various pursuits in which he engaged; and he may, therefore, be supposed to have viewed the Tract on Education, a subject on which he had written nothing, with more indulgence and favour than the Essay on Human Understanding, in which subjects to which the Oracle of Germany had so ardently, and, in the opinion of many, so unsuccessfully devoted himself, are handled with unparalleled bold ness and originality, as well as acuteness and ingenuity. This is not the place to speak either of the Letters on Toleration, or of the Treatise on Government, two books to which the world has been indebted for much valuable and original information, and which alone would have served to perpetuate the author's fame as one of the deepest and soundest thinkers the world has ever seen, and as an honest incorruptible patriot, as well as an ardent searcher for, and lover of, truth.

The name of Leibnitz has been unavoidably of frequent occurrence in the preceding remarks: it now remains briefly to point the reader's attention to the contributions of this great and versatile genius to the science of Mental Philosophy.-The Metaphysical Theories, which ac knowledge Leibnitz as their author, are the doctrine of Pre-established Harmony, and the scheme of Optimism, as new-modelled by himAccording to the system of Pre-established Harmony," says Mr S.," the human mind and human body are two independent but constantly correspondent machines; adjusted to each other like two unconnected clocks, so constructed, that, at the same instant, the one should point the hour and the other strike it. Of this system the following summary

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VOL. IX.

and illustration are given by Leibnitz himself, in his Essay entitled Theodicaa:

"I cannot help coming into the notion, that God created the soul in such manner at first, that it should represent within itself all the simultaneous changes in the body; and that he has made the body also in such a manner, as that it must of Itself do what the soul wills: so that the laws which make the thoughts of the soul follow each other in regular succession, must produce images which shall be coincident with the Impressions made by external objects upon our organs of sense; while the law by which the motions of the body follow each other, are likewise so coincident with the thoughts of the soul, as to give to our volitions and actions the very appearance, as if the latter were really the natural and necessary consequences of the former.'-(Leib. Op. p. 163.) Upon another occasion he observes, that every thing goes on in the soul as if it had no body, and that every thing goes on in the body as if it had no soul.'-(Ibid II. p. 44)

"To convey his meaning more fully, Leibnitz borrows from Jaquelot (author of a book entitled Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison) a comparison which, whatever may be thought of its justness, must be allowed some merit in point of ingenuity. Suppose that an intelligent and powerful being, who knew, before-hand, every particular thing that I should order my footman to do to-morrow, should make a machine to resemble my footman exactly, and punctually to perform, all day, whatever I directed. On this supposition, would not my will, in issuing all the details of my orders, remain, in every respect, the same as before? And would not my machine-footman, in performing his different movements, have the appearance of acting only in obedience to my commands?' The inference to be drawn from this comparison (continues Mr S.) is, that the movements of my body have no direct dependance whatever on the volitions of my mind, any more than the actions of my machine-footman would have on the words issuing from my lips. The same inference is to be extended to

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the relations which the impressions made on my different senses bear to the co-existent perceptions arising in my mind. The impressions and perceptions have no mutual connection, resembling that of physical causes with their effects; but the one series of events is made to correspond invariably with the other, in consequence of an eternal Harmony between them, pre-established by their common Creator."

Mr Stewart remarks, with his usual depth and discrimination, that the Pre-established Harmony of Leibnitz originated in the same train, of thinking which had produced Malebranche's Doctrine of Occasional Causes. "The authors of both theories saw clearly the impossibility of tracing the manner in which mind acts on body, or body on mind; and hence were led rashly to conclude, that the connection, or union, which seems to exist between them is not real, but apparent. The inferences, however, which they drew from this common principle were directly opposite; Malebranche maintaining that the communication between mind and body was carried on by the immediate and incessant agency of the Deity; while Leibnitz conceived that the agency of God was employed only in the original contrivance and mutual adjustment of the two machines ;-all the subsequent phenomena of each being the necessary results of its own independent mechanism, and at the same time the progressive evolutions of a comprehensive design, harmonising the laws of the one with those of the other." There can be but little doubt, we should imagine, that these bold and original attempts of Malebranche and Leibnitz (and that of the French philosopher is the more tenable of the two) to explain what is, in its own nature, not only inexplicable, but probably incomprehensible, as the human faculties are now constituted, is a pure figment of imagination, as absurd and illusory as Mesmerism or the Tractors; leaving us, with reference to what it professes to illustrate, in the identical situation in which it found us. At the same time it must be confessed, that there is something wonderfully striking, if not sublime, in the idea of this hy

pothesis, which stands in such remarkable contrast to the Platonic theory of Reminiscence. But the fundamental objection to the scheme of Pre-established Harmony consists in this, that it assumes the mind to be a Spiritual Automaton, which may be conceived; and the body, a Corporeal Automaton, independent of the mind, but maintained in correspondence and accord, or, if we may say so, in tune, with it, which is not only not proved, but directly contrary to the fact: for, upon this hypothesis, the body, at death, would not lose its mechanical, or, to speak more correctly, its automatic powers, but would only suffer the disturb ance, or disruption of the harmony pre-established between it and the Spiritual Automaton. Besides, Leibnitz, as appears to us, has been remarkably unfortunate in the illustration which he borrowed from Jaquelot, and which Mr Stewart praises for its " ingenuity." The object of that comparison is to establish, that the "machine footman," while he "has the appearance of acting only in obedience to the commands" of the maker, is totally uninfluenced by his volitions, and is obedient only to the laws of matter which are permanent and necessary: and that, therefore, the movements of the body have no dependence on the volitions of the corresponding and harmonised mind. The whole, however, is a mere quibble. To assert, for example, that a clock or a watch does not act in obedience to the volitions of the maker is as false as it is absurd. True, the horologist does not, and cannot possibly will the laws of matter to sustain modifications suited to his convenience, but, taking the laws of matter as pre-ordained by the creator, he wills a particular end, the division of time, and, by his "ingenuity" and knowledge, he renders matter subservient to his purpose. Now, is not the effect here produced a direct result of volition? But it may be argued in favour of the Leibnitzian hypothesis, that all this is admitted as true of the MAKER of the Human Machine, which acts in obedience to his Volitions, but is not true

of the Corporeal Automaton when placed in harmony with a Soul, or Spiritual Automaton, just as a

clock or watch may be allowed to act in obedience to the volitions of the maker, but cannot be admitted to act in conformity to the volitions of him who knows nothing of its mechanism, and has only purchased it from the original contriver. The analogy here stated, though it may be admitted to be ingenious, does not hold, or bear upon the point at issue. There is, so far as we know, no harmony preestablished between a man and his watch; and it is certainly true, that his mere volition has no more influence on the movements of the machinery than on the winds or the tides, the rising or setting of the sun, or the motions of the heavenly bodies. But the possessor of a watch has a power over its movements, and although that power is not the direct effect of volition alone, without intermediate agency, still, as all power must ultimately depend on will, it may correctly be described an effect of simple volition. But, according to Leibnitz, the will has no control or influence over the movements of the body. Hence the analogy in question utterly fails; and so does that of the "machine footman" of Jaquelot, which is in precisely the same predicament with the watch. If any philosopher should ask us to say how Leibnitz assumed the existence of such a pre-established harmony *, not

We cannot resist the temptation of corroborating our opinions by the concurrent sentiments of a very profound and original thinker:-" According to the system of pre-established harmony, the soul derives all its knowledge from its own proper fund, without any contribution on the part of the body and the senses. Thus, when I read in the Gazette

that the Pope is dead, and I come to the knowledge of the Pope's death, the Gazette and my reading have nothing to do

with the communication of this know

ledge, as these circumstances respect only my body and my senses, which have no manner of connection with my soul. But, conformably to this system, my soul de rives at the same time, from its own proper fund, the ideas which it has of this same Pope. It concludes he must absolutely be dead, and this knowledge comes to it with the reading of the Gazette, so that I imagine the reading of the Gazette furnished me with this knowledge,

only without proof, (for, from the very nature of things, he could produce none, all his attempts being merely to illustrate what he had previously taken for granted), but, in direct repugnance to one of the most powerful of the fundamental principles of human belief-the conviction that the movements of the body take place in consequence of, and correspond with, the volitions of the mind-we honestly profess our entire ignorance of the matter in question, and of the principles of that philosophy (if philosophy it may be called) in which one meets with such gratuitous and unsubstantiated assumptions.

That such a system as this should have terminated in optimism will be matter of surprise to nobody who understands it. "As it represented all events, both in the physical and moral worlds, as the necessary effects of a mechanism originally contrived, and set a-going by the Deity, it reduced its author to the alternative of either calling in question the divine power, wisdom, and goodness, or of asserting that the universe which he had called into being was the best of all possible systems. This last opinion, accordingly, was eagerly embraced by Leibnitz, &c." That the subject of moral evil should have been felt by Leibnitz, as a peculiarly puzzling and ticklish problem to resolve upon his system, is no more than we might have expected, considering the difficulty that adheres to this matter upon any system which human ingenuity has hitherto been able to devise. But how, upon the scheme of pre-established harmony, he should have held it possible for men to incur guilt, or, what comes to the same thing, for human beings surely not so easy to account for to be responsible for their actions, is The truth is, Leibnitz cut the knot he could not untie. Bold as he was, human actions: philosopher as he he durst not deny the morality of was, he would not surrender his own ingenious hypothesis: there was consequently nothing for it but a

which I really derived from the proper fund of my soul." (Euler's Letters to a German Princess, p. 320. Lond. 1802. English Transl.)

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