CHAPTER II. THE EVALUATION OF PUBLIC OPINION. IN considering its place in our Constitution we have been speaking of Public Opinion as if it were one and indivisible. But in fact when one course from among several possible courses has to be chosen in reference to a matter which concerns a number of people, it often happens that a controversy ensues. People may disagree about the facts; or, agreeing about the facts, they may differ in their calculations; or, agreeing in the calculation that a certain course will attain one object at the sacrifice of another, they may differ in their estimation of the relative worth of these objects; and this last element of difference may spring from any one of an infinite series of sources, ranging from mere differences of personal sentiment or interest up to the most general and fundamental differences of thought and principle.1 Consultation may do much to bring about an agreement as to what is practicable in many instances, but in others the conflict of opinions will remain irreconcilable, and then the course finally adopted will be adopted without the consent and against the will of some of the persons concerned. This is true of any body of people associated together, but if they 1 "My Conservative friends who do me the honour to read thus far, will say: 'Why, you think just as we do; why, then, do you join the “atrocity cry' and hamper the action of Government on platforms all over the country?' The answer is not difficult. I reply: Our premises are to a certain extent the same, because they rest upon immutable physical facts. Our conclusions, as to the right course for England to pursue, are totally different; because they are based upon totally different views of the motives that ought to guide public as well as private morality and policy." [He goes on to say that because he sees as plainly as his opponents that the command of the Dardanelles is at present essential to England, it does not follow he must do violence to his conscience by being blind to barbarities for which we (who placed Turkey in a position so to abuse her power) are morally responsible, unless we take effective measures that she shall have no such power in the future.] Keep the key of the Dardanelles in your hands as much as you like, but go to Constantinople, if you go at all, in a right cause, and not in a wrong one."-Sir H. Havelock, "Constantinople and our Road to India," Fort. Rev., Jan. 1877. form a State then the power of determining upon the course to be adopted and of constraining the acquiescence even of those who dislike or disapprove it must reside somewhere, and it is this power which writers on jurisprudence call sovereignty. It must be remembered that " Public Opinion the Will of the Nation," and phrases of that kind are really nothing but metaphors for thought and will are attributes of a single mind, and "the Public" or "the Nation" are aggregates of many minds. One of Mr. Galton's typical portraits,1 formed by super-imposing the portraits of a number of individuals, in which the individual peculiarities are eliminated and the features which are common to the type come out, is in some respects an analogue of "Public Opinion." But this method assumes a general conformity of type among the individuals who are grouped together, and if we attempt too wide a generalisation, or if we have to deal with diverse, still more with conflicting, types, the method breaks down. To get at any satisfactory result we must group burglars with burglars and philanthropists with philanthropists. Under circumstances such as those with which we have to deal, where the discrepancies are great and numerous, we cannot reduce Public Opinion to one type, but we can reduce it to a limited number of types. With regard to the expression "the National Will" the case is somewhat different. The National Will must always be one, however fierce may be the internal dissensions. The psychological analogy seems to hold good, for will is the expression of the final impulse after all the motives have had play. The National Will, then, is that which would be the will of the sovereign if sovereignty were vested in a single man. Apart from the occasional use of the phrase as applied to the people in distinction from, or in opposition to, their government, the phrase always has an implied reference to this hypothetical autocrat, with his mind made up and acting accordingly. And though he may vacillate, at any one moment he must will one thing. How he makes up his mind is the question to which an account of the constitution of any country is the answer, and how the imaginary being who stands for the will of England made up his mind in the particular case we are considering is the question which we must try to solve. We shall see him torn, as it were, by conflicting motives, and if we can gauge the strength of each legitimate motive, we may be able to judge by the course actually pursued whether there were any bye motives operating. 1 See Galton's Inquiry into Human Faculty. The opinion which is politically predominant, or in other words sovereign, is a matter which can be definitely ascertained by reference to the course which the State actually follows. But that is not what we mean when we speak of the "predominant" or "preponderating" opinion. By such phrases as these, we mean the same thing which men have in their minds when they talk of the true, or the real opinion of the country, and it is another question whether this is actually sovereign or not.1 If the constitution of a state insures that power shall be exercised according to the preponderating public opinion, we say shortly that in such a state Public Opinion is sovereign. We conceive of the persons who contribute to the predominating Public Opinion as forming a quasicorporate body, and we need not stop to consider the metaphysical problem, whether sovereignty is vested for the time being in these shifting and indeterminate individuals, or in the officials who are intrusted with the actual exercise of power. The question now arises, "What criterion have we which will enable us, amid conflicting counsels, to say where the weight of opinion lies?" Public Opinion being manifold, we want some calculus by which to distinguish that particular opinion which preponderates. So far as Public Opinion is organised on some such form as Parliament, the preponderating opinion can of course be easily ascertained. But all organisation or machinery is imperfect, and though Parliament professedly exists as the reflex of the country's opinion, and derives its authority from that fact, yet there are occasions when it is felt that the true opinion of the country is something distinct from that of Parliament. How then is this true opinion to be ascertained? But it may be questioned whether the problem suggested is one which, in the nature of things, admits of a complete and satisfactory solution even in theory, irrespective of imperfections in the machinery through which, as a matter of practical politics, the attempt must be made to give effect to the best approximation attainable. May not some of the factors of the weight of Public Opinion be ultimately incommensurate? For instance, a small number of great philosophers and statesmen, might be opposed to a large number of ignorant persons. In such a case could anything 1 Having regard to derivation perhaps strictly the word "predominant" ought to be confined to political predominance, leaving "preponderating" to indicate what is indeed often called "the weight of opinion," whether sovereign or not. But this is a distinction which hardly seems recognised in common parlance. |