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Will it be objected that this view practically renders Treaties so much waste paper, by reducing their validity to a mere question. whether the stipulations are in fact observed or not?

It will not be so, provided the international opinion which frowns on a State which unjustly provokes to war, or which goes to war for less than a just cause, can be maintained.

A Treaty is at least a formal acknowledgment that the state of things it provides for and contemplates may justly be maintained, and if need be enforced, on the one side, as long as on the other side no change of circumstances have caused it to afford a reasonable ground for complaint.

§ 4. The Doctrine of British Interests.

Let us now consider for a moment the relation which the different conceptions of England's true rôle, and of the criterion of international conduct, have to one another.

In the first place, to regard it as England's true rôle to act as one of the Great Powers of Europe implies the conception of a community, or system of States, and is tantamount to acknowledging the law of the system, that is to say the Conventional European International Law, as the proper criterion of conduct. This of course does not preclude attempts to amend the existing conventional law, if it is deemed defective, any more than an English citizen is precluded from agitating for acts of Parliament to amend the law of England. But just as to boast one's citizen · ship in a State implies that one is proud to have lot and part in its institutions, so to boast oneself a Great Power of Europe implies a similar acceptance of the European public law.

In proportion as England is thought of as English rather than European does the conception of the cogency of European public law fade away, and there is nothing in the nature of the case to determine whether it will be replaced by the notion of acting according to the rules of abstract morality between States, or by that of pursuing purely English Interests.

It is to be noticed that those who admit the cogency of the passive duties only, incline, as a rule, to the Little England conception. But there is no abstract reason why the English conception should carry with it an admission of the cogency of even passive duties. We might easily have the cry for a thoroughly immoral war (as, for instance, a war for tariffs) going

with that conception. But in such a case the Interests which would be fought for would be the supposed Interests of the English people. Again, in the desire for territorial aggrandisement, as affording scope for English commerce and industry, or the profitable investment of English capital, we see how the English conception may merge into the Imperialistic one.

Let us now turn to the Imperialistic conception of England, and ask, "What room is there for Morality, and what are the Interests here?" In a growing military State Interests and territorial aggressions are apt to be regarded as synonymous. For such a State International Morality, whose very basis is respect for the right of other States as States, has no place. For such a State the pursuit of Interest will not be limited by even the passive duties. Now we shall find that this conception, as to the criterion of international conduct, was implicated in the discussion on the Eastern Question. When policies were advocated on the ground of national duty, this assertion of the binding nature, as between nations, of considerations analogous to those which among individuals go by the name "Morality," was met by expressions of the most scornful contempt for persons who, aspiring to be politicians, were yet sentimental enough to admit the cogency of any motive but Interest in international dealings.

The maxim answering to this latter position found apt expression in the watch word "British Interests," which played a great part in the coming controversy. But it is to be noted that the Interests referred to under this phrase were always those of Britain conceived of as a great military, and chiefly as a great Asiatic, Power-and not as an Island or a group of English-speaking Colonies.1

It was contended that the maxim was not new. Lord Palmerston, at the commencement of the session of 1848, in defending his foreign policy, used the following expressions:

If I might be allowed to express in one sentence the principle which I think ought to guide an English Minister I would adopt the expression of Canning, and say that with every British Minister the Interests of England ought to be the shibboleth of his policy. Ashley's Life of Palmerston, vol. i. p. 63.

And accordingly, Canning and Palmerston were often vouched as sponsors of the maxim. But in the mouth of Palmerston, or of

1 "British Interests" of course would be very different from "English Interests" in this sense. Compare Goldwin Smith's "Policy of Aggrandisement," Fortnightly Review, Sept., 1877.

Canning, the doctrine was different indeed from that which we are considering. With Canning it was little more than a corollary from his principle of non-intervention. He meant by it that England should not allow herself to be made the cat's paw of the Holy Alliance; not that the aggrandisement of Great Britain should be sought at the expense of other Powers. On the contrary, he held that her dignity and character required her to protect weaker nations against oppression, not only if such assistance was consistent with her interests, but so far as it was not absolutely incompatible with her own security. It is singular that the dictum of Lord Palmerston, which has been quoted, was uttered in reply to an attack upon him for not being hostile enough to Russia. His thesis was that English policy ought not to be ruled by any such antipathy, but by the exigencies of our Interests understood in the broad way in which Canning understood them.

I hold, with respect to alliances, that England is a Power sufficiently strong to steer her own course, and not to tie herself as an unnecessary appendage to the policy of any other Government. I hold that the real policy of England is to be the champion of justice and right, pursuing that course with moderation and prudence, not becoming the Quixoto of the world, but giving the weight of her moral sanction and support wherever she thinks justice is, and whenever she thinks that wrong has been done. As long as she sympathises with right and justice, she will never find herself altogether alone. She is sure to find some other State of sufficient power, influence, and weight to support and aid her in the course she may think fit to pursue. Therefore I say that it is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally, or the perpetual enemy of England. We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow. Ashley's Palmerston, vol. i. p. 62.

To make Interest the sole criterion of the conduct of States is to push to an unwarrantable extreme that protest against internationalism, which within due limits is not only reasonable and wholesome, but absolutely essential to the existence of States at all. It is to make submission to the claims of the political tie paramount to every other consideration. This spirit often usurps the name patriotism, yet, inasmuch as this word has acquired a connotation which admits the idea of wishing one's country to sacrifice her Interests in a good cause, and as the doctrine we are 1 Stapleton's Canning, vol. i p. 134. 2 Ibid. vol. i. p. 6.

considering is strictly the antithesis of the various forms of internationalism, it might perhaps more appropriately be called extreme Nationalism.

The matter will perhaps be clearer if we consider for a moment what internationalism in its various forms essentially is. We have the black internationalism of a priesthood, which claims every man's devotion, body and soul. We have, again, the white internationalism of a royal caste, who would fain use the national force intrusted to them for national purposes to hinder any derogation from the privileges of any one of their number. Lastly, there is the red internationalism of those who seek to weld together in one compact organisation all who live by the labour of their hands. that they may, as they think, better their material condition.

Thus from time to time it happens that some principle o union arises, which cuts across the lines of division marked out by the boundaries of States, and engages men of different political allegiancies to combine for common action. If the members of the new organisation can pursue their course without failing in their duty to their political sovereign it is well; but if the duty a man owes to his cause clashes with the duty he owes to his State, which is he to follow? It will of course depend upon his estimate of the importance of his cause in comparison with the claims of his State upon him. But we notice that to feel an affinity powerful enough to decompose States, and to group their elements in new combinations is internationalism, while to affirm that in no case ought a man to prefer any claim to that of his State upon him is nationalism, which in another light is closely connected, if not identical, with the doctrine that Interest is the sole criterion of national conduct.

To be sure, in one aspect it is the standard of individual, and in the other of national conduct, which is in question, but there is a close connection between holding that every other consideration must give way to the claims of the State as far as a man's own conduct is concerned, and holding that one's State is entitled to consider the claims of its own interest as paramount to those of every other person or organisation in the universe. If one exalts. one's State so high as completely to sacrifice oneself, why not every one else?

On the other hand, men who are possessed by some form of

1 "The idea that the world would profit by the removal of the barrier between nations is internationalism."-Fyffe, Hist. Modern Europe, vol. i. p. 372.

internationalism, if they chance to get political power at home, will be apt to use it to promote their object without regard to the interest of their own State, as a State, in the matter. The phrase, "English Interests," in the mouth of Palmerston or of Canning was nothing but a protest against this kind of internationalism.

But the doctrine of British Interests as proclaimed in 1876 was something very different from the moderate and reasonable nationalism of Canning or of Palmerston. It amounted to nothing less than the assertion of England's freedom to act untramelled by any moral considerations whatever. Some persons appear to have arrived at this conclusion from the belief that the attempt to formulate general rules for national conduct was too intricate.1

Others took the ground that it does not concern us to observe such rules, although they seemed to admit that rules are possible. Others were led to the same result because they thought that international anarchy had set in, and that for any one country to abstain from any course which offered advantage from any moral considerations would be destruction. And, finally, there was a curious apologetic and self-righteous argument, which reconciled interest and morality on the ground that English aggrandisement was tantamount to the spreading of virtue and civilisation, and that thus the Interests of England and of Morality were identified.

2

Thus we note as one of the factors of Public Opinion the existence of a general theory, to the effect that our action as a nation should be guided by regard to our own Interests solely. This theory was to a certain extent reasoned out, but the ready acceptance of the maxim, and the way in which the cry of "British Interests" was caught up, indicates the existence in considerable volume of a separate bias of Public Opinion tending to reinforce the demand for the policy to which that maxim and cry would point.

1 See above § 2, p. 43.

2 This appears to be the view of the Pall Mall Gazette: "We cannot do as we would be done by, because if we did we should nowadays in most cases expose ourselves to irreparable injury or ruin. And the reason is that the moral rules which writers on public law eloquently exhort States to respect are now either openly defied or, if they are used, they are merely employed as bandages to blindfold a too confiding victim. There is not now anywhere in the world an assemblage of equal States conducting themselves on the principles which govern the intercourse of man and man. There is overwhelming evidence that the moral code, which Radical orators declare to have been shamefully violated, has collapsed in all the greatest States of the civilised world."—"International Morality, Old and New." P.M.G., Dec. 20th, 1879.

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